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I think that all happiness depends upon the energy to assume the mask of some other 
self; that all joyous or creative life is a rebirth as something not oneself, something 
which has no memory and is created in a moment and perpetually renewed. 




In the late 1990s, when otherwise healthy women in Aotearoa/New Zealand 
started to die as a result of thrombosis allegedly attributed to third generation oral 
contraceptive pills, the workings of this particular version of contraceptive 
technology (and for many users 'the pill' and other contraceptive methods in general) 
became subject to scrutiny and re-investigation. This thesis examines the 'talk' of a 
small selection of contraceptive consumers and health providers in Christchurch, 
New Zealand who were aware of this contraceptive debate. Through conversations 
with this study's participants it is possible to trace the discursive practices, 
responses and strategies taken before and during this medical controversy. 
The voices of consumers dominate this thesis and it is my contention that 
their 'talk' can be interpreted as the deployment of what I call 'bricolage'. Bricolage 
as practice can be illustrated by paying attention to the self-stories that some 
contraceptive consumers utilise to constitute themselves and their actions. 
Contraceptive consumers, particularly during a medical controversy, are exposed to 
multiple sources of information. They engage in the production of the self with 
whatever resources they find 'at hand'. My focus is on the practice of bricolage as 
subjects constitute their selves in and through the varied, often incommensurable, 
discourses with which they come into contact. I argue that 'bricolage' is a strategy 
that is utilised when contraceptive consumers want to ensure that they are not 
constructed as passive, 'blind consumers', but as proactive users who make 
'informed choices' and take meaningful action. 
This thesis attempts neither to uncover what 'really' happened before and 
during this contraceptive controversy, nor does it reach conclusions about the 
medical and statistical 'safety' of oral contraceptives. On the contrary, this study is 
an exploration of discursive practices: the layering of accounts and the innumerable 
versions of the same controversial events. While I am interested in the meanings 
that differently positioned 'actors' ascribe to this controversy, I recognise that access 
to meanings - such as explanations of 'real' physiological side effects - are mediated 
though discourses. This is not to deny the 'vital signs' of corporeality, but to contest 
the supposed transparency of 'experience'. These, then, are the primary approaches 
that this thesis adopts in order to engage with the strategies utilised by this study's 
participants when they are coming to terms with the controversy surrounding third 
generation oral contraceptives. 
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The following list of abbreviations are used throughout this thesis: 
CCNM Canterbucy College of Natural Medicine 
coc combined oral contraceptive 
FPA Family Planning Association 
IUD Intrauterine device 
NFP Natural Family Planning 
oc oral contraceptive 
OCs oral contraceptives 
2GOC second generation oral contraceptive 
3GOC third generation oral contraceptive 
PE pulmonary embolism 
POP progestogen only pill 
THAW The Health Alternatives for Women 
VTE venous thromboembolism 
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INTRODUCING MEDICAL CONTROVERSIES 
The more people you talk to and the different information that you get, the more you 
find out by putting it all together. One thing is not enough. It just keeps going. It's 
like polishing a stone. The more you continue to polish it, the prettier it gets, the 
more it changes and the more enlightened you become from it. 
(Zena, interview 13/9/2000) 
The controversy surrounding third generation oral contraceptives (3GOCs) is 
constructed through many contradictory and opposing discourses. Zena (a woman 
in her late 20s, who switched from oral contraceptives to Natural Family Planning, 
primarily as a result of the recent controversy in Aotearoa/New Zealand 
surrounding 3GOCs) reflects on this debate in one of the interviews I conducted in 
Christchurch in 2000 as part of my research into responses to this controversy. Her 
comments suggest that during a controversy people are exposed to different sources 
of information. Her 'talk' highlights several issues of central concern to this thesis. 
What strategies do contraceptive consumers utilise when they are confronted with a 
medical controversy? How do they respond to medical debates about the risks and 
side effects of pharmaceuticals? 
In order to explore the answers to these questions I conducted interviews 
with a number of young women who had been or were users of third generation 
contraceptive pills and a range of different health providers. I spoke to eleven 
contraceptive consumers and seven health providers (three 'conventional' doctors 
who prescribe oral contraceptives, one community health activist, one Natural 
Family Planning (NFP) teacher, one 'alternative' practitioner, and one midwife). Since 
'informed consent/ choice' consistently appeared as a highly significant theme 
throughout all the interviews, I also decided to interview a solicitor well versed in 
medico-legal issues.1 This thesis attends to contraceptive consumers' and health 
providers' 'talk' about the third generation oral contraceptive controversy and their 
responses to it. Using a variety of conceptual tools, I offer an analysis of the 
discursive practices of the consumers and health providers who participated in this 
study. 
The purpose of this introductory chapter is twofold. First, it will introduce 
the medical controversy at the centre of this thesis: the debate surrounding the 
safety of third generation oral contraceptives. Secondly, it will tease out the pivotal 
agendas of this thesis through analysing some of Zena's 'talk' during an interview 
about her responses to a public controversy about the side effects and risks of third 
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generation oral contraceptives. Although I recognise that not all the contraceptive 
consumers who participated in this study respond as Zena (intetview 13/9/2000) 
does, many other women I interviewed about the 3GOCs deploy a strategy of putting 
together disparate pieces of information. I refer to this strategy as 'bricolage'.2 This 
process primarily involves contraceptive users constructing themselves as proactive 
consumers who collect and recombine disparate information that is readily available 
in order to make expeditious decisions about future contraceptive use. 
There are many stories that could be told about the 3GOC controversy. What 
particular story gets voiced is dependent on the person's positioning. Controversies 
about the pill, and contraception in general, have a lengthy trajectory in 
Aotearoa/New Zealand.3 For example, as Bunkie (1992) points out in her article on 
Copper 7, there has been adverse information and debate about OCs and Copper 7 
for years. In the 1960s when there was publicity about the risks of the original OC, 
the sales of OCs dropped dramatically (Bunkle, 1992, p.100). Stories about the 
current 3GOC controversy are set within historical stories of similar medical 
controversies. In the media, contraceptive controversies are typically framed in 
terms of drama, loss and the statistical probabilities of risk. 4 These media stories are 
embedded in other stories which are told within alternative frames. 
My own personal involvement in the 3GOC controversy, as a consumer of 
this formulation of the pill, provided the impetus for this study. I had used a 
selection of second and third generation OCs sporadically for six years. Mercilon, 
which is a third generation formulation, was the main OC that I used. For a 
reasonable length of time I had been experiencing dizziness and fainting. Upon 
consultation with a Christchurch health organisation, I was advised that Mercilon 
was "very safe", especially in comparison to 2G0Cs, and that the cause of my 
symptoms was irregular sleep patterns 'and stress. 
As these health problems were escalating, I saw a section on 20/20 (Sunday 
28 February 1999) that interviewed the people who were close to women who had 
died as a result of blood clots attributed to 3G0Cs. This programme made me aware 
that this debate was not confined to Aotearoa/New Zealand, but that it was an 
international controversy, involving the United Kingdom and Germany in particular. 
The 20/20 programme also compelled me to investigate the possible links between 
my own health problems and use of 3GOCs. Only days later, I visited many different 
health providers, including a naturopath, general practitioner and a doctor at the 
Family Planning Association. The typical response of these health professionals was 
to issue me with a handout provided by Medsafe for consumer use which outlined 
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the relative risks of OCs and blood clots. 5 I was also advised that I did not have a 
high risk of blood clotting attributed to 3GOCs because of the absence of this in my 
family's medical history. However, I was dissatisfied with this advice, because, for 
me, although the controversy was about the risk of blood clots, my concerns were 
interconnected with my own contraceptive history and, in particular, whether there 
was a relationship between my pill usage and fainting and dizziness. In order to 
explore these issues further, I consulted more health providers, started to do my 
own research on the internet, in libraries and by talking to family and friends who 
used the pill. 
The media brought the 3GOC controversy to my attention. Although the 
3GOC controversy could arguably be said to have started in 1995, with the 
publication of five international epidemiological studies (WHO, 1995a; WHO, 1995b; 
Jick et al, 1995; Bloemenkamp et al, 1995; Spitzer et al, 1995), there was an 
explosion of media coverage of this debate in 1999. It is hardly surprising, then, that 
my personal chronology highlights 1999 as the start date of the controversy.6 The 
1999 newspaper articles typically construct the debate in terms of the drama and 
loss associated with the deaths attributed to 3GOCs (McNeil, The Press, 5 March 
1999; NZPA, The Press, 25 January 1999; Miriyana, Sunday Star Times, 7 March 
1999). The media also contrast doctors' advice to consumers that they avoid 'panic' 
responses (Hoby, The Press, 26 January 1999; NZPA, The Press, 8 March, 1999), 
with emotive articles centred on OC users' responses to the debate (Miriyana, 
Sunday Star Ti.mes, 11 July 1999; Miriyana, Sunday Star Times, 2 May 1999). 
The focus in the majority of the media articles was on the particular medical 
risk (thrombosis attributed to 3G0Cs) that was the starting point of the controversy 
and the basis of many consumers' concerns about 3GOCs and OCs in general. The 
issue at the centre of the 3GOC controversy concerned the relationship between the 
use of oral contraceptives and venous thromboembolic disease. 
Venous thrombosis is the collective term used to describe the related 
diseases, deep vein thrombosis and pulmonary embolism (Sartwell & Stolley, 1982). 
A clot develops in an additive process and may result in the occlusion of the affected 
blood vessel. Venous thrombosis may occur in the superficial or deep veins and 
tends to affect the lower limbs, especially the calf. Symptoms, if any, may include 
pain, muscle tenderness and swelling of the affected leg (Sartwell & Stolley, 1982). 
Pulmonary embolism is a potentially fatal event which may arise from deep vein 
thrombosis. Embolisation occurs when a thrombus (or part of one) is dislodged from 
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the point of attachment and travels through the venous system to the pulmonary 
arterial circulation (Greaves & Tabener, 1996; Ledingham & Weatherall, 1996). 
Numerous epidemiological studies (Stadel, 1981) had shown that the use of 
any combined oral contraceptive was associated with a four to eleven-fold increase 
in the risk of venous thromboembolism (VTE) over non-use. The thrombogenicity 
was originally thought to be associated with oestrogen content (Edwards and Cohen, 
2000). Subsequent reports, such as the 1995 epidemiological studies, have 
indicated that oral contraceptives containing the newer progestogens, desogestrel 
and gestodene (3GOCs contain these), are associated with a higher risk ofVTE than 
older formulations. The findings of the 1995 studies led to considerable controversy. 
In the medical community, the debate focussed on whether the results of the 
research represented a causal relationship, or whether the results could be 
explained by bias or confounding (Egermayer & Roke, 2000; Edwards & Cohen, 
2000). 
Pharmac (The Pharmaceutical Management Agency, a Crown entity, directly 
accountable to the Minister of Health and which manages pharmaceutical subsidies 
in Aotearoa/New Zealand) was also concerned with assessing the epidemiological 
'evidence'. For example, in an article released by Pharmac in the New Zealand GP 
magazine (26/4/1999), the headline 'Emotion vs Fact: the Drug Marketing Game', 
suggests that their focus in the controversy was on evaluating the physiological 
'evidence' and 'facts' in order to assess whether 3G0Cs have a higher risk of VTE 
than older formulations of the pill. This article questions what type of information 
about the risks of OCs can be considered "reliable and accurate" given that a lot of 
pharmaceutical marketing stems from drug companies which could contain "bias". 
In For Health or Profit: Medicine, the Pharmaceutical Industry, and the state in New 
Zealand, Peter Davis (1992) also questions whether the pharmaceutical industry is a 
disinterested partner for the clinician and he argues that this industry is not devoid 
of social and moral colouring. He creates a tension between health and profit in 
terms of the type of information, especially in advertising, that is generated by 
pharmaceutical companies. 
In addition to the different, often conflicting, information circulating, the 
3GOC controversy was also particularly pivotal in Aotearoa/New Zealand because 
this country appears to have one of the highest levels of prescribing of the 
implicated OCs in the world (Carnall et al, 1995). In early 1995 before the 
controversy, 3G0Cs represented between 75-80% of the total OC market in 
Aotearoa/New Zealand (Aggett, 1997); whereas, 3G0Cs represented about 53% in 
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the United Kingdom, 33% in Norway, 400/o in the Netherlands, 15% in United States 
and Canada and only 5% in Australia (Farmer 1997). The particularly low use in 
Australia might be primarily due to the cost because 3GOCs are not subsidised in 
Australia 
In contrast to Australia, all oral contraceptives in Aotearoa/New Zealand are 
at least partially subsidised by the government (Pharmac, 1996; Pharmac, 1998). 
The cost of these pharmaceuticals depends on the brand of the pill and the 
consumer's circumstances. For those women who are not prescribed a fully 
subsidised pill, or who have not been granted Special Authority,7 a three month 
prescription costs the consumer approximately $9.50 - $11.50 (Pharmac, 1998). The 
introduction of fully subsidising OCs was part of a government initiative aimed at 
improving access to contraception. For example, in August 1998, Pharmac provided 
full subsidy to two more OCs: Monofeme and Trifeme (article, 15/7/1998, 
www.pharmac.govt.nz). 
In 1995, 3G0Cs were available to consumers at the same price as the older 
formulations (Egermayer & Roke, 2000, p.52). Subsequent to the 3GOC controversy, 
2GOCs attracted a higher subsidy from Pharmac than 3G0Cs (Edwards and Cohen, 
2000). In addition, following the controversy, the market share of 3GOCs in 
Aotearoa/New Zealand dropped from 76.8% :in 1995 to 31.5% in 1999 (Egermayer & 
Roke, 2000). In countries, such as Aotearoa/New Zealand, where the utilisation of 
the pill was high, there was a "widespread" shift to 2GOCs (Egermayer & Roke, 
2000, p.53). In all countries except Aotearoa/New Zealand and Norway, 3GOCs are 
again prescribed as the first option, or the "first line" (Egermayer & Roke, 2000, 
p.53). In their recent article, Egermayer and Roke (January 2000, p.53) indicate that 
"anecdotal evidence" is suggestive that due to the experience of minor side effects on 
2GOCs, some women are resuming use of 3G0Cs, despite the current extra cost. Of 
the eleven women I spoke to for this study, six stopped using OCs in favour of other 
contraceptive methods and five continued usage of OCs. Half (three) of those who 
were former OC users, had ceased usage as a result of the 3GOC controversy. The 
other three had various other reasons, sometimes in addition to the controversy, 
which contributed to their decisions to change their method of contraception.8 
For many of the consumers I spoke to, making decisions about whether to 
continue OC usage did not only revolve around the questions of primary concern to 
Pharmac and many medical professionals about the relationship between 3GOCs 
and thrombosis. On the contrary, the consumers who participated in this study 
made decisions about future contraceptive · use based upon, among other things, 
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continue OC usage did not on]y revolve around the questions of primary concern to 
Pharmac and many medical professionals about the relationship between 3GOCs 
and thrombosis. On the contrary, the consumers who participated in this study 
made decisions about future contraceptive use based upon, among other things, 
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their contraceptive histories and personal biographies and their 'experiences' of side 
effects other than thrombosis, such as headaches, acne, mood changes and weight 
gain. Due to the nature of the controversy, the consumers I interviewed were 
exposed to multiple sources of information. Rather than paying attention only to the 
epidemiological evidence, many of the consumers I spoke to also utilised other 
knowledges such as media publications, internet articles, conversations with family, 
friends and 'alternative' health providers. 
This thesis focuses on exploring the responses to the 3GOC controversy that 
can be garnered from the interviews I conducted with consumers or former 
consumers of oral contraceptives. I argue that the process suggested by Zena 
(interview 13/9/2000) can be interpreted as 'bricolage'. Bricolage as practice can be 
illustrated by paying attention to the self-stories that some contraceptive consumers 
utilise to constitute themselves and their consequent actions. They engage in the 
production of self with whatever resources they find 'at hand'. My focus is on 
subjects' practices of bricolage as they constitute their selves in and through various 
discourses with which they come into contact. 
Zena (interview 13/9/2000) discusses the possibility of reworking the 
different pieces of information that she has collected. For example, she says that it is 
possible to understand an issue more fully by speaking to different people, gathering 
various pieces of information and "putting it all together". More importantly, she 
explains that: "One thing is not enough". Another way to express this is to say that 
the traditional quest for one epistemological truth is inadequate when attempting to 
come to terms with an issue. Zena suggests that medical information by itself is "not 
enough" when OC users try to make sense of an issue such as the recent 3GOC 
controversy. Zena is clearly promoting a multiplicity of information, that I call 
'bricolage' (which includes a collection of knowledges9) as opposed to knowledge. The 
practice of bricolage as it is utilised by many of the consumers interviewed for this 
study is explored in Chapters Three and Four. Bricolage allows not only new 
possibilities, but also expanded understandings. Although many of the OC users -
whose voices dominate this thesis - invoke statistical knowledge during their sense-
making strategies, they also pay attention to other information, such as their 
personal contraceptive histories and embodied 'experiences', in ways that many 
health providers do not. 
This seeming delineation between health providers' attention to knowledge as 
opposed to contraceptive consumers' utilisation of knowledges is potentially 
misleading. I do not want to argue that OC users comprise a homogeneous group 
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which is entirely distinguishable from the 'other' group: the health providers. Neither 
am I suggesting that these two groups exclusively operate with contrasting 
epistemologies. On the contrary, my point is that during a controversy, although 
differently positioned people reinstate their identities and vigorously draw 
boundaries between competing lrnowledge claims, a closer analysis of their 'talk' 
highlights the fluidity, instability and changeable nature of selves and lrnowledges. 
Given this state of flux, the consumers and health providers I interviewed often 
occupy multiple selves simultaneously. 
One of the purposes of this thesis is to unpack the, often contradictory, 
discursive tactics utilised by a self-selected group of consumers and health 
providers who were aware of the 3GOC controversy. Prior to a controversy, it might 
appear that people's 'identities' and epistemological foundations are singular and 
stable. It is during a debate that the epistemological assumptions underlying 
differently positioned people's statements and responses become visible. I trace this 
process of constituting subjectivities which is highlighted through an examination of 
the discursive practices of the contraceptive consumers and health providers 
interviewed for this study. How are matters of 'fact' debated? Can a matter of fact 
become definitively established? What happens to 'facts', selves and bodies during a 
controversy? How do people involved in a medical controversy respond? What 
strategies, if any, do they deploy? These are a few of the primary tasks of this 
thesis. 
My interest in the ramifications that flow from the ways that people position 
themselves and gather and utilise information within the 3GOC controversy was 
conducive to a semi-structured interviewing methodology. 10 I considered that a 
qualitative technique, which facilitates in-depth 'talk', was suitable for my primary 
purposes: to explore the meanings and discursive constructions surrounding the 
3GOC debate and their resultant actions. Although I did conduct interviews armed 
with a potential list of questions and themes, 11 participants often initiated the 
direction of the dialogue. They regularly discussed meanings about issues that 
disrupted my preconceptions and raised ideas that I previously thought "didn't fit" 
(Becker, 1998). For example, my preliminary readings argued that consumers 
privilege experiential information (Williams & Popay, 1994; Stacey, 1994; Tuckett et 
al, 1985; Arksey, 1994). However, while transcribing, I realised that the narratives 
"didn't fit" this type of analysis. I decided to pay attention to this anomaly. The 
result was my argument that consumers do value experiential knowledges, but they 
also draw on a variety of sources and recombine them in order to understand an 
event. These were/are the sorts of meanings that I was/am interested in and which 
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are explored in Chapter Two of this thesis. This chapter explores the methodological 
assumptions that informed this research. It is followed by a chapter that provides a 
detailed discussion of the key theoretical tools that are used in my analysis of the 
interviews I conducted with a small number of consumers and health providers. 
In Chapters Four and Five I illustrate the practice of bricolage through an 
analysis of the risks associated with OCs. In Chapter Four I also explore what 
information is valued by differently positioned people during a controversy. However, 
the focus in this chapter is on bricolage in action. I enquire into how information 
circulates, how it is accessed and what consumers do with it. I point out that many 
of the contraceptive users I spoke to consider medical/ quantitative information 
alone to be inadequate. A bricolage strategy is undertaken whereby consumers 
patch together this knowledge and other knowledges such as magazine and 
newspaper articles, television programmes, conversations with friends and family, 
bodily signs and internet information. Despite an effort to circulate and re-establish 
certain knowledge about OCs through devices such as government constructed user 
leaflets, the contraceptive consumers I interviewed do not passively rely solely on 
this information. Rather, they access, interpret and mould various types of 
information. The knowledge contained within these leaflets is often embedded within 
their understanding of eve:cyday, lived bodily 'experiences'. Indeed, it is clear that 
this active recrafting of such objects enables the consumers in this study to feel 
empowered and proactive and, thus, to contest their depiction in the media as 
'victims' of biotechnology. 
In Chapter Five, the analysis in Chapter Four is developed through a 
troubling of the notion of 'informed consent'. In particular, I argue that the 
consumers I spoke to constitute themselves as 'informed' once they have collected a 
melange of knowledges, rather than just 'official' information. I explore the 
relationship between the legal and medical notion of 'informed consent' and the 
construction of a proactive health consumer who is resistant to passivity and 
docility. 
The mutations which I am contending occur during the 3GOC controversy, 
are indicative of the contested character of meanings. I trace the disputes over 
meaning that are played out in transcripts of the interviews I conducted and a 
modest selection of media documents. Certain meanings are strategically deployed 
in order to designate boundaries. As I have already noted, often a particular type of 
knowledge/meaning is marked via a material entity such as a government pamphlet. 
To illustrate, doctors typically appeal to statistical 'evidence' when trying to 
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minimise the risks allegedly associated with OCs. By contrast, the meaning of risk 
for OC users and so-called 'alternative health practitioners' is often endowed with 
variable meanings. 
This existence of multiple meanings with respect to OCs does not imply that 
each definition is accorded an equal standing with others. Certain meanings are 
frequently legitimised at the expense of other knowledges. Once a particular 
meaning is valued to the detriment of others, certain consequences follow. For 
example, when the State decided that 3GOCs were safer than older formulations of 
OCs, they subsidised these pills (Doctor X, interview 14/9/2000; Ketring, 1996). In 
addition, many general practitioners preferentially prescribed 3GOCs because they 
also considered that the safety of 3GOCs was an incontrovertible 'fact'. Clearly, then, 
the prevailing meanings ascribed to 3GOCs - and the privileging of a certain 
definition of the risks associated with 3GOCs - have practical consequences that are 
not isolated to mere textual, discursive battles. 
Claims relating to a multiplicity of meanings and knowledges are political 
and have theoretical implications.12 Opponents of postmodernism/ 
poststructuralism13 (MacKinnon, 2000; Waters, 1996; Klein, 1996; Thompson, 1996; 
Spretnak, 1996) wony that embracing these theoretical impulses will result in a 
denial of the material and an undermining of identity politics and relativism. Due to 
this hostility to poststructuralism and postmodernism, I have chosen to use insights 
drawn from poststructuralist theories with some trepidation. Indeed, I have even 
endured anxieties about applying these 'theories' to such a thorny issue as the 
3GOC debate where women have died and experienced 'real' side effects. 14 In 
Chapter Three, I outline both the concerns that I had regarding the use of some 
poststructuralist and postmodernist ideas and also the inimical reaction that an 
uptake of these orientations sometimes receives. 
I decided that an analysis of the 3GOC controversy in terms of these sets of 
ideas is not problematic. My specific worry was that attention to the discursive 
would negate users' bodily 'experiences'. I am, however, convinced that to examine 
meanings is not to deny the material, in this case, users' 'vital signs' of physicality. 
For instance, when an OC user has a headache as a result of the pill, these 
physiological signs are not ignored. My focus, however, is on the meanings given to 
this corporeal experience. And what a headache means, or how it is understood, is 
mediated through the discursive. 
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My choice of methodology was significant not only because of my focus on 
the discursive, but also due to the dearth of qualitative material on this topic. I was 
unable to locate the work of any social scientists on the 3GOC controversy that 
began in 1995, but received most media exposure in 1998 and 1999. In addition, 
the majority of literature that canvasses contraception or OCs, in general, is 
quantitative and located within a medical paradigm (Egermayer & Roke, 2000; 
Edwards & Cohen, 2000; WHO, 1995a; WHO, 1995b; Jick et al, 1995; 
Bloemenkamp et al, 1995; Spitzer et al, 1996; Farmer et al, 1997). The same applies 
to the literature that pertains to these areas in the social sciences. Here, too, 
investigations have been mainly quantitative analySes (Coulter, 1985; Marks, 1999; 
Pool et al, 1999). This thesis utilises a different orientation which conceptualises 
embodiment and pain as multifaceted rather than the sole creation of anatomy and 
physiology (Williams & Bendelow, 1998). It is my hope, therefore, that this thesis 
provides a starting point for further qualitative investigations into some of the issues 
surrounding the recent 3GOC controversy. 
A qualitative approach seemed essential to glean an insight into a selection 
of consumer 'stories' about the impact of the 3GOC controversy. It is these 
knowledges that are often excluded from 'official' accounts, such as the pamphlets 
and information sheets on OCs. Consequently, consumer 'stories' dominate this 
thesis. As Zena's (interview 13/9/2000) quote at the beginning of this chapter 
indicates, it is this 'storytelling' which is crucial during such a controversy. She 
explains that "you can't talk about things too much" (Zena, intetview 13/9/2000). 
She goes on to say that this process is healing because it facilitates you "dealing 
with it" and "moving on" (Zena, intetview 13/9/2000). It is not unusual for 
consumer 'stories' to blend past occurrences and future anticipations into their 
reconstructions of the meanings surrounding the 3GOC controversy. They respond 
to this contemporary debate in terms of their own life histories of using the pill and 
other contraceptive methods. The knowledge that they draw on may contain medical 
elements from doctors, medical pamphlets or the media, but the sense-making 
associated with it is always embedded within their particular biographies. As a 
result, their stories often resist a linear path, preferring instead to blend present, 
future and past. In Zena's (interview 13/9/2000) words, talking about a controversy 
produces "something new" each time. She concedes that . the historical "old issues 
and parts are still there but there are new ones too" (Zena, intetview 13/9/2000). 
Her mixing of time frames allows her to recraft the 'current' debate in terms that 
make sense to her. 
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This troubling of linear conceptions of past - present - future has 
implications for the 3GOC debate. Many health professionals give this ongoing 
de bate a narrow definition. For them, it is solely about 3GOCs and the 'relative risk' 
of thrombosis. Granted, some prescribers do set this latest 'pill scare' in the context 
of earlier 'scares', but they do so in different terms. Their framing, however, fails to 
address a plethora of wide ranging issues that are not simply confined to 3GOCs 
and thrombosis. For instance, in contrast to health professionals' tendency to focus 
exclusively on quantitative medical information, many of the consumers I 
interviewed located this controversy in their personal histories of contraceptive use 
and their future plans. For instance, Ginny's (interview 31/8/2000) comments 
suggested that contraceptive consumers are often not "surprised" when researchers 
find "things wrong with the pill" because they have been "waiting to hear 
something", given that medical studies sometimes simply "verify" (Coney, 1987, p.7) 
their own bodily responses. Furthermore, for consumers, the 3GOC debate is also 
simply yet another example of a medical controversy,15 not necessarily related to 
contraception. Users' 'storytelling' about this particular debate are invariably 
embedded within discussions about other, similar medical 'scandals', both public. 
and private. Given this mingling of present, future and past, it is important to 
traverse the previous 'pill scares' and other medical controversies that have occurred 
in Aotearoa/New Zealand in order to 'situate' the 3GOC controversy. 
As Zena (interview 13/9/2000) relates in this chapter's opening quotation, 
"old issues" resurface in a new debate. Reworked versions of familiar concerns 
certainly re-emerge during the 3GOC controversy. For instance, the 1999 3GOC 
controversy was simply the latest in a string of 'pill scares' which involved many 
health professionals trying to minimise the risks associated with 3GOCs by setting 
identified side effects against general, everyday risks. To illustrate, during an early 
'pill scare', a 1971 headline quoted Dr Richard Seddon as saying that there was 
"more risk in [a] car than on [the] pill" (cited in Smyth, 2000, p.146). Similarly, one 
of the health professionals interviewed, Luxi (interview 13/10/2000), makes 
analogous comments when she argues that the risks of 3GOCs are "less than if you 
were driving along the road for two hours without being killed". Luxi reifies a static 
meaning of the pill in which its risks are dismissed as insignificant. 
Conversely, those who are critical of OCs emphasise the side effects 
associated with the pill. Yet, just as advocates of OCs have reworked old arguments, 
so, too, have the pill's opponents. This is captured through a comparison of an 
excerpt from Broadsheet, a feminist magazine, and comments made by Peter Kearns 
(Co-Director and naturopath CCNM, interview 26/8/2000). Broadsheet featured 
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several articles expressing the dangers of the pill's early years on the market. In 
response to statements which diminished the pill's side effects, Sandra Coney wrote 
in 1978 (p.7) that: 
If [women) have resisted [use of OCs) and tried other less harmful means of 
contraception or used none, they are labelled as irresponsible, careless and 
unintelligent and their fears dismissed with such irrelevant statements as "You're 
more likely to get run over in the street" or "It's better than being pregnant". These 
studies show that such statements are lies designed to quell the very realistic fears of 
women about what they are expected to do to their bodies in the name of 
"responsibility'. 
In this extract from Broad.shP..-et, Coney discussed contemporaneous British 
studies that cast doubt on the safety of early OC formulations. Coney polemically 
called into question arguments which diminished the side effects of the pill by 
reducing them to "lies". She invoked the study's findings in order to substantiate 
that OCs were dangerous, something that users had already known "instinctively" 
(Coney, 1978, p.7) for years. In keeping with this line, Coney deemed the correlation 
between the risk of getting "run over in the street" with OC usage as "irrelevant". 
Despite Coney's challenge to the construction of women as "unintelligent" in favour 
of advocating women's agency, this stance is somewhat irreconcilable with the 
cartoon that appeared on the same page ( see figure 1.1). This image depicted the 
hypothetical headstone of "Sarah Sacrifice". It symbolised the medical and 
technological oppression of women in general and, thus, not just the subjugation of 
women via OCs. In the cartoon's terms, Sarah had sacrificed not "hberated" herself 
through talcing the pill. She paid a "price" for the freedom that the pill supposedly 
granted her. In fact, the cartoon questioned this assumed freedom further with the 
headstone's inscription which read that Sarah was "conned, ripped off, cheated on, 
lied to, used, abused, diseased, deluded, dehumanised, deranged, dead". The "lied 
to" here certainly echoed and reinforced Coney's earlier sentiment that dismissive 
statements about OCs' side effects were "lies". Broadsheet was certainly contesting 
claims that medicine and technology free women by contending that this dubious 
liberation was actually a "sacrifice" which came with costs of long-term 
medicalisation, potential health-threatening side effects, and a "responsibility" that 
absolved men from any accountability. 
Figure 1.1: Broadsheet, 1978, no.57, p.7. 
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This debate about whether birth control liberates or oppresses users is an 
"old issue" (Zena, interview 13/9/2000) which continues. The argument that life is 
full of risks that exceed the risks associated with using the contraceptive pill has 
been around for some time. It surfaces with each new wave of controversy. On the 
one hand, feminist publications such as Broadsheet have contended that medicine 
and technology treat consumers as "guinea pigs" (Smyth, 2000, p.94), failing to 
provide women with promised liberation. On the other hand, there are feminists who 
suggest that birth control has the potential to liberate women from their biological 
constraints (Firestone, 1979). My aim at this juncture, though, is to point out that 
when such issues appear in recent controversies, they are not new. Consequently, 
when Peter Kearns (Co-Director and naturopath CCNM, interview 26/8/2000) refers 
to the 3GOC debate and states that women have had a "huge price to pay" through 
their use of birth control, it is easy to see that this argument is a reworked version 
of the issues that were raised in Broadsheet in 1978. Specifically, "Sarah Sacrifice" 
paid a price for using early formulations of OCs, just as current users of 3GOCs 
have a "huge price to pay". Likewise, Coney's troubling of the argument that risking 
OC side effects is "better than being pregnant" also foreshadows Kearns' assertion 
that 3GOC debates about the same issue are "foul" because they imply that 
"pregnancy is more dangerous than the pill" (Peter Kearns, Canterbury College of 
Natural Medicine, interview 26/8/2000). Undoubtedly, all the aforementioned 
examples indicate that the recent 3GOC controversy does not exist in a vacuum, but 
is 'situated' within a histo:ry of similar debates about oral contraceptives in which 
comparable matters were raised. 
Indeed, in addition to the 3GOC controversy, other 'pill scares', both national 
and international, have surfaced at regular intervals since the pill's introduction in 
the early 1960s.16 To name a few, fears about thrombosis were first raised in the late 
1960s and ear]y 1970s and concerns about the pill's links to breast cancer were 
debated in the early 1980s. Reports in medical journals have documented the 
repercussions of previous 'scares'. In 1983, for instance, another 'scare' was 
supposedly instigated when two studies concerning a possible relationship between 
early OC use and the development of cervical and breast cancers were published 
(Grimes, 1990). Earlier in 1969 the Committee on Safety of Drugs in Britain released 
a statement which highlighted the thromboembolic risk of COCs and recommended 
the use of lower estrogen17 doses. By the end of 1970, almost all OCs contained 
lower doses of estrogen. In Aotearoa/New Zealand in 1977, the Royal College of 
General Practitioners' study recommended that women over thirty five years of age 
and who smoked should discontinue OC use. This apparently led to an increase in 
the number of conceptions and terminations of pregnancies (Ketting, 1996). 
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Fears about 'pill scares' frightening women into having abortions are 
similarly raised in the recent 3GOC debate. Underlying such concerns is an 
assumption that abortion is a grossly inappropriate method of fertility control. 
However, one Asian participant in this study reported her mother's advice that it is 
preferable to "just have an abortion if you get pregnant" (Heidi, interview 
26/8/2000) rather than risk having "a kid before you're married". Contraception is 
not always an option in this community because, according to Heidi, "you're not 
even supposed to be having sex" (inteiview 26/8/2000). Although Heidi is an 
"atypical" (Heidi, inteiview 26/8/2000) Asia,_,. and, undoubtedly cannot be 
considered representative of Asians in general, when I asked her if these 
circumstances might be similar in other families, she explained that this scenario 
would hold true for "quite a few". Many Japanese women also consider abortion to 
be a legitimate contraceptive method (Oaks, 1994; Yokoyama, 1993, 1995; Peter 
Kearns, CCNM, interview 26/8/2000). Some researchers have highlighted both the 
legitimacy and high incidence of abortion in Japan (Oaks, 1994) and the 
relationship between the frequency of abortion and prostitution in Japan 
(Yokoyama, 1993, 1995). This highlights the cultural specificity of the assumption 
that abortion is an inappropriate form of fertility control. Given these accounts, it is 
arguable that under the guise of 'objectivity', many doctors' quantitative 
explanations and assumptions actually "promiscuously cohabit" (Haraway, 1997, 
p.68) the same space as culture and subjectivity. In other words, objectivity and 
subjectivity are not posited in a binary opposition. On the contrary, these concepts 
overlap, interact and intermingle. They "cohabit" or occupy similar spaces, rather 
than being isolated to specific realms and/ or people. 
It would be reductive, however, to suggest that these debates are only 
contested with the consumers on one side, who are constructed as the 'anti-pill' 
campaigners, and the 'pro-pill' campaigners, the health professionals and drug 
companies on the other. These groupings - and their presumed attendant views - do 
not enjoy such stability. On the contrary, some health professionals have made 
unequivocal stands against the pill. In her book, The Bitter Pill: How Safe is the 
Perfect Contraceptive? (1985), Dr Ellen Grant calls into question the claim that the 
pill is a 'wonder drug'. As an illustration, the cover of her book depicts an image of a 
free-floating packet of OCs in flames (see figure 1.2). A possible reading of this 
depiction suggests that these drugs should be destroyed, burnt, or, in Paul Holm.es' 
words, "vehemently thrown out" (Holmes, 2/6/2000). Just as fire is dangerous and 
life threatening, so, too, do OCs pose serious and potentially life-taking risks. One 
such side effect that Dr Grant isolates as "notorious" (p.28) is thrombosis. She 
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explains that this particular condition was identified early as a highly dangerous 
risk linked to the pill (Grant, 1985, p.28). 
Figure 1.2: Cover of Dr Grant's (1985) The Bitter Pill: How Safe is the Perfect 
Contraceptive? 
Just as doctors may oppose the use of OCs, so some consumers may adopt 
arguments typically advanced by health professionals. For instance, one consumer I 
interviewed, Jacqueline (interview 25/8/2000), defends the familiar stance that 
medical technologies, like OCs, indicate that 'we' have "progressed". She continues 
by claiming that "medicine has given us a lot of valuable knowledge" that should not 
be rejected under any circumstances unless 'we' want to revert to "primitive times". 
It hardly needs mentioning that this position is reminiscent of conventional Western 
medicine arguments. Moreover, the dichotomies that she constructs between 
West/East, them/ 'we', civilised/ 'primitive', are highly problematic. The dualisms 
that Jacqueline (interview 25/8/2000) presents here privilege the first term in the 
hierarchy at the expense of the second. It is through the use of such binary 
oppositions that the first term maintains itself as the yardstick for the 'other'. 
Deconstruction defies this type of either/or reasoning (logocentrism). It challenges 
such schemas by showing that such dualistic thinking is 'leaky' (Shildrick, 1997). 
The start date of the current 3GOC controversy is also 'leaky'. Many OC 
users inteiviewed (when asked about these dates) responded, again, in terms of their 
personal histories. Indeed, prior to commencing this thesis, I, too, conceptualised 
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the 3GOC 'scare' in the context of my own personal trajectory. Consequently, for me, 
the debate began in 1999 after I watched a programme on 20/20 that explored the 
topic. 18 By contrast, 'official' versions maintain that the catalyst for this particular 
'pill scare' was the publication of five epidemiological studies starting in 1995 (WHO, 
1995a; WHO, 1995b; Jick et al, 1995; Bloemenkamp et al, 1995; Spitzer et al, 1996; 
Farmer et al, 1997). This thesis does not attempt to resolve or arbitrate in the 3GOC 
controversy or to assess this medical 'evidence'. 19 Therefore, in this section I canvass 
(describe rather than analyse in medical terms) the relevant chronology concerning 
this debate. This description does not highlight the 'leaky' nature of these dates. 
Instead, it provides a brief summary of the 'official'version of the '1995 pill scare'. 
The five studies associated with the occurrence of this 'scare' purport to 
provide epidemiological evidence that the COCs containing the newer third 
generation progestogens, desogestrel and gestodene, are associated with an 
approximately two-fold greater risk of venous thromboembolism (VTE) than older 
formulations.20 In October 1995, the United Kingdom Committee on Safety of 
Medicines made recommendations concerning the prescription of 3GOCs 
(Egermayer & Roke, 2000, p.49). The New Zealand Ministry of Health subsequently 
issued advice (including that 3GOCs only be prescribed as the first line/option) and 
created pamphlets for general practitioners to distribute to consumers. I have found 
different accounts regarding the rate of mortality which links the eause of VTE 
deaths to 3GOCs. This is perhaps, in part, because there is ongoing debate about 
causation. Published medical material states that in Aotearoa/New Zealand there 
have been nine deaths reported in women using 3GOCs since 1993 (Egermayer & 
Roke, 2000, p.49) and that there have been twenty VfE deaths, :fifteen of which can 
be linked to use of 3GOCs (Egermayer & Roke, 2000, p.49). Following these deaths 
and the 'pill scare', the market share of third generation OCs in Aotearoa/New 
Zealand dropped dramatically from 76.8% in 1995 to 31.5% in 1999 (Egermayer & 
Roke, 2000, p.52). Prior to the 'scare', 3GOC products were "perceived to be safer 
and were therefore preferentially prescribed" (Egermayer & Roke, 2000, p.51). 
The key results, which have subsequently been vigorously debated and 
criticised for confounding factors and bias, are considered to be the :findings that 
there are relatively higher risks of VTE in users of OCs containing third generation 
progestogens, compared with non-users and those taking older formulations. 
Indeed, another point of contention is that even some of the researchers affiliated 
with the 1995 studies have seemingly revoked their conclusions. For instance, 
Spitzer (1997, p.2347) stated that "the relative risks of 3G0Cs for VTE, even if real, 
are clinically unimportant and of no public health significance". I would argue that it 
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does not necessarily follow that because the clinical risk is "unimportant" that the 
issue is also of "no public health significance". On the contrary, given the high 
prevalence of OC use in Aotearoa/New Zealand, and other countries, these findings 
have serious implications for users, their families, their partners, health care 
services, health practitioners and drug companies. 
Many health providers prefer to describe the 3GOC controversy as a 'pill 
scare' because, like Spitzer, they do not see the clinical risk as statistically 
significant. The meaning of 'scare' here - while conveying some sense of fright -
primarily implies that the worries many users (and some doctors) articulate are 
properly resolved only through medical peer review and via appeal to disembodied 
'facts'. Notwithstanding this construction, it is my argument that the consumers I 
interviewed respond to this medical controversy by utilising not only 'facts' but also 
other strands of knowledges. Consequently, I prefer to refer to the 3GOC debate as a 
controversy. This term is capable of conveying a sense of these issues in a way that 
'scare' is not. 'Controversy' is indicative of a dispute or disagreement in which there 
are strong alternative positions. Despite attempts by some medical professionals to 
diminish this 'scare' as what one doctor interviewed referred to as a "storm. in a tea 
cup" (Luxi, interview 13/10/2000), the attention to meaning undertaken in this 
thesis reveals that there is, indeed, a controversy. For example, even the meaning of 
the word 'safe' in the context of OCs is contestable and 'slippery'. I think it is more 
appropriate, therefore, to conceptualise the 3GOC debate as a controversy rather 
than a 'scare'. 
The mass media have played a big part in the 3GOC debate. While 
participants criticise the media's tendency for "sensationalism", they also 
acknowledge the ability of this medium to make a medical issue accessible. 
Divisions, conflicts and contestable meanings, once hidden, are more likely to 
surface in times of controversy, especially if the media function as a provider of 
information.21 In her article on the controversy surrounding cholesterol in the mass 
media, Lupton ( 1994) isolates the media as a site for the discursive struggle over 
meanings, where a number of competing discourses are negotiated. Other social 
science literature on medical controversies similarly describe the central role played 
by the media in shaping discourses about issues such as risk (Powers, 1999; 
Darling-Wolf, 1997; Safer & Krager, 1992; Whiteman et al, 2000). In their account of 
the Halcion controversy, Gabe and Bury (1996) highlight the "contestability" (p.465) 
of knowledge. They emphasise the fracturing of a unitary stance on the controversy 
in favour of a "multidimensional character of events" (ibid). Many of the consumers I 
interviewed in this study respond to fractured knowledges on 3GOCs by adopting 
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the strategy ofbricolage. My argument differs from Abraham's (1994) sole focus on 
the "interest-based bias" of medical knowledge in a controversy. A concern of 
Haraway's (1991, 1997) is also the 'interest-based' bias of scientific knowledge. The 
focus in this thesis remains the strategies and discursive practices utilised by a self-
selected group of consumers and health providers who chose to discuss their 
responses to the 3GOC controversy. 
In order to make sense of a controversy, people actively reconstitute their 
subjectivities and recraft the disparate collection of information that comprise the 
discursive 'toolboxes' (Levi-Strauss, 1968, p.17) available to them. These knowledges 
are drawn from a multiplicity of sources and they are coded with diverse levels of 
prestige by different people. Armed with this information, consumers of medical 
technologies are able to begin the ongoing task of what Zena refers to as 
'(re)polisbing' (interview 13/9/2000). The claim that knowledges and selves need 
continual attention is seen as opening not closing possibilities. Even medical 
professionals themselves, some of whom are in favour of settling 'facts', recognise 
uncertainty in this field. A very recent media article by Clausen (The Press, 13 
November 2000, p.2), which discusses the most recent studies on 3GOCs and VTE, 
is a clear example of the difficulty of definitively settling knowledge. David Skegg 
highlights this problem when he says that it would be a "great pity' (The Press, 13 
November 2000, p.2) if people thought that these studies were the "last word on the 
matter" (The Press, 13 November, p.2). This suggests that some medical 
professionals do not consider the reported studies to be conclusive evidence of the 
safety of 3GOCs. 
Chapter Two continues my exploration of the 3GOC controversy through 
reflections on my methodology. In this chapter I discuss the ontological and 
epistemological positions that inform this thesis and how interview texts such as 
Zena's were generated. I argue that the stories which people tell about the 3GOC 
controversy (including my own) are drawn from established tropes and that they are 
not voiced in a vacuum, but set within a context. Just as some of the health 
professionals involved in the 3GOC controversy argue that the 'last word' on the 
debate has not been uttered, some of the consumers interviewed also suggest that 
this medical controversy is not what Zena (interview 13/9/2000) refers to as an 
'isolated issue'. This medical debate has a context which is often embedded within 
personal biographies, contraceptive histories and future contraception concerns 
which require continual '(re)polishing'. 
19 
While the convention in theses is to begin with an outline of the theoretical 
agendas of the thesis, in this case, the methodology chapter appears first. This is 
because I want to resist the separation between theoty and methodology. The 
meaning of theocy is shaped by its interaction with 'grounded', or 'concrete' (Levi-
Strauss, 1968) knowledge and the production of this type of knowledge is informed 
by theoty. Throughout this thesis, I attempt to introduce theoty via the 'talk' of 
those who participated in this research. Chapters Three and Four develop the 
connection between abstract theory and 'concrete' experiences through an 
illustration of bricolage at work. Chapter Five develops bricolage in action by 
analysing the wa;ys that some consumers constitute themselves as 'informed' once 
they have gathered and evaluated a collection of knowledges. In each of the 
chapters, the voices of consumers occupy prominent positions. In this respect I 
attempt to highlight the stories that as Patricia Grace ( 1988, p.28) puts it, are rarely 
"worded". 
NOTES 
1 See appendix 4 for the interview schedules. Also see appendix 6 for information about how 
this study's participants were accessed and some biographical details. 
2 The etymology of 'bricolage' and the noun 'bricoleur' is French. Bricoleur literally means a 
'.jack-of-all-trades' or 'handyman' [sic]. Bricolage means to potter about, or do odd jobs. These 
terms entered social theory via Levi-Strauss' (1968) comparison of 'savages', who utilise 
bricolage, with engineers. See Chapters Three and Four in which I discuss bricolage as a 
concept in action as it appears in some of the interview transcripts. 
3 See media appendices 8, 9, 10. 
4 See media appendices 8, 9, 10. 
5 See appendix 7 for these government handouts. 
6 See appendix 8 for 1999 media coverage of 3GOC controversy. 
1 Special Authority enables some consumers subsidised access to certain pharmaceuticals. It 
is available for all hormonal contraceptives, removing the manufacturer's surcharge, allowing 
the consumer to pay only the $3 dispensing fee. An application for Special Authority is 
usually made by a doctor on behalf of a consumer who cannot afford the cost of the 
pharmaceutical (Pharmac, 1996). 
8 See the research design appendix. 
9 Throughout this thesis I will use both knowledge, singular, and knowledges, plural. The 
former term will be used when I am discussing the Western tendency to uphold one true 
logocentric stance which is incapable of including alternative knowledges. By contrast, the 
latter term will be used to contest this Enlightenment impulse by revealing the inadequacies 
of one knowledge when some consumers are trying to make sense of a controversy. 
Contesting Enlightenment conceptions of knowledge, singular, is no easy feat. Indeed, this is 
demonstrated by the simple example provided by my computer. It insists on underlining 
knowledges in red every time I type it in order to highlight this word as an error. It seems that 
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even my computer dislikes the pluralism of knowledges embraced by bricolage and wants to 
reinstate knowledge! 
10 Please see Chapter Two for an explanation of my preference to speak of 'methodology' rather 
than 'method'. This chapter also gives specific details about the research process and 
methodology. It is reflexive in nature. · 
11 See appendix 4 for the interview schedules. 
12 My theoretical approach to this thesis is discussed further in Chapter Three. Essentially, 
my focus is on the central metaphor of bricolage at work, with a focus on discursive practices 
and strategies invoked when faced with a medical controversy. 
14 See my methodology chapter where I am reflective about these theoretical anxieties and 
where I also comment on some email correspondence that discusses such concerns. 
15 For many of the QC users interviewed (and some 'alternative health providers), the current 
3GOC controversy is embedded within a historical, present and (expected) future of analogous 
medical scandals. For instance, the public debates about the risks associated with the Copper 
7, IUDs, depo-provera and abortion pill RU-486 were commonplace comparisons. For 
examples of these debates see: NZPA, 26 June 2000, 'Abortion Pill to be Tested', The Press, 
p.5.; Bunkle, P. 10 December 1990, 'the Claims Against the Copper 7', Listener, pp. 10-15.; 
Betts, M. 12 July 1999, 'Shot in the Dark', NZWW, pp.20-21.; Fleming, D. 22 September 
1997, 'My IUD Nightmare', NZWW, pp.20-21. All these contentious debates deserve full 
treatments which are beyond the scope of this thesis. 
During discussions about these medical controversies, participants often angrily 
questioned why there is no 'male contraceptive pill' so that men, too, can assume 
responsibilities. See for example the article entitled 'Next Stop ... A Pill for Men?' (New Zealand 
Women's Weekly, 16 May 1988, p.52-53). 
Finally, the Cartwright Report, and the "bloody old men" (Ellen, interview 7/9/2000) 
associated with "screwing up women's health care" is also mentioned on several occasions. 
Please see Chapter Five for a more complete discussion of the relationship between the 
Cartwright Report and the ongoing debate surrounding 3GOCs. 
16 Oral contraceptives were introduced to the Aotearoa/New Zealand market in 1961. Pill use 
increased dramatically throughout the 1960s and this country eventually became one of the 
highest users of OCs in the world (Doctor X, interview 14/9/2000). 
17 Estrogen and progestogen are the so-called 'artificial' steroid hormones that appear in OCs. 
Whereas oestrogen and progesterone are the hormones that occur 'naturally'within bodies. 
18 See my methodology chapter which provides a full description of my own personal 'stoiy' of 
the 3GOC controversy. 
19 For interested readers, the articles published by Edwards, R. G. & Cohen, J. (eds) in the 
November/December 1999 issue of Human Reproductive Update, vol. 5., no. 6. provide 
excellent, detailed discussions of the medical position and evidence, clinical implications and 
new epidemiological studies in the area. 
20 The classification of OCs is as follows: each OC may be classified into one of three 
generations, depending on the type of progestogen contained. Each classification essentially 
correlates with the approximate time of market introduction (Doctor X). First generation 
products (although, according to Doctor X, this 'generation' of OC is not generally labelled as 
such) are usually taken to include those with high estrogen doses coupled with the older 
progestogen norethisterone. Second generation products contain low dose estrogen coupled 
with progestogen other than the third generation variety, usually levonorgestrel. Finally, third 
generation pills include the progestogens desogestrel and gestodene and norgestimate, in 
combination with a similar does of estrogen that is found in second generation formulations. 
21 My substantive chapters are interlaced with several more detailed examples from the mass 
media that pertain to the 3GOC controversy. See also appendices 8, 9, 10 for chronologies of 
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the media's treatment of the 3GOC debate, earlier contraceptive debates and other medical, 
especially contraceptive, controversies. 
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CHAPTER 2 
STORYTELLING AND METHODOLOGIES 
There's a way the older people have of telling a stoxy, a way where the beginning is 
not the beginning and the end is not the end. It starts from a centre and moves away 
from there in such widening circles that you don't know how you will finally arrive at 
the point of understanding, which itself becomes another core, a new centre. You can 
only trust these tellers as they start you on a blindfold journey with a handful of 
words which they have seemingly clutched from nowhere ... Or sometimes there is a 
stoiy that has no words at all, a stoxy that has been lived by a whole generation but 
that has never been worded. 
(Grace, P. 1998, Baby No-Eyes, p. 28) 
Yes, I think that there is always a context. It's never an isolated issue ... So you had a 
vested interest really. I think that's always the best place to start really. For starters, 
you've got a passion for it. People txy to be 'objective' (she laughs). But you can't. It's 
better to just say where you're coming from. There's no point hiding or pretending. So 
I appreciate that. I mean you '11 be objective with your findings by letting people say 
what they will and respecting that 
(Zena, interview 13/9/2000) 
Patricia Grace and Zena (interview 13/9/2000) have a firm grasp of the way 
that an issue is not "isolated" but embedded and situated within a context of 
"widening circles" which span the present, past and future. The recent 3GOC 
controversy is an occurrence that generates storytelling of this nature. Unlike Zena 
(interview 13/9/2000) and Grace, I arrived at this realisation late in the research 
process. As I conducted interviews, it initially unsettled me that many of the 
participants were not concentrating on discussing the 3GOC controversy itself. This 
was one of those occasions when my :findmgs refused to "fit" (Becker, 1998, p.85) my 
initial research problem and questions. Instead of "ignoring" this "inconvenience" 
(ibid) I chose to grapple with the cases that did not "fit". I eventually came to 
conclusions similar to those articulated by Grace and Zena (interview 13/9/2000). 
While the 3GOC controversy is at the heart of this project, participants' responses to 
the debate are set within the "context" of their personal biographies. To put it 
another way, they create "new centre[s]" and "core[s]" through their storytelling 
about, not only the controversy itself, but also their contraceptive histories and 'life 
stories'.1 
My exposure to and acknowledgement of the anxieties that occur during the 
research process is the primacy focus of this chapter. Although the thrust of this 
thesis is to examine the discursive practices and narratives generated by the 
research participants, I would argue that it is also important for the researcher to 
"situate" (Haraway, 1991, p.135) her/himself. This is not to say that I want my own 
storytelling about my personal involvement in the 3GOC controversy to take centre 
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stage. Rather, the purpose of this chapter is to highlight that which underlies my 
research practices. Instead of "hiding" (as Zena, interview 13/9/2000, implied) my 
own epistemological and ontological orientations, I want to make my assumptions 
about knowledge production, for example, visible and subject to scrutiny. 
This chapter, then, is not a discussion of my 'methods' of research but a 
'methodology' chapter. Various theorists have clarified this distinction (Harding, 
1987; Tolich & Davidson, 1999; Bloom, 1998). Essentially the difference lies in 
whether or not the researcher discloses and 'reflexive]y' (Tolich & Davidson, 1999, 
pp.35-39) critiques the assumptions underlying her /his research process. Whereas 
attention to 'method' involves a description of research techniques, procedures and 
practices; attention to 'methodology' involves making explicit the epistemological and 
ontological assumptions that a researcher brings to her /his project. 'Methodology' 
differs from 'method' because it is about addressing the philosophical assumptions 
that underpin research processes. As Zena (interview 13/9/2000) aptly argues, 
there is "no point hiding or pretending" that your 'method' is objective, devoid of any 
theoretical and personal underpinnings. Methodologies make what could be hidden, 
explicit and subject to scrutiny. The present chapter is concerned with investigating 
the researcher's own research process and practices. 
My ontologies (theories about the world, such as questions about what 
'exists) and epistemologies (ways of knowing or asserting what is 'real' in the world) 
are strongly influenced by feminist postmodernist and poststructuralist theorists 
(Haraway, 1991, 1997; Gavey, 1989). People who subscribe to postmodernism 
destabilise Enlightenment and humanist assumptions. They are not troubled to find 
that 'reality' cannot be transparently captured and consider meanings, even matters 
of 'fact', are inherently slippery and unstable (Jones, 1997; Davies, 1997; Haraway, 
1991, 1997). Zena (interview 13/9/2000) would say that meanings are potentially 
open to '(re)polishing' and reinterpretation. 
This approach did concern me intermittently during the research process. I 
imagined that the participants would feel betrayed because they had trusted me 
with their thoughts about a sensitive and personal topic and I would not necessarily 
convey what they "real]y meant'. Indeed, during an informal discussion with one 
participant, Jacqueline, we exchanged thoughts about the interview material. After I 
descn"bed the way that I had analysed an excerpt from the transcript, she declared, 
with horror, that she could not "see" how I had "got that from what [she] said". 
Conflict over the meanings of any text is inevitable, according to poststructuralist 
theorists (Jones, 1997; Davies, 1997). With the 'death ofthe author' (Barthes, 1977), 
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there is an expectation that multiple readings are possible, despite authorial 
intentions. Therefore, while I speak throughout the thesis with an analytical voice, I 
do not assume authority over the transcripts. I accept that my readings are not the 
only possible ways to interpret the material. As Luxi - a doctor interviewed for this 
study (13/10/2000) - points out (through an analogy with viewer responses to 
television), "even if you and I see and hear the same thing, we won't necessarily 
interpret [the programme] in the same way because there are a hundred different 
ways that it could be interpreted". This is the type of philosophical orientation that 
is potentially disturbing to other research participants, but it is one with which I am 
sympathetic. 
To be specific, from the outset of this project I have favoured an 
epistemological approach that does not presume that 'stories' about 'experience' 
unproblematically reflect a pre-existent 'reality'. Although my initial aim was to 
document participants' 'experiences' of the 3GOC controversy, I recognised that this 
aspiration could not be realised. This is because people's stories about what 
happened to them, why they took certain action or not, will not be accounts of what 
'really' happened, but stories about what 'actually' 2 (Denning, 1994) occurred. Their 
storytelling constitutes layers of (re)workings, (re)memberings and, of course, 
'(re)polisbing' (Zena, interview 13/9/2000). Haraway (1991, pp. 109-113) eloquently 
articulates this stance: 
Women do not find 'experience' ready to hand any more than they/we find 'nature' or 
the 'body' preformed, always innocent and waiting outside the violations of language 
and culture ... 'Women's experience' does not pre-exist as a kind of prior resource, 
ready simply to be appropriated into one or another description... 'Experience', like 
'consciousness', is an intentional construction, an artefact of the first importance. 
'Experience' may also be re-constructed, re-membered, re-articulated. 
A foundational approach, which treats 'experience' as incontrovertible 
evidence of claims, is rejected by Haraway. Meanings given to 'experiences' are 
inside not "outside the violations of language and culture". This means that any 
meaning that a person brings to an 'experience' depends on the discursive resources 
that are available and, thus, it is open to "re-construction". Ginny (interview 
31/8/2000) illustrates this point in her interview when she concedes that what the 
controversy meant to her differed at various stages in her personal biography. For 
instance, in response to my question about what questions she asked her health 
provider about the risks associated with 3GOCs, she states that she "doesn't 
understand the risks in the same way now, looking back on it". And then towards 
the end of the interview, Ginny (interview 31/8/2000) "re-articulates" what she 
"probably thought about the risks at the time". Here, Ginny is engaging in precisely 
the sort of "construction" of 'experience' that Haraway refers to. There is no easy 
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access to a 'real' experience. Rather, the person's 'identity' is reconstituted, just as 
the 'experience' is (re)con:figured with each new narrative. 
Just as Ginny (interview 31/8/2000) actively creates her selves and 
'experience' through storytelling, I, too, (re)crafted my own 'experiences' of the 3GOC 
controversy with each new narrative. Throughout the practical phases of the 
research project I kept ajournal. I also wrote a 'memo' (Tolich & Davidson, 1999, 
p.12) canvassing my personal story about my contraceptive history and, specifically, 
versions of my 'experience' during the 3GOC controversy. In both these documents I 
construct 'selves' through storytelling. Another way to express this is to say that my 
stories are exercises in what Somers (1994, p.613-614) calls 'ontological narrativity'. 
This notion suggests that selves are constructed through the telling of particular 
stories rather than 'expressed' or 'represented' in stories. There is a shift here from 
'representational' (Somers, 1994, p.612) narratives to ontological storytelling that 
brings selves into existence. The difference is that the former entails the belief that it 
is possible to accurately represent an event or yourself through narratives; whereas, 
the latter stance holds that events and selves are fanned through storytelling using 
established story genres. Subject to what narrative is privileged and deployed at a 
particular time, actors become certain people through the telling of the strategically 
chosen discourse. 
Researchers are not immune to this 'ontological narrativity'. Through the 
journal, "free writing" (Tolich & Davidson, 1999, p.12) and interviews, I constituted 
my 'experience' and selves through the stories I told. For instance, in the journal I 
engaged in attempts to craft myself as a 'professional' sociological researcher. Given 
that my original training was in the humanities, the production of this particular 
self-story was particularly important. In addition, I also constructed my selves 
through storytelling about my 'experiences' of the 3GOC controversy. The versions I 
told about my 'experience' of the 3GOC debate depended strongly on the subjectivity 
privileged at the time. 
I adopted different registers according to the person I was speaking to, often 
emphasising particular aspects of stories. For instance, the 'identity' I constructed 
for myself as a contraceptive consumer during my journal writing was one who was 
proactive and had a lot of energy for accessing information. And yet when I spoke to 
participants who expressed a desire to 'trust' health professionals rather than doing 
their own research, I sympathised with their strategy. I became acutely aware of my 
different selves speaking when I reflected on the stories that I had conveyed to Peter 
Kearns (Christchurch naturopath and Co-Director CCNM) during an interview 
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(26/8/2000) as opposed to the stories I told to Judith Sim, who is a Christchurch 
Natural Family Planning practitioner I interviewed (28/8/2000). While interviewing 
Peter Kearns, I asserted proudly that I discontinued the use of OCs in favour of 
something more "natural" and yet I critiqued the meanings of 'natural' and 'artificial' 
during the 'same' story I told to Judith Sim. Frank (1995) suggests that these 
reworked versions of a 'single' story are not uncommon. He explains that on one 
particular day he had "told a version of my illness story eight times" (pp.53-54) 
because people required different stories. My storytelling undetwent similar changes 
and (re)polishing. The sequence of events was altered and (re)membered pieces of 
the story added and subtracted according to the self speaking. 
The importance of being explicit about my 'ontological narrativity' became 
clear during the research process. I realised that a multiplicity of selves and 
experiential stories precludes 'sameness" (Haraway, 1997, p.57). This was 
highlighted through contrasts with my selves during the controversy and other 
consumers' selves. Actively creating myself as an 'assertive' consumer, I consulted 
various health providers after learning about the debate surrounding 3GOCs. 
Initially, a major focus of the project was to be the 'experiences' of consumers at 
their health care consultations during the controversy. My ethics application forms 
to both the University of Canterbury and Health Funding Authority indicate my 
preference that at least fifty per cent of participants would have consulted health 
providers. I soon realised that underpinning this desire was an assumption: namely, 
the presupposition that consumers do take action during controversies and that this 
action will entail consulting health providers. 
On the contrary, some OC users I spoke to did not take any action and 
others, while they reacted to the debate, did not respond by consulting health 
providers. To illustrate, after speaking informally with an OC user, I note my 
"surprise" in my journal that she was unconcerned about the debate. Writing later 
in the journal, I recognise that I had unquestioningly "expected" other consumers to 
respond to the debate as I had. I conclude that such a "radical difference" in 
'experiences' should indicate the importance of examining the assumptions I bring 
from my personal story to the research. Later in the research process, interview 
material similarly highlighted the minimal impact that the 3GOC debate had on 
some OC users. Zena (interview 13/9/2000), for example, mentions that her sister 
"couldn't have cared less about the debate" and she just "stayed on the pill, no 
worries at all". Zena's sister's response to the 3GOC controversy contrasts with 
mine. This illustrates the relational nature of selves. They are created through 
comparisons with other people's stories. These contrasts in 'experiences' alerted me 
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to the risks not only in failing to engage reflexively with my assumptions, but also 
the danger of expecting participants' stories to verify and confirm my own stories 
and selves. 
It does not follow from these cautionary notes about 'experience' that I 
dispense with the idea totally. In fact, the researcher's personal biography is cited as 
the "best place to start" (Tolich & Davidson, 1999, p.13) research. So 'experience' 
(including the researcher's) remains pivotal. The shift lies in the emphasis. 
'Experience', pursuant to some postmodernist and poststructuralist theorists 
(Jones, 1997; Davies, 1997; Kondo, 1990; Scott, 1992; Haraway, 1991), has been 
reconfigured as a discursive event. The accounts, narratives, or stories that 
participants give about their 'experiences' form the basis of analytical enquiries. 
Consequently, I wanted to find out what stories, knowledges and information 
proliferated during the 3GOC controversy. What stories were generated during the 
interviews I conducted with consumers and health providers? Why did differently 
positioned participants draw from certain stories rather than others? Although 
participants draw from conventional, established story tropes, how are these 
narratives uniquely deployed? What stories about selves are privileged? To this end, 
I asked questions about why participants paid particular attention to certain types 
of information sources rather than other knowledge. I also asked specific questions 
about their own personal biographies. In addition, I enquired about participants' 
memories of their 'experiences' during health care encounters. 3 The emphasis, then, 
clearly resides with an examination into discursive]y constructed 'experiences' 
rather than uncovering the 'real' experience. 
My comfort with this discursive emphasis on the 'narrativity' of 'experience' 
was troubled as I conducted the interviews. I worried about reducing OC users' 'real' 
physical 'experiences' of side effects on the pill to poststructuralist signs and 
symbols. What I am referring to is the current centrality in much theoretical and 
empirical work about the material and discursive divide (Shilling, 1992; Shildrick, 
1997; Frank, 1995; Williams & Bendelow, 1998; Oudshoorn, 1994; Usher, 1997; 
Barrett, 1992). Like many of the theorists involved in this debate, I became 
considerably irritated with what could be interpreted as poststructuralist 
reductionism. I was perplexed about how I could recognise OC users' physicality and 
simultaneously deconstruct their accounts of such 'experiences'. My anxiety centred 
around whether paying attention to discourse would deny the materiality of 
consumers' (often painful} side effects. 
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The interviews expeditiously quelled my fears. I was not negating material 
physiological side effects by focussing on the discursive. Few would deny that there 
are 'real' bodily activities occurring when an OC user 'experiences' a headache 
attributed to the pill. What my project was concerned with was exploring the 
meanings attached to such physiological phenomenon. Whereas doctors fypically 
categorise headaches as 'minor' side effects from OCs, some consumers attach 
drastically different meanings to the 'experience' of this material occurrence. In an 
intetview (7/9/2000) with Ellen, for instance, describes how her "pill headaches" 
become a 'major' problem for her when they made her a "crazy freak". This contrast 
in meanings for the same physical sign highlights the way that the material is 
mediated through the discursive, as Shildrick (1997) persuasively argues. 
Discursive renditions enable people to explain and justify their actions and 
'narrativity' can have material consequences. For example, subsequent to the 
discursive construction of the pill as risky, a material consequence followed: 2GOCs 
attracted a higher subsidy from Pharmac than 3GOCs (Egermayer & Roke, 2000; 
Edwards & Cohen, 2000). So, crafting stories during a controversy is not simply 
restricted to the discursive realm. As I discuss in Chapter Three, people have to 
actively pursue and seek out knowledges in order to compile their bricolage 
collections which provide meanings for them in a controversy. Bricoleurs 
demonstrate the materiality of building discourses by having to actively pick up 
elements from the discursive toolboxes 'at hand'. 
In addition to destabilising 'experience' (Haraway, 1991; Klein, 1983; Mies, 
1983; Stanley and Wise, 1983; Scott, 1992) some postmodernist theorists also 
subject the category 'women' to debate. In particular, writings by women from 
"marked" (Haraway, 1991) groups such as Maori, African American, and the 'third 
world', have upset the presumption that woman equals white, middle class and 
Western (Spivak, 1999; Awatere, 1984; Hooks, 1992). A generic 'woman' is not 
possible because women do not comprise a homogeneous group. It is now 
unacceptable to presume that just because "she bleeds [menstruates] like I do" 
(Emily, intetview, 13/9/2000), that this biological connection will result in 
analogous 'experiences'. On the contrary, women's differences are emphasised 
because it is acknowledged that people's selves are crafted through the intersection 
of various social axes such as class, race, sexuality, religion and gender. 
This unsettling of 'woman' had implications for my research. Rather than 
intetviewing a statistically representative group of women and health providers, I 
chose to do in-depth interviews with a small number of women and health providers 
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identified via notices, advertisements and personal networks. However, I did want to 
try to elicit a range of responses. To aid this end, I placed a number of notices4 at 
different health care centres throughout Christchurch. Specifically, in June and 
July 2000, I placed notices inviting participation in my study on the notice boards of 
the following health care organisations: The Health Alternatives for Women, 
Christchurch Family Planning, Christchurch School of Medicine, Canterbury College 
of Natural Medicine, Natural Family Planning, University of Canterbury Student 
Health, High Street Medical Centre. I also placed an advertisement inviting 
participation in this project in the Christchurch Press. The impetus behind my 
decision to utilise notices and advertisements as methods for accessii,g participants 
was twofold. First, the sensitive, personal and contentious nature of the topic 
suggested that it would be preferable to access people who were comfortable talking 
about the issues and who could make decisions about participation without feeling 
under direct pressure from the researcher. Secondly, I placed notices at a range of 
health care organisations in different locations throughout the city in order to 
maximise my chances of accessing differently positioned people who nught draw 
from various discursive resources in their responses to a medical debate. 
Despite comments that I had approached a "good range" (Peter Keams, Co-
Director and naturopath, Canterbury College of Natural Medicine, interview 
26/8/2000) of health care organisations, it transpired that the consumers who 
responded to my notices were primarily "European" (as many described themselves 
in the demographic forms5 I distributed), middle class, well educated and employed. 
However, I did interview a consumer who identified herself as Catholic and one who 
identified herself as Asian. These participants all suggested that the "taboo" (Heidi, 
interview 26/8/2000; Janet, interview 31/8/2000; Marion, interview 29/8/2000) 
nature of the topic of this thesis would very likely be a deterrent when other Asians 
or Catholics would have considered whether or not to participate. Reinforcing that 
this study can only be illustrative, Heidi (interview 26/8/2000) explains that she is 
an "atypical" Asian and, thus, "not representative". Similarly, Janet (interview 
31/8/2000) was quick to point out on several occasions that her narratives "might 
not be what other Catholics would say". What Janet and Heidi suggest is that 
'woman' is not associated with fixed meanings or categories. More importantly, 
though, they convey that even women within any particular grouping are different, 
dissimilar and "atypical". 
This troubling of 'woman' contributed to my realisation that I occupied 
multiple social axes. In particular, as both a researcher and an OC user who 
participated in the 3GOC controversy, I was positioned both 'inside' and 'outside', as 
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Spivak (1993) has suggested. Possibilities and challenges emerged from having 
'inside' and 'outside' selves. For example, several participants, such as one OC user, 
Janet (inteiview 31/8/2000), challenged my insider positioning. I initially wanted to 
have a question about whether the participant would like to lrnow anything about 
my 'experiences' during the 3GOC debate at the start of the interview. Following my 
primary supervisor's advice, I placed this question at the end of the interview 
schedule. It transpired that this was indeed a good place to insert the question. This 
was suggested by Janet who explained that she was: 
happy to just be interviewed without too much of an exchange. I think that it is a 
good question to have in there because some people would feel like they have told you 
everything and want you to share something too. But I don't feel like that. This is a 
professional relationship. So I think that things need to stay on track. We should just 
stick to the questions. But I think that it is a nice question to put at the end so that 
people feel that they can ask you if they want to. It gives people the choice. But it's 
still good to have it at the end so that the whole thing doesn't get off target and 
become an exchange. 
Interestingly, immediately following this remark, Janet proceeded to ask me 
about the personal impetus behind the research by wondering "how [I] came to do 
the project". Nonetheless, her central point was that although it is a "good question", 
the inteiview should not degenerate into an "exchange" because this compromises 
the "professional relationship" between researcher and participant in the context of 
an interview. Janet suggests that she favours an approach where professionalism is 
maintained by rigidly "stick[ing] to the questions" proposed by the 'expert' and not 
straying "off target" by engaging in unprofessional "exchanges". While she considers 
it an inappropriate question, she does accept that it offers other participants, who 
might want the researcher to "share", the "choice" and opportunity to do so. By 
placing the question at the end of the interview, it was possible to create a situation 
where alternatives to my own experiences, responses and actions could be 
facilitated. 
I wanted to include this question at the conclusion of the interview in order 
to refrain from inducing participants into reworking their stories of the 3GOC 
controversy so that they matched mine. If I disclosed my stories first, some 
participants might have altered their stories under the impression that I would 
prefer to hear narratives that were consistent with my own. Consequently, I chose to 
place the question which invited "exchange" at the end. This allowed participants to 
tell their own stories without being influenced by my storytelling. And yet I did not 
expect that this approach would be entirely non-directive. As Middleton (1993, p.70) 
accurately writes, the "kinds of questions asked, the verbal and nonverbal reactions 
to responses ... the physical setting itself' function by encouraging certain stories 
from participants. Despite the inevitable hints of researcher agreement or 
disagreement that can be gleaned from such signs, putting the "exchange" question 
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at the conclusion of the interview was successful inasmuch as it provided a "choice" 
and also avoided, albeit partially, researcher influence over participants' storytelling. 
I also acknowledge that on the occasions when I did discuss my experiences 
· of and responses to the 3GOC controversy with participants, this technique 
influenced the 1ype of stories garnered. Generating a dialogue rather than the 
unilateral divu]gence of their stories made some participants feel more at ease and 
comfortable discussing their own lives. For example, one participant, Jacqueline 
(interview 25/8/2000), asked me questions about what 1ype of pill I had used, when 
I ceased usage, what health providers I consulted and why. She pointed out that she 
wanted to ask me these questions because she considered it "unfair if we have to 
tell you everything" (Jacqueline, her emphasis). 
Jacqueline's emphasis on the pronouns 'we' and 'you' highlights the 
conventional distance between the researcher and her /his 'subjects'. I wanted to 
challenge the orthodoxy of the scientifically removed o bseiver, while also being wary 
of allowing the insider position to generate 'talk' that confirmed my own responses to 
and experiences of the 3GOC controversy. My approach was to have the 'exchange' 
question at the end and if participants asked me questions during the interview, I 
would simply indicate that we could delay such conversations until the conclusion 
of the interview. If a participant was particularly frustrated with this response, I 
would answer her question(s) briefly and indicate that we could discuss the issue(s) 
further at the conclusion of the interview. I hoped that this technique would serve a 
dual purpose: it would both indicate to participants that I was comfortable sharing 
stories, but it also avoided (albeit not totally successfully, as Middleton's account 
suggests) participants changing their stories in order to 'match' my own. Since my 
own responses to the 3GOC controversy could be interpreted as 'bricolage', I wanted 
to resist privileging this position during the interviews in order to facilitate 
alternative stories. I did not want to do all the talking all of the time and I did not 
want to encourage stories that confirmed my own experiences, but I also did not 
want to alienate participants by refusing to share my stories. 
At the conclusion of the interview (25/8/2000), Jacqueline conveyed the 
importance of sharing 'experiences' during the research process. She explained that 
it is "great for women to share their experiences of health and the pill" because "too 
often they don't get an opportunity to do this at the doctor's because he [sic] isn't 
interested in that". Jacqueline clearly expresses her satisfaction in a joint effort to 
generate stories about contraception and the 3GOC controversy. She also 
significantly points out that these 1ypes of stories are obscured by 'official' versions. 
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I anticipated that this storytelling might "never have been worded" (Grace, 1998, 
p.28) before in this capacity. Jacqueline's remark suggests that it is worthwhile 
documenting these narratives. And her comments indicate the importance of setting 
up a research atmosphere which garners such stories. 
On one occasion, it was not even necessru:y for me to monitor or reduce my 
role in the research process. During the inteiview (31/8/2000) with Dr Rosemary 
Reid, for example, she read out the interview questions from her own copy of the 
document and then proceeded to provide answers complete]y unprompted by me. 
Rather than allocating the task of asking questions to the researcher (which is the 
conventional technique), I would argue that Dr Rosemary Reid engages in resistance 
by acting as both 'researched' and 'researcher'. In her article "Interviewing - An 
'Unnatural' Situation?", Jane Ribbens (1989, p.561) analyses similar situations, 
what she calls 'subtle sabotages', where researchers have experienced shifts in 
power relations and interviewed in a hierarchical atmosphere. Ribbens 
conceptualises the interview as a 'social encounter' and explores the shifts in power 
and control between 'researcher' and 'researched' in this relationship. Ribbens 
argues that research interviews often involve power imbalances that stem from 
public domains and that these can have implications for "how people talk to each 
other and what they say to each other as a result" (p.579). Endowed with a 'public' 
medical authority, Dr Rosemary Reid does not dispense with this when in the 
supposedly 'private' research encounter. 
At the time, I did find this slightly unsettling, even though I did not want to 
position myself as more powerful than the person I inteiviewed because researchers 
are frequently those without knowledge in research encounters. As the interview 
progressed I did interject with questions of my own, often ones which were not on 
the original list of questions. 6 The point remains, though, that this is but one 
example that illustrates the difficulties in assuming that the researcher and 
participant occupy the same "critical plane" (Harding, 1987, pp.180-181) as some 
feminist theorists, especially standpoint feminists, have advocated. As Cotterill 
(1992, p.599) points out, the balance, or imbalance, of power and control in a 
research encounter is not "fixed and may vary according to ... the age and status of 
the women being interviewed ... [and also] on the perceptions of the person being 
inteiviewed". At the beginning of the research, I anticipated that achieving equality 
in the research process needed to be sought after in terms of the researcher 
resisting elevating her/himself above the participants. Yet the interview with Dr 
Rosemary Reid (31/8/2000) suggests that the same "critical plane" is often a goal 
which cannot be aspired to because of the position(s) assumed by the participants. 
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My scepticism about the possibility of being able to produce an entirely equal 
research relationship is reinforced by the slippery meanings of 'feminist'. As a 
feminist researcher, I learnt that I could not presume that participants who identify 
themselves as feminists share the same rmderstandings. This leads some theorists 
to propose that 'feminism' should be 'feminisms', plural, in order to resist the 
erroneous thinking that there is a homogeneous feminism (Harding, 1987, p.7). The 
tensions across meanings of 'feminism' are demonstrated in an excerpt from my 
journal. After my.introductory visit with Cindy Carmichael at THAW, I collected one 
of their brochures. I wrote in my journal afterwards that this pamphlet and my 
discussion with Cindy revealed that THAW "has some 'essentialist' and/ or 'older' 
strands/versions of feminism. In particular, there is a continual separation between 
the categories 'men' and 'women'. These categories do not seem to be contested at 
THAW as they are in say, postmodern feminism" (p.9). THAW's delineation between 
men' and 'women' does not sit easily with postmodern feminism which holds that 
feminism is not a stance dependent upon a person's gender. 
So, unlike some feminist researchers, who define their type of research as 
being fundamentally concerned with women (Cook & Fonow, 1986, p.5; Stanley & 
Wise, 1983, p.196), my position follows other theorists who hold that men can make 
useful contributions to feminist projects (Harding, 1987, pp.11-12). In an interview 
(7/9/2000), Ellen enquired about whether my research would investigate "how 
males see the whole thing as well in terms of their experiences of being with 
partners on the pill during the scare". Although I had to answer this question in the 
negative, this thesis does explore the storytelling of some men who were involved in 
the controversy. These men were not OC users' partners, they were health providers. 
Despite my focus being on consumer narratives about the 3GOC controversy, I 
wanted to interview some differently positioned people in order to explore what 
storytelling is privileged by a variefy of people within a controversy and why. I also 
wondered whether there would be any overlap between the subjectivities reinstated 
during the controversy and the sorts of narratives that different groups drew from in 
their storytelling. Indeed, I found that participants who are typically positioned as 
holding divergent views, often had overlapping narratives with the 'other' depending 
on the particular self that the person privileged at the time.7 
My decision to include a variefy of people who participated in the 3GOC 
controversy in the study meant that I sometimes interviewed health providers whose 
positions on this controversy were very different from my own. The health providers I 
interviewed were contacted in different ways. For example, Doctor X and Doctor 
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Rosemary Reid responded to the notices and interviews with Family Planning 
Association, Natural Family Planning and The Health Alternatives for Women were 
attained through phone, letter and personal negotiations. The interview with 
Canterbury College of Natural Medicine w~ the result of a letter and visit to the 
clinic. The midwife, Margaret Kyle, who I interviewed was contacted through a 
consumer, Ellen, who suggested that I intetview her "midwife friend". Fewer than 
expected consumers interviewed for this study responded to the notices placed at 
various health centres around Christchurch. Of the eleven consumers interviewed, 
four responded to the notices, four were as a result of 'snowballing' (whereby their 
friend who was inteiviewed suggested that someone they knew be interviewed too) 
and three were contacted by representatives from health organisations on my 
behalf.8 
Two contraceptive consumers contacted me, in response to notices placed at 
health care clinics, who were not intetviewed. One consumer decided that she had 
not been on the pill for a sufficient length of time to make a valuable contribution to 
the project. The other consumer had used oral contraceptives but ceased usage well 
before the controversy began. She, too, felt that this would mean she would be 
unable to provide the study with suitable information. All the other consumers and 
health providers who contacted me through notices and advertisements were 
inteiviewed. Some participants referred me to other people who might be appropriate 
to interview, but three such opportunities were not followed up due to the 
limitations of the number of interviews I could conduct for a small research project. 
It is worth emphasising here that I did not always agree with the consumers I 
inteiviewed. My point is that I made a conscious effort to take people's narratives 
seriously irrespective of whether my own views were dissimilar. On occasions, I 
recorded stories that were very different from my own. For instance, I had to 
emphasise my sociological self to one of the health provider participants who was 
concerned about whether the "medical evidence" would be accurately represented. I 
explained that, as a sociologist I was not interested in resolving the physiological 
debate surrounding thrombosis and 3G0Cs, but that my concern was to explore the 
meanings, discursive strategies and storytelling which circulated during the 
controversy. After this incident, I wrote in my journal that my area of interest was 
not "whether or not something is true (i.e. how risky the pill is), but where people 
get their knowledge from and who it takes for them to be convinced/ persuaded that 
something might be true?" Having isolated this as my focus, I also recognised that 
narratives from people who were not focussed on this aspect should also be taken 
seriously and the assumptions beneath their preferences probed. To this end, I have 
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started four of the six chapters in this thesis with a quotation from participants. 
Much empirical work makes its way into an analysis through quotations from 
'experts'. However, I decided to start with participants' storytelling and work my way 
out to broader issues in order to ensure that participants' narratives are taken 
seriously. 
The extent to which I "let people say what they would say and respected that" 
(Zena, interview 13/9/2000) was problematised once I started to privilege material 
that was of interest to my theoretical orientation. Once I started to look for evidence 
of bricolage, some material inevitably received more attention. Despite the 
differences and variances in the responses from the consumers interviewed, I have 
isolated several key features of bricolage and constructed health consumers as 
bricoleurs. 
The result is what is referred to as "messy texts" (Marcus, 1994 cited in 
Denzin, 1997, pp. xvi-xvii). Although I did not arrive at the interviews with the 
notion of bricolage, I valorised this approach to the 3GOC controversy through the 
questions I asked participants. For example, I asked the contraceptive consumers in 
this study about what information they sought during the 3GOC controversy and 
why they chose particular types of information. I also asked questions about what 
type of action they took in response to the controversy. Finally, I asked whether they 
spoke to health providers and/or other people, such as friends, 'alternative' health 
practitioners, about the controversy.9 I have sifted through the transcripts and 
privileged stories that illustrate the bricolage strategy. The <mess' being referred to 
highlights the researcher /writer's involvement in the production of research 
material. 
I, as the researcher/writer, became a "scribe" (Denzin, 1997, p.xvii) who 
"voices interpretations about the events recorded ... and shapes the representations 
that are brought to the people studied". 'Messy' texts are grounded in the study of 
narratives and the stories people tell as they make sense of events like the 3GOC 
controversy. In other words, the narratives provided by this study's participants and 
the readings that I bring to these texts, are reflexive. What was noticed shifted and 
changed during the research process. 
I respected participants' preferences for certain issues to the extent that I 
altered the initial focus of the thesis. When I began this research I envisaged that it 
would take the form of an analysis of consumer responses to the media's 
representation of the 3GOC controversy.10 The notices I placed at health care 
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institutions invited people to participate in discussions concentlng the "ongoing 
controversy in the mass media". Although I did ask questions about the media's 
construction of the debate (and some participants did utilise the media as a source 
of information), this aspect was not discussed extensively. The consistent response 
was that the media "sensationalised" the controversy. But most participants also 
pointed out that the media played an important role in the disclosure of the debate. 
For instance, Marion (interview 29/8/2000) states that it was "good that [the media] 
reported it because we might not have found out otherwise". Yet discussions about 
the controversy and the media rarely progressed or developed further. 
What was volunteered without any prompting on my behalf was discussion 
concerning 'informed consent/choice' as it related the 3GOC controversy. It was an 
early goal in the project to ensure that those interviewed felt free to guide the 
conversation into areas that they considered important. In my research journal I 
pose these questions: "What do [participants] say unprompted? What is important 
for them to talk about?" (p.13). Despite my anticipations that the media would be a 
central issue and that "informed consent would probably be a significant, but 
peripheral, issue which is largely beyond the scope of the project" (journal, p.25), it 
transpired that the medico-legal issue was of pivotal importance to consumers I 
interviewed. Indeed, issues surrounding it are a major focus of Chapter Five. 
It might reasonably be objected that 'informed consent/choice' emerged as a 
significant issue due to the self-selected group of people who participated in this 
research project. What I am suggesting is that the notices inviting participation 
attracted people who were primarily assertive as health consumers and had a lot of 
energy for accessing information about the controversy from a variety of sources and 
discussing the issues. The notices, in general, had quite a low response rate ( only 
four of the eleven consumers interviewed were accessed through notices and they 
were potentially read by hundreds of women). While four participants were 
interviewed as a result of suggestions from their friends who had spoken to me 
during an earlier interview, the way that these people were accessed meant that 
interviews with more assertive health consumers were conducted. Since these 
people associated with the assertive health consumers I had already interviewed, it 
was likely that they, too, would be assertive as contraceptive consumers. Despite my 
attempts to place notices at a range of health care clinics around Christchurch, the 
final group of participants comprised of many consumers who were similar to me in 
terms of responses to the controversy. I have been able to construct many of these 
participants as bricoleurs as a consequence of the ways that these consumers were 
accessed. 
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Neither the notices nor the snowball technique succeeded in accessing 
participants who had 'survived' thrombosis attributed to 3G0Cs, or Maori 
interviewees. Although a Christchurch marae was approached on several occasions, 
particip~tion did not eventuate. The marae was approached using letters. 
Subsequently, there were several positive phone conversations with the nurse 
associated with the marae. I was concerned not to exclude tangata whenua from the 
study. As Tuhiwai Smith (1999) points out, even if the researcher's ethnicity is 
different, omission of indigenous people's voices based on this distinction is not the 
solution. In fact, a nurse on the marae in.dicated that potential participants might 
feel more comfortable talking to me because I identified as Jewish and, therefore, 
would not be considered Pakeha She also suggested that there would be few people 
to talk to because oral contraception was not a popular contraceptive method for 
women associated with the marae. I eventually foreclosed the pursuit of Maori 
participants due to time pressures. More might have been done to facilitate 
participation from a wider range of participants given additional time and an 
extended study. These omissions from the sample highlight some of the limitations 
of my methodology. 
One methodological asset was that I was vigorous about protecting the 
identities of participants. No long case studies of participants are included in the 
thesis. In a small city like Christchurch and a tiny country like Aotearoa/New 
Zealand it is too easy to identify participants and the priority was to provide 
participants with confidentiality. It was also vital to protect participants' identities 
because of the potentially contentious nature of the research topic. I often felt torn 
by divided loyalties to the differently positioned participants who all wanted their 
stories about the controversy adequately represented in the thesis, partly, because 
of the high profile that the debate received in the media 
A final note about the contents of my methodological practices concerns the 
way that I have incorporated and analysed participants' stories. I was initially 
anxious to ensure that all important aspects from participants' narratives would be 
included. I quickly realised that this is an impossible task. I have adopted Becker's 
(1998, pp.71-76) 'trick' exemplified by the "case of ethnomusicology". This 'trick' 
holds that the researcher's choices inevitably leave things out, but that this is 
acceptable provided s/he is reflexive about why such omissions were made which 
involves her /him questioning what can be said about what "we didn't see on the 
basis of what we did see" (p. 75). For example, while this thesis focuses on a strategic 
response to a medical controversy that I refer to as 'bricolage', in Chapters Three 
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and Four, I recognise that this primary focus eschews alternative responses that 
participants might adopt in response to a medical debate. I only spoke to a limited 
number of people from a specific range of contexts. Many of the tertiary educated, 
young consumers I interviewed, but not all of them, deploy the 'bricolage' strategy. 
The extent to which this study's participants utilised tactics of gathering and 
combining information differs too. 
This chapter's investigations into the assumptions underlying my research 
practices indicate that what I saw· was influenced by the epistemological and 
ontological presuppositions I brought to the research questions. I conceded the 
importance of aclmowledging what Zena (interview 13/9/2000) refers to as a "vested 
interest" in the study's subject matter. Some of the research questions had their 
origins in the biographical details of my own life. Consequently, the research process 
was often what Janet (inteiview 31/8/2000) called an "exchange" of contraceptive 
'experiences'. This "exchange" and intermingling of narratives does not end with the 
conclusion of practical aspects of the research process. On the contrary, I co-
construct the 'data' as I write my analyses of the interview transcripts. The co-
creation, (re)creation and '(re)polishing' of different information sources pertaining to 
OCs, through a strategy that I interpret as 'bricolage', is the topic of the next 
chapter. 
NOTES 
1 My use of 'life story' follows the definition utilised by Du Plessis, Higgins & Mortlock (2000, 
p.5). They interpret 'life story' as a "personal story about some aspect of a narrator's life, not a 
comprehensive account of 'a life"' (ibid). While this study's participants' 'life stories' frequently 
cover past, present and future aspects of their biographies, they are, nonetheless, narratives 
about their contraceptive, and sometimes medical, histories, rather than accounts of their 
lives in general. 
2 Denning (1994) uses the terms 'really' and 'actually' in order to delineate between realism 
and acting, performance or construction. He argues that what really happened, or the so-
called 'real' story, can never be discovered because we can only ever know what actually 
occurred, or a version of 'reality'. He relates this notion to Clifford Geertz's concept 'thick 
description', whereby the competing layers of representation are described thickly. Whereas 
the realist mode of examination claims to scrape away multiple layers and reach the 'truth' 
left at the bottom, Denning and Geertz argue that the illusion of realism needs to be negated 
by paying attention to innumerable cultural constructions and the performance of what 
'actually' happened. 
3 See appendix 4 for the interview schedules which include the specific questions that I asked 
participants. 
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4 See appendices 1, 2, 3 for the notice, consent form and information sheets placed at health 
organisations around Christchurch. 
5 See appendix 6 for the demographic information. 
6 See appendix 4 for the question schedules. These documents traverse the themes to be 
pursued but they were not used as question sheets. In other words, the interviews did not 
follow a linear path from question one to the final question. Nor did the interview 'questions' 
preclude transitions to other topics prompted by the participants. I adopted a semi-structured 
approach which permitted such transgressions. The aim was to allow the participants to have 
more control over the structure and direction of the interaction than would otherwise be the 
case. The appendix includes the schedules used for OC users, health providers and the 
medical law specialist. I used slightly different schedules for the various health organisations 
interviewed. While the core questions and themes remained the same across all health 
providers, I have included the different questions that were asked of specific health 
organisations. 
7 Refer to Chapter Four where I discuss this finding in more detail. 
8 Refer to appendix 5 for further details about this study's research design, including which 
participants were accessed through notices as opposed to those who were accessed through 
'snowballing', or through health professionals. 
9 See appendix 4 for the interview schedules. 
10 See appendix 8 for information pertaining to the media coverage of the 3GOC controversy. 
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CHAPTER 3 
BRICOLAGE: MAKING ABSTRACT THEORY CONCRETE 
That sort of language [academic and medical] doesn't get you anywhere. There is no 
action, no politics, so what's the point? 
(Cindy Carmichael, THAW, interview 24/8/2000) 
The potential apolitical and inaccessible features of 'academic language' a.re 
highlighted by Cindy Carmichael's (interview 24/8/2000) comment above. Cindy is 
commenting critically on difficult language in general, but similar criticisms have 
been directed at postmodernism and poststructuralism (Hall, 1990; Bloom, 1987; 
Harding, 1983; Graham, 1995; Suleri, 1989; Pihama, 1988). One particular concern 
is that these theorists often make simple points in an elaborate and obscure way. 
This critique troubled me somewhat because I wanted my research to be accessible 
to people from a variety of backgrounds. It bothered me that a potential corollary of 
utilising theoretical frameworks, which have been criticised fQr their inaccessible 
discourses, would be that I would fail to convey my argument to people who were 
unfamiliar with these ideas. My wony was similar to Cindy's. I, too, wondered "what 
[would be] the point" of adopting aspects of postmodernist analysis if only a small 
group would be able to understand my arguments. 
In addition to the inaccessibility of postmodernist and poststructuralist 
writings, I was also concerned about other critical formulations, in which these two 
terms frequently appear, such as: 'if discourse is all there is .... ,' or 'if everything is a 
text ... ,' or 'if the subject is dead ... ,' or 'if real bodies do not exist.. .. ' (Butler, 1992, 
p.3). And opponents of postmodern orientations (MacKinnon, 2000; Waters, 1996; 
Klein, 1996; Thompson, 1996; Spretnak, 1996) also voice fears similar to Cindy's 
such as whether this theoretical position negates "politics" and "action". Similarly, 
Actor Network theorists have had to defend themselves against charges that their 
arguments betray the existence of 'reality'. In his book Pandora's Hope ( 1999, p.1), 
for example, Latour provides answers to the question posed by his friend about 
whether he "believe[s] in reality". All these fearful articulations constitute the main 
reasons why I questioned whether adopting a postmodernist and poststructuralist 
approach was problematic. Butler (1992, p.4) Singer (1992, p.460) and Flax (1992, 
p.475), albeit in varying ways, respond to the arguments that some postmodernist 
and poststructuralist ideas are apolitical. 
The primary purpose of this chapter is to introduce and defend my use of the 
following ideas and concepts that are central to this thesis: subjectivity ('body-self), 
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'bricolage/bricoleur', 'blackboxing' and 'whiteboxing'. I draw on several theoretical 
concepts from Actor Network Theory including 'blackbo.xing' and 'immutable mobile'. 
I invoke a term which I have created called 'whiteboxing'. This is an extension of 
what is called 'white box testing' by engineers. 'Bricolage /bricoleur', 'black boxing' 
and 'whiteboxing' are the central theoretical ideas running throughout this chapter; 
whereas, 'actor', 'subjectivities' and 'immutable mobile' are drawn upon in order to 
discuss these central theoretical concepts more fully. 
The 'theoretical' ideasi discussed in this chapter are presented in a concrete 
rather than an abstract manner. Although it is customary to demarcate theory from 
inteiview material, since the central theoretical concept in this thesis (bricolage) is 
one which is practised by people, it follows that this theoretical chapter utilises 
concrete extracts from this study's interviews in order to illustrate bricolage at work. 
Furthermore, following Foucault (1988, p.68), I would argue that the theoretical 
orientation that I am utilising "is practice". Many of the OC users I inteiviewed 
exemplify the practice of several of these theoretical notions. Specifically, in this 
chapter I interpret these 'actors" responses to the 3GOC controversy as 'bricolage'. 
Bricolage is 'grounded' in everyday activities rather than being relegated to the 
realms of inaccessible abstraction. Given that the theoretical approach in this 
chapter involves illustration by way of practice, I intend to analyse the key 
theoretical concepts alongside some substantiating examples from the interview 
transcripts.2 
Such a pragmatic approach to a theory chapter is necessary because one of 
the primary aims of my study is-to explore how a selection of people - but especially 
the OC users I interviewed - respond to the 3GOC controversy. My interpretation of 
the interview transcripts is that some consumers decide what action to take during 
the 3GOC controversy by invoking the practice of combining a multiplicity of forms 
of knowledge. I refer to this conceptual and practical process as 'bricolage'. It is 
necessary, therefore, to show bricolage in action. It is important to emphasise that I 
will show bricolage at work because I have read these contraceptive consumers' 
responses, reactions and 'storytelling' as 'bricolage'. But this does not mean that I 
am suggesting that 'bricolage' is the only possible way to respond to the 3GOC 
controversy. 'Bricolage' is one valuable aspect that I have selected from the interview 
transcripts because it is an especially prevalent method used by many of the OC 
users who participated in this project. They practise bricolage as they relate to a 
particular contraceptive technology and the controversy surrounding it. 
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The way that I use 'bricolage' and 'bricoleur' throughout this chapter and the 
thesis borrows from and develops its usage in social theory (Hess, 1997; Levi-
Strauss, 1968; Katovich, 1995; Weinstein & Weinstein, 1991; Weinstein, 1991; 
Preston, 1996; Turkle & Papert, 1990). The etymology of both concepts is French. 
The conventional definition of a bricoleur is someone who is a "handyman" [sic] or 
"jack-of-all-trades" [sic] (Hess, 1997, p. 139). This term entered social theory in Levi-
Strauss' major work on the 'primitive' mind (1968), but it has subsequently been 
embraced by qualitative researchers who promote bricolage as a legitimate method 
of inquiry (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994, pp. 2-3). In addition, researchers have 
interpreted other theorists as bricoleurs (Katovich, 1995; Weinstein & Weinstein, 
1991) and the transcripts of interviewees have also been interpreted as "narrative 
construction [which] forms a bricolage from their babble of discourse" (Preston, 
1996). Bricolage is also likened to "epistemological pluralism" and advocated as a 
valid approach to knowledge (Turkle & Papert, 1990). Of course this proliferation of 
work on bricolage has not escaped criticism from those who contend that the 
practice of theoretical bricolage undermines analytical work and that, thus, the 
metaphor of 'boatbuilding' is preferable (Hammersley, 1999). In order to follow my 
use of bricolage in this study, it is necessary to first explore the various elements of 
bricolage - tracing the connections and differences as they appear in social theory 
and in my writing - and then provide examples of bricolage in action. Given the 
inherent composition of bricolage - it is slippery, messy and practical - it is 
sometimes unavoidable that theory and practice will blend. This chapter illustrates 
bricolage by applying it to extracts from this study's interview material. 
Bricolage is principally one way to make sense of the world. In The Savage 
Mind (1968), Levi-Strauss contrasts the sense-making approaches of the bricoleur 
'savage' with the engineer. Whereas 'primitive' people respond to the world around 
them by a process that Levi-Strauss refers to as the 'science of the concrete' (1968, 
p. 16), the engineer makes sense of the world by utilising 'abstract' logic. Bricoleurs 
perform odd jobs using a limited number of tools which they carry with them. When 
faced with a task, they simply turn to their toolbox and adapt one to the situation. 
The bricoleur engages in practical problem solving, but, unlike the engineer who has 
the capacity to create knowledge, no new knowledge is created by the bricoleur. 
Instead, pre-existing tools and/ or knowledges are reconstructed, reworked, and 
'(re)polished' (Zena, interview 13/9/2000). In the words of Levi-Strauss, the 
bricoleur is: 
adept at performing a large number of tasks; but unlike the engineer, he [sic] does 
not subordinate each of them to the availability of raw materials and tools conceived 
and procured for the purpose of the project. His universe of instruments is closed and 
the rules of his game are to always make do with 'whatever is at hand', that is to say 
with a set of tools and materials which is always finite and is also heterogeneous 
because what it contains 'bears rw relation to the current project, or indeed to any 
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particular project, but is the contingent result of all the occasions there have been to 
renew or enrich the stock or to maintain it with the remains of previous constructions 
or destructions. (1968, p. 17, my emphasis) 
While I concede that the bricoleur will primarily "make do with whatever is at 
hand", Levi-Strauss' articulation does not adequately illustrate the difficulties that 
bricolage can present during the 3GOC medical controversy. To be sure, the OC 
users inteiviewed collect information which has been "transmitted in advance" (Levi-
Strauss, 1968, p. 20) and they build bricolage from the "remains and debris of 
events" (ibid, p. 22), but accessing information is often a considerable challenge. The 
3GOC controversy began internationally in 1995 but it did not circulate in the 
'public' domain until years later. One reason for this delay is that the medical 
profession is often reluctant to allow information to "get out to the public" before it 
has been "peer reviewed" and "scientifically appraised" (interview 31/8/2000 with 
Rosemary Reid, medical specialist). The question, however, remains: how easy is it 
for contraceptive consumers to get access to information which is supposed to be 
readily 'at hand'? 
Many of the consumers interviewed spoke about the problems that they 
encountered trying to access information about the controversy. Despite their 
resetvations regarding the "sensationalism" (Jacqueline, interview 25/8/2000) and 
"inaccuracy" (Heidi, interview 26/8/2000) of the media, some OC users 'made do' 
with this information while they sought out other sources. My point is that, 
although consumers did utilise the information 'at hand' (such as media, talking to 
friends, family, partners, embodied experiences, personal contraceptive biographies), 
they also proactively sought out other sources of information because of the 
inadequacy of the 'tools' readily available. This is not to say that the information at 
hand is not valid. It is simply considered that this, alone, is not sufficient. It might 
be argued that the information that is collected by bricoleurs still constitutes 
information that is 'at hand' because it does not involve the creation of new 
knowledge. My purpose is not to argue about this point. Rather, I am suggesting 
that accessing even the knowledge which is supposedly 'at hand' is not a 
straightforward task. Ellen (interview 7/9/2000) has this to say about access to 
information about the 3GOC controversy: 
I couldn't believe it when I discovered that this drama had been raging for years and 
we didn't have any ideal I hate it how the medics keep these things to themselves. 
What, are we just meant to be content with what the media says or whatever? I had 
to go out and ferret around for anything - medical stuff I mean - that I could get 
myself. This sort of stuff doesn't just fall into your lap you know! Even talking to 
friends about it is sometimes an effort. Shouldn't it be the doctors' responsibility to be 
sending us information in the mail? I mean they're playing with our lives here! I mean 
I don't think that we should do nothing, but come on! 
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Ellen (intetview 7/9/2000) is perturbed that she has to 'make do' with the 
"remains and debris" of a controversy that has "been raging for years" unbeknown to 
her, or many other consumers for that matter. Ellen is also clearly both perplexed 
and angry that the medical profession fails to ensure that important information 
pertaining to 3GOCs is readily 'at hand'. The difficulties that she describes regarding 
access to information indicate that the task of the bricoleur is not necessarily as 
trouble-free as one might imagine from Levi-Strauss' description. As Ellen 
indignantly puts it, the bricoleur's potential toolbox does not "just fall into your lap". 
Ellen's discourse illustrates the connections and differences between the way that I 
use bricolage an.d bricoleur as opposed to the way that Levi-Strauss defines these 
notions. Granted, the result of a bricoleur's efforts to access disparate bits and 
pieces is bricolage: a reconstruction of "heterogeneous objects" (Levi-Strauss, 1968, 
p. 17). To "make do with whatever is at hand", however, is not a simple activity. 
What should arguably already be 'at hand' often has to be actively sought out. For 
example, Ellen (interview 7/9/2000) has to "ferret around" for information because 
she is not "content" to only "make do" with the sources that are 'at hand', provided 
by the media in this case. 
Given that accessing information often requires effort, it is not surprising 
that the bricoleur is often placed in a position where s/he has to 'make do' with a 
'stock' of information that frequently "bears no relation to the current project, or 
indeed to any particular project" (Levi-Strauss, 1968, p.17). The individual 
consumer does not generate the latest contraceptive technologies, nor create the 
newest knowledge pertaining to such methods. She is, therefore, constituted in the 
position of the bricoleur. But while Levi-Strauss assumes that bricoleurs are 
competent actors with a full toolboxes, health consumers often struggle to assemble 
their tools. Zena (interview 13/9/2000) certainly draws from materials collected 
from "old" and "new" experiences and sources, which are wilikely to have been 
connected with the 3GOC controversy specifically. Similarly, Emily (interview 
13/9/2000) appears to 'make do' with an eclectic 'stock' of knowledges which she 
has collected over time and which are often only loosely related to the current 
medical controversy. Why do some of the consumers in this study feel that it is 
necessary to adopt this bricolage approach? Emily explains the impetus behind her 
regular additions to her toolbox: 
I read a lot. I have researched quite a lot over the years too. I have a good women's 
health book. I have magazine articles and I can get to university easily so I can also 
find whatever I want from there too. Some of my friends even have scrapbooks f"tlled 
with mag articles on such and such an issue, nearly anything that might be helpful 
at some stage basically. I think we all just think that it might be useful one day and 
that probably the people who should supply the info won't (she laughs). So I don't talk 
to GPs much anymore. When anything comes up, like problems with the pill, then I 
go back and have a look at these things. I really think that from my experience, 
doctors haven't been that helpful. In retrospect, that second doctor who I went to 
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about my painful periods and who told me that I should go on the pill, that was really 
dodgy of her. I think that she should have been able to tell me a lot more things. Like, 
maybe if you cut out caffeine, which I have done, and completely regulated my painful 
periods by some simple changes to my diet and exercise routine. So it's just things 
like that which a doctor should know about and tell to clients. I didn't want to go 
back on the pill again because I noticed when I went off it the first time I was a lot 
happier. Sure it could have been other factors like moving to Christchurch. But I 
don't think so because then I remembered another earlier occasion which wasn't to 
do with the pill but it was that contraception injection which also affected me badly 
and so I think it's just these hormonal chemicals in general that don't sit well with 
me. Basically you have to put what the figures say in the context of your own body's 
responses to the treatment. I couldn't simply read the statistics as they appear. That's 
why those information leaflets you asked me about aren't enough by themselves. 
You've got to read them with other stuff. 
This extract from Emily's (interview 13/9/2000) storytelling is lengthy but 
necessarily so. The toolbox of a bricoleur is customarily comprised of bits and pieces 
and odds and ends which sometimes "bear no relation to the current project", often 
because they are selected from personal biographies. The bricoleur links materials 
and information in the present to specific knowledges accomplished in the past and 
anticipated in the future. In order to solve "problems" raised by the 3GOC 
controversy, Emily "goes back and has a look at these things" which she has 
stockpiled "over the years". This accumulation of material involves reference to her 
personal contraceptive history, previous medical experiences generally, references 
from books, magazines and similar information from friends' "scrapbooks". 
The scrapbook is arguably a quintessential manifestation of the activity of 
bricolage. Without "any particular project' in mind, Emily's friends simply assemble 
"nearly anything that might be helpful at some stage". The contents of such a 
scrapbook are "second hand" (Levi-Strauss, 1968, p. 22) because they are not 
created by the bricoleurs themselves, but they are collected and retained on the 
"principle that they may always come in handy" (Levi-Strauss, 1968, p. 18). They are 
deemed to be potentially "helpful" in the future. A controversy is almost anticipated 
or expected by these bricoleurs. Note, for instance, that Emily uses "when" not "if' 
as she speaks of future medical debates that might arise. 
Certainly what is expected by Emily (interview 13/9/2000), and presumably 
some of her friends with scrapbooks, is any one of three scenarios including: that a 
medical professional will not disclose information, or thats/he will fail to disclose 
enough information, or that the information will be too abstract. The possibility of 
any combination of this sequence of events occurring provides an explanation for 
the phenomenon of scrapbooks and the activity of bricolage in general, which draw 
from material that is seemingly irrelevant to "any particular project". Reminiscent of 
Ellen's indignant comment that she "hate[s] it how the medics keep these things to 
themselves", Ellen also complains that "probably the people who should supply the 
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info won't". It is evident from these two observations that there is some scepticism 
about whether the people who have easy access to important information about 
medical matters will even disclose such material. In Chapter Five, I explore this 
concern through a discussion of the concept of 'informed consent'. My purpose in 
this chapter is to point out that these contraceptive consumers, who I argue are 
behaving like bricoleurs, adopt the activity of bricolage because of their reservations 
about access to information, materials and certain types of (medical) toolboxes. One 
way to respond to this predicament is to gather "nearly anything" over an extended 
period of time and create a "useful" file of such data in the form of a scrapbook, for 
example. 
An additional concern raised by some consumers in this study is that 
doctors regularly fail to provide sufficient information, or certain types of knowledge. 
The complexities of this issue are also traversed in the chapter on 'informed 
consent'. For the moment, I want to address the matter of inadequate information in 
the context of bricolage. To return to a question posed earlier: why is it that these 
consumers feel they need to adopt bricolage? It is my contention that some 
contraceptive users experience difficulties accessing certain types of information 
and, as a consequence, they bolster their toolboxes almost in anticipation of the 
need to solve problems or extend their knowledge. Since one particular solution (for 
example, consulting a health professional) to the problem is deemed inadequate, it 
becomes necessary to seek out alternatives. As Emily (interview 13/9/2000) 
grumbles, it is because the doctor "should have been able to tell [her] a lot more 
things", but failed to do so that she ends up in a position of having to get the 
additional information, such ~ "cutting out caffeine ... (and] changes to diet and 
exercise", via alternative avenues. 
Due to her difficulties in accessing information and her experience that the 
medical advice provided is usually not "helpful", Emily (interview 13/9/2000) does 
not "talk to GPs much anymore". Eight of the eleven health consumers who 
participated in this study also share Emily's sentiments. This is not to say that 
these consumers interviewed never consult health professionals, but that they are 
sceptical about the advice they receive. For example, Jacqueline (interview 
25/8/2000) feels that the medical profession "hush up" important health issues, 
and consequently women are "less informed" and have to "look it up [them]selves in 
textbooks". Clear]y, then, accessing information supposedly 'at hand' can be an 
arduous task. 
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One method of attaining knowledges is to approach health organisations that 
are specifically set up to provide consumers with an assortment of information on a 
variety of health topics. One such Christchurch organisation is The Health 
Alternatives for Women (THAW). Indeed, at various stages in her narrative, Emily 
says that she "visits THAW all the time about health things". Her positive comments 
about THAW are not restricted to her personal opinion as she points out that "a hell 
of a lot of women use their service" and that she is continually "amazed" when 
perusing their "books at how many women visit them each year". Emily explains 
that she thinks THAW is popular because of their approach to health. She says that 
they "provide all sorts of info from different perspectives on anythfr1g you care to 
think about". Likewise, Ginny (interview 31/8/2000) also explains that when she 
"doesn't get enough information from doctors" she consults "women's resource 
centres ... [and] women's health groups in Wellington" and, later, when she relocates 
to Christchurch, she "discovers THAW". Like Emily, Ginny also prefers these 
organisations because of the "range of information that they provide". 
Cindy, a nurse associated with THAW whom I interviewed (24/8/2000), does 
not use the word 'bricolage', yet her comments about THAW's approach to health are 
suggestive of this technique. Cindy descnbes THA W's "philosophy" in the following 
way: 
We don't tell women what to do, we provide them with information on lots of people's 
opinions and then it's up to them to take what they want, follow that up and reach 
their own conclusions ... Our information is half conventional, half alternative ... We 
cover the whole field ... So our approach is very broad ... We sort of try to get the 
positive and negative sides of any issue, like the problems with the pill, and then 
people can take what they want. If you just have a look at all those folders there (she 
points to rows of files which line the walls of the room). Under each heading we put a 
hodge podge of info from all sorts of places. You can see that we have so much 
information and that we add to it constantly, almost every day in fact. 
Cindy reinforces Emily's (interview 13/9/2000) and Ginny's (interview 
31/8/2000) statements about THAW. In particular, the emphasis is on THAW's 
diverse "treasury" (Levi-Strauss, 1968, p. 18) of "heterogeneous" (Levi-Strauss, 
1968, p. 18) information. The materials in THAW's office constitute an exercise of 
bricolage. Cindy describes the materials available to consumers as a "hodge podge" 
of "information on lots of people's opinions", which includes sources from "half 
conventional, half alternative" perspectives, both "positive and negative". THAW's 
unique ability is to ensure that they hold a "collection of oddments left over from 
human endeavours" (Levi-Strauss, 1968, p.19) with which the health consumer as 
bricoleur engages and, hopefully, uses to make decisions about her own health care. 
THAW's assemblage is necessarily "limited" (Levi-Strauss, 1968, p.19) 
because they do not create the knowledge themselves but collect the "left over[s]" 
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from other health, feminist and government organisations. Once accessed, THAW 
then proceeds to "build up structured sets" of knowledges. This is illustrated by the 
folders which Cindy proudly points out. These "structural patterns" (Levi-Strauss, 
1968, p.33) are created by organising information into folders under the appropriate 
"heading". One of the tasks of a THAW employee is to "add to" these folders 
"constantly, almost every day". Cindy's words echo Levi-Strauss' description of the 
"ordering and re-ordering" (1968, p.22) that a bricoleur engages in. 
The purpose of this continual reworking or '(re)polishing' of the "same 
materials" (Levi-Strauss, 1968, p.21) is the "search to find [the materials] a 
meaning" (Levi-Strauss, 1968, p.22). Although the THAW office is like a bricoleur's 
creation, the people who work for this organisation do not complete the bricoleur's 
task of affixing 'meaning' to the assortment of information. This is because THAW 
avoids "tell[ing] women what to do" and, instead, encourages their clients to 
complete the job like that of a bricoleur by urging "them to take what they want, 
follow that up and reach their own conclusions". In other words, there is what could 
be likened to teamwork bricolage in operation here. THAW is responsible for the 
collection and ordering, reordering process, but their clients are obliged to do the 
additional reconstruction of the toolboxes and the final sense-making and problem 
solving components that a typical bricoleur addresses. Peter Kearns, a Christchurch 
naturopath and Co-Director of Canterbury College of Natural Medicine who was 
interviewed for this study (interview 26/8/2000), comments positively on THAW as a 
resource for health consumers when he says that "THAW does a good job with 
access to information ... they are very effective in this regard". It is my contention that 
access to a diversity of information, but especially medical data, is often tricky. 
'Conventional' medical knowledge rarely "falls in your lap" (Emily, interview 
13/9/2000) or appears magically 'at hand', so a collective bricolage effort becomes 
necessary. Bricoleurs can work together to solve problems and this is just the sort of 
atmosphere that is generated by THAW. THAW has created what could be called a 
bricoleur friendly environment by providing easy access to a set of tools that enable 
health consumers to engage in an activity similar to bricolage. This 1ype of approach 
to health matters is clearly appreciated by health consumers such as Emily 
(interview 13/9/2000) and Ginny (interview 31/8/2000). 
A clarification is necessary at this point in the discussion. The type of 
bricolage which I have been traversing and that some of the contraceptive users in 
this study practise, is a specific variety of "mythical thought" (Levi-Strauss, 1968, 
p.17) that Levi-Strauss refers to as "intellectual bricolage" (1968, p.17). That is, a 
number of health consumers I interviewed select :from a repertoire of extensive, but 
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nonetheless limited information at their disposal. The operative words here are 
'intellectual' and 'information' because as Weinstein and Weinstein (1991, p.162) 
note, the intellectual bricoleur "does not do hand work with tools and materials, but 
brain work with signifiers and significations" (1991, p.162). Weinstein and 
Weinstein's use of 'signifier and signification' refers to a conceptualisation of 
language as a sign system. A sign is composed of a signifier and a signified 
(Saussure, 1966). The signifier is the material aspect of the sign; whereas the 
signified is the mental concept (Saussure, 1966). The relationship between the 
signifier and the signified is 'arbitrary' (Saussure, 1966) and yet the two together 
create signs which generate significations (meanings). Ferdinand de Saussure ( 1966) 
is an important theorist who explored language in these terms, arguing that 
meanings lie in relations of difference. For instance, a "safe" 3GOC acquires 
meaning only in its contrasting relation to being "dangerous".3 
In other words, bricolage is not restricted to practical, everyday arenas, but 
is also able to operate within sign systems. Bricolage can be either/or, or both/and 
intellectual and practical. I would argue that many of the consumers in this study 
are intellectual bricoleurs, but that the way that they collect their information can 
be a practical, everyday activity (often an arduous one!) and that their decision 
making involves transforming the 'abstract' (intellectual) into the 'concrete' through 
examination of embodied signs. I will come to these elements later in the discussion. 
At present, I want to highlight that, although bricolage is not limited to intellectual 
manipulations, the particular variety that is exemplified by the consumers' 
storytelling in this study does primarily fall into the 'intellectual' category. To 
illustrate this point, many of the health providers and consumers in this study 
engage with meanings and sign systems that circulate before and during the 3GOC 
controversy. The consumers interviewed deploy a :fixed stock of signifiers, including 
the forms that the medical controversy takes. They do not develop a special 
technical language to deal with the debate. Rather, they construct meanings from 
the bricolage of tools and materials (often sign systems) which are 'at hand'. 
Bricolage is a term that comes from a structuralist theorist: Levi-Strauss. 
However, in their article 'Postmodernizing (Macro)Sociology', Weinstein and 
Weinstein (1993) argue that bricolage can be conceptualised as a postmodern 
concept. They draw analogies between bricolage, 'discursive formation' and 
'deconstruction', specifically because these three concepts stress "nonsystematic 
order" (p.224). They argue convincingly that there are "postmodernist elements to 
Levi-Strauss's structuralism" (1993, p.226). Weinstein and Weinstein reach the 
conclusion that Levi-Strauss "mutes his own rationalist search for deep structures 
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and emphasises bricolage as the form of cultural totality" (p.227). It is this 
postmodern flavour of bricolage that I contend provides most of this study's OC 
users with the ability to make sense of the 3GOC controversy. Since these 
consumers are working between and within competing and overlapping paradigms, 
the postmodern nature of bricolage assists them in reaching decisions about how to 
handle the controversy. 
In general, dismantling foundations, disrupting hierarchies, unsettling the 
"modernist settlement" (Latour, 1999, p.14) and questioning the modernist master 
narratives that seek to oppress 'others', are some of the primary aims :in most 
postmodernist projects. A Derridean (1976, 1997) deconstruction, for example, 
seeks to subvert the hierarchy of sign systems and to render them less authoritative. 
This allows marginal and excluded signifiers and subjectivities to gain presence. 
Anti-postmodernist protests (MacKinnon, 2000; Waters, 1996; Klein, 1996; 
Thompson, 1996; Spretnak, 1996) enter the arena at this point with claims that 
such deconstructions are actually destructions since they censure terms and render 
them nonexistent. However, as Butler (1992, p.16) persuasively reminds readers, 
this type of destabilisation manages to "release the term into a future of multiple 
significations, to emancipate it from the maternal and racialist ontologies to which it 
has been restricted and to give it play as a site where unanticipated meanings might 
come to bear". In liberating categories from fixed referents, new possibilities emerge 
and the potential for 'repolishing' becomes conceivable. 
In order to explain why it is that bricolage can be conceptualised as a 
postmodern notion, it is helpful to compare bricolage with 'blackboxing' (Latour, 
1999, p.304). Such a comparison does not set up bricolage and 'blackboxing' as a 
binary opposition since components of bricolage are more often than not blackboxes. 
But for the purposes of the present discussion the emphasis will be on contrasting 
these two notions rather than making connections. 
'Blackboxing' has been used by sociologists of science to refer to the way that 
"scientific and technical work is made invisible by its own success" (Latour, 1999, 
p.304). When a machine runs efficiently or an object is "unproblematic" (Latour, 
1987, p.131), or when a fact is settled and "well-established" (ibid), then the focus is 
on "inputs and outputs" (Latour, 1999, p.304) rather than internal complexities. For 
instance, prior to the 3GOC controversy, the focus was on the efficacy of the pill to 
prevent pregnancy in many women (output) who used OCs every day (input). During 
the controversy, the focus shifted to the internal complexities of OCs, especially 
3GOCs which contained certain hormonal steriods which were isolated as 
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problematic. Something becomes 'blackboxed' once many elements become a 
durable whole by "act[ing] as one" (Latour, 1987, p.131). This is significant because 
when something acts as one, a problematic element(s) (for example, the type of 
hormonal content in OCs) becomes 'invisible' and does not attract scrutiny. 
'Blackboxing' was ubiquitous before and during the 3GOC controversy. Prior 
to this medical controversy, 3GOCs were "unproblematic" for many users because 
the safety of this formulation was presumed to be a "well-established fact". The 
internal complexities of the pill's chemical hormones, for instance, were hidden from 
view. These were figuratively dark, hidden, covered up: blackboxed. The deaths of 
New Zealand women who had been taking 3GOCs prised these blackboxes open and 
subjected them to debate and scrutiny. 
'Blackboxing' is a technique that sits easily within the 'modernist settlement' 
because this concept's primary aims are to stabilise 'facts' and ensure the 
incontrovertible objectivity of objects. The postmodernist impulses discussed above 
are anathema to attempts to engage in 'blackboxing'. During the 3GOC debate, the 
vocabulary of the medical profession and researchers was suggestive that they were 
attempting to re-box 'facts' and convince users that it was appropriate to focus only 
on the pill's inputs and outputs instead of its internal composition. For instance, 
one of the medical professionals I interviewed, Doctor X (interview 14/9/2000), 
refers to "data that is definitely secure", and Doctor Rosemary Reid, a Christchurch 
medical specialist (interview 31/8/2000), states categorically that certain statistics 
pertaining to mortality and 3GOCs are "solid". Here, both the doctors' comments 
suggest that it is possible to push the questionable data back into their appropriate 
locations as stable, durable 'facts'. 
The medical profession is primarily concerned with the statistical risks, such 
as the "infrequent" (Medsafe, 1999) occurrence that only "l [woman] in 30,000" 
(ibid) each year will develop a blood clot. When new problems present themselves, 
such as those raised by the 3GOC controversy, the first problem solving technique is 
often to start with these statistical blackboxes. The aim is to rearrange the existing 
blackboxes into an appropriate pattern in order to solve the problem. If the data is 
"secure" and "stable", as alleged, then one can simply shuftle blackboxes around 
without actually opening them for further, detailed scrutiny. 
Blackboxes come in collections with other, related blackboxes, much like 
Russian dolls,4 in that it is possible to remove one blackbox or doll and find inside it 
a smaller, but similar blackbox or doll. Modernist settlements, blackboxes and 
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Russian dolls do not lend themselves to disruptions that try to alter the way that 
they were originally made. If you do not believe me then try to replace the dolls in a 
way that was different from the way that they were removed. Such "secure" and 
"solid" arrangements do not take kindly to these disruptions! 
It is worth pursuing a note on temporality here. This study explores the ways 
that OC users, in particular, deal with and make sense of the 3GOC controversy. 
What happens, for example, when they realise that a fact that they thought was 
settled, such as the safety of 3GOCs, becomes destabilised? Although it would be 
possible to do a study pursuant to the ANT model, (where the focus is the earlier 
periods of fact construction and how facts get 'made), this is not the focus of my 
thesis.5 Instead of taking 'facts' "back to where they crune from, to the mouths and 
hands of whoever made them" (Latour, 1987, p.25), this study's focus is on one 
method that consumers utilise to make sense of the controversy: bricolage. 
Bricolage can be conceptualised as a postmodern. notion for the following 
reasons: it is inherently messy, resisting cohesion, it reappropriates 'second hand' 
signs, and it is "ever-mutating" (Weinstein & Weinstein, 1993, p.230). In the process 
of making do with a stock of signi:fiers, bricoleurs piece together systems of 
meanings that do not resemble binary oppositions. The bricoleur constructs 
deregulated meanings which are subject to dispersion and endless transformations, 
such as "adding to" (Cindy Carmichael, interview 24/8/2000) and subtracting from 
medical folders "almost every day" (Cindy Carmichael, interview 24/8/2000). The 
bricoleur creates a strategy for living and coping with the 3GOC controversy by 
cobbling together whatever meanings can be wrested from the shards and fragments 
that are left over from, for example, the 3GOC controversy. 
Crucial to the process of bricolage is the accessing of information and the 
tools in the toolbox. However, as I have explained, "the public" as identified by 
Doctor Rosemary Reid (interview 31/8/2000) are often discouraged from opening 
and interrogating these 'blackboxes' and, indeed, 'blackboxes' invariably have a 
complicated series of metaphorical locks on them. Jacqueline (interview 
25/8/2000), a former OC user, imagines that important medical information is 
literally boxed up or locked away. She elaborates as follows: 
I think that the problem is that women aren't actually informed. I think that they are 
made to feel that the people who are in authority keep the information. I think that 
the medics keep knowledge to themselves, locked up, stored away and they only talk 
to each other about it. We aren't supposed to know about our own health or bodies. 
It's so hard for us to get into these secret safes of information. 
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Compare Jacqueline's description of 'secret' information to that offered by 
Doctor Rosemary Reid, the medical specialist interviewed for this study and cited 
above: 
It's good not to be paternalistic and withhold information from patients ... But I do 
think that the information in this particular debate has been misrepresented and I 
think that's just as harmful as hiding something in some ways. I think that it 
would've been better to keep the information away from the public until it had been 
looked at and settled by specialists ... ! know some people even went on the Internet 
and looked at information. That is sometimes quite dangerous because they're not 
sure how to interpret things. Medical things can be quite uninterpretable to non-
medical people. 
Although Doctor Rosemary Reid concedes that "withholding" data is 
problematic and "paternalistic", she, nonetheless, oscillates between disclosure and 
the 'dangers' supposedly connected with divuJgence of medical information to 
consumers. Indeed, it seems that despite her reservations about "hiding" 
information from consumers, Doctor Rosemary Reid eventually decides that keeping 
"these secret safes ofinfonnation. .. to themselves" (Jacqueline, interview 25/8/2000) 
is in the best interests of "the public". Her concern centres on whether medical 
information is "settled" or "uninterpretable" [sic]. "Misrepresentation" can be 
"harmful" according to Doctor Rosemary Reid. Her comments suggest that her 
concern is that the proliferation of signi:fiers will be open to a multiplicity of 
meanings. This is boxed up and called "misrepresent[ation]". 
But 'bricolage' does not just involve people accessing information and 
'blackboxing' is not just about people hiding information, as in the example above. 
What is 'blackboxed' is what scientists and doctors take for granted. Attention is not 
paid to the internal dynamics because assumptions are made about how things 
work. Doctors and scientists do not bother with their assumptions about how things 
fit together until there is an unexpected output. 
Bricolage involves opening and appropriating 'blackboxed' medical 
information for its own sense-making purposes. Bricolage may involve lifting the 
metaphorical lids of blackboxes and investigating the contents. But it is important to 
note that this process involves accessing information from different sources, a 
lateral action, rather than delving deeply in 'blackboxes', as I point out later in this 
chapter. Furthermore, bricolage can be disruptive of 'blackboxes', but it does not 
have to be. Nonetheless, the bricoleurs' work of e::rrnmining details within 
'blackboxes' (albeit less deeply) is related to what gets done by engineers doing 'white 
box testing' (Myers, 1979; Beizer, 1995; Wallace, 1986). This is a type of testing that 
is conducted by software engineers. The essence of this process is as follows: when 
an engineering product is functioning correctly having been 'white boxed tested', the 
'black box testers' only need focus on its inputs and outputs. However, when 'field 
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failures' occur and something malfunctions, the 'white box testers' must re-examine 
the intricate workings of the product. Both blackbox and whitebox testing are test 
design methods. Blackbox testers treat the system as a blackbox in that they do not 
explicitly use or investigate knowledge relating to the internal structure. Blackbox 
testers usually focus on function requirements. Hence, this system of testing is also 
referred to as "functional", "opaque boxed", or "closed box" (Beizer, 1995, p.8). White 
box test design, by contrast, allows the tester to peek inside the boxes and focus 
specifically on using internal knowledge of the software to guide the selection of test 
data Synonyms for white box testing include "structural", "glass box" and "clear 
box" (Myers, 1979, p.12). During blackbox testing the internal code is hidden and 
inputs and outputs are examined, but whitebox testers look specifically at the 
intricate workings of the programme.6 
Borrowing from the notion of 'white box testing', this study invokes what I 
have called 'whiteboxing'. This activity is not 'testing' per se, but a close examination 
of the inner contents of blackboxes that are comprised of sign systems, knowledges, 
information, meanings. Prior to the 3GOC debate (and despite historical 
controversies about OCs), many of the key actors in this field (consumers, doctors 
and scientists) thought that 3GOCs were problem free and, consequently, it was 
satisfactory to focus only on the pill's inputs and outputs. However, the deaths of 
several Aotearoa/New Zealand women (drastic 'field failures1) lifted the lid of the 
'blackboxed' 'facts' pertaining to risks and side effects and prompted further 
whiteboxing. This involves looking at how the pill works, how it interacts with 
different female bodies, what its chemical composition is, and addressing the 
previously hidden 'structures', or epistemological underpinnings, of the object or 
'facts'. 
The notion of 'white boxing' is useful for a study of a medical controversy. 7 
What gets done in a controversy includes rigorously unpacking the previously solid, 
timeless certainty of particular meanings and 'facts'. One thing that happens in a 
controversy is that people ask questions, examine and scrutinise the proliferation of 
claims that emerge from the previously neatly packaged blackboxes. The synonyms 
for the two systems of testing are pertinent here. Whereas, blackboxed information 
has the effect of making some consumers feel as if this knowledge is "locked up, 
stored away" (Jacqueline, interview 25/8/2000) so as to render them "blind" (Ellen, 
interview 7/9/2000) or "kept in the dark" (Ginny, interview 31/8/2000), the 
adoption of bricolage allows consumers to 'unpack' some of the components of these 
boxes. 
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The difference between 'whiteboxing' and 'white box testing' is that the latter, 
in its most pure form, tries to test and solve the whole problem and to understand 
its complexity in its entirety. Granted, this is sometimes not what occurs in practice, 
but the aim of white box testing is to take the bits of blackboxes to pieces, examine 
them and get to the vezy bottom of the problem 'boxes'. By contrast, as a researcher, 
I am engaging in a type of 'whiteboxing' because I am selecting certain blackboxes to 
'open'. My focus is on the 'boxes' that pertain to knowledge and information 
construction and appropriation, but this does not mean that these are the only 
blackboxes that could be scrutinised. There are many blackboxes that circulate 
during the 3GOC controversy that I have not attempted to 'open'. For in.stance, this 
project does not 'white box test' the chemical hormonal components of the 3GOCs. 
Like the consumers in this study, I, too, have chosen only to explore the contents of 
certain boxes that pertain to the project 'at hand'. 
Bricolage, while sharing some similar investigative strategies as 
'whiteboxing', departs from the latter in that bricoleurs are content to only open 
those blackboxes that are relevant to their problem solving tasks 'at hand'. The 
exercise of bricolage involves paying equal attention to different pieces of information 
(such as embodied signs, 'talk' from friends and family, media representations and 
popular television talk shows) in a way that medical professionals do not. A doctor 
might invoke statistics on the frequency of thrombosis, but for the consumer as 
bricoleur, the question becomes whether she is one of those two people in thirty 
thousand who might suffer from a blood clot. The attempt to answer this question 
involves acquiring more information about the consumer's own 'body-self, for 
in.stance. In addition, a bricoleur frequently does not delve particularly deeply into 
'blackboxes'. A white box tester is in.variably obliged to delve deeper into the 
'blackboxes'. By contrast, a bricoleur is often content with scratching surfaces, 
peeking and glancing in.to blackboxes. 
This distinction between 'whiteboxing' and bricolage can be illustrated 
through a comment from Peter Kearns, a Christchurch naturopath and Co-Director 
of Canterbury College of Natural Medicine (inteiview 26/8/2000). Peter Kearns 
argues that "people know what they read in the paper, or on the internet, etc, but in 
actual fact that's just the tip of the iceberg". He contrasts "substantial, detailed 
knowledge" with "tip of the iceberg" information. Peter Kearns continues to say that 
accessing the "real detail" is "complicated and sophisticated" and "takes a lot of 
digging". The point is that both 'white boxing' and bricolage are strategies devoted to 
"digging" in.to blackboxes. However, the difference lies in the degree of "digging" that 
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eventuates. While bricolage might only reach the "tip of the iceberg", 'white boxing' 
aims to burrow and rummage deeply in details. 
According to Zena (interview 13/9/2000), the 'limitations'B of collecting a 
multiplicity of knowledges are often a result of both time constraints and "closure" of 
the controversy for the individual consumer. Zena states that although she would 
want to talk to a "GP, NFP practitioner, naturopath, midwife, consumers, etc, etc" in 
order to "really investigate every possible angle", this would prove to be a "complete 
impracticability" due to "strained time factors". In other words, despite Zena's 
preferred strategy, she has to 'make do' with bricolage because this is more practical 
when there are time pressures. She elaborates, saying that she had "quite a decent 
look at what a few people have said about the debate and some of the statistical 
data" and she deems that is "enough for [her] to make a decision". Further, Zena 
says that once she completes this task, for her, "there is no debate now. I've 
forgotten about it. The problem has been solved to my satisfaction". Once Zena has 
unpacked the blackboxes pertinent to her own investigations, she can create a new 
blackbox out of the available signifiers, a (re)appropriation in other words, and 
create a solution which ends the debate for her. It is my argument that the concepts 
bricolage and blackboxing, in particular, are useful to a study of the 3GOC 
controversy because these are a few of the primary notions at work during the 
debate. 
Bricolage is a metaphor, a conceptual possibility, bent to the purpose of 
highlighting features of strategic action taken by the majority of the consumers of 
OCs interviewed for this study. Bricolage is a term applied to the processes and 
practices undertaken by the majority of this study's participants. However, all the 
participants do not behave according to what I call bricolage. I interviewed eleven 
contraceptive consumers. According to my utilisation of bricolage, nine of these 
consumers can be analysed as bricoleurs and two as contraceptive users who are 
not bricoleurs. In Chapter Four, I problematise this strict demarcation between 
those who do and do not engage in bricolage. For example, while Marion (interview 
29/8/2000) gives weight to her own embodied 'experiences', she primarily relies 
upon her doctor's advice. The extent to which people employ certain zypes of 
information and which sources are valued, is explored in-Chapter Four. In addition, 
this chapter also compares the strategy of bricolage with other strategies, such as 
"trusting" (Marion, interview 29/8/2000) the "doctor's expertise" (Marion), which 
:frees a potential bricoleur from the perceived necessity to seek out further 
information. In a similar way, some of the consumers who do bricolage during the 
3GOC controversy, tell stories which indicate that in other areas of their lives they 
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do not behave as bricoleurs but, instead, "rely on people who know more" (Sarah, 
interview 26/9/2000) about health care, in this case, purchasing a herbal remedy. 
My acknowledgement that I am constructing this study's contraceptive 
consumers as bricoleurs, stems from an awareness that I am inevitably simplifying 
the complexity of their storytelling, in part, because I am framing 'reality' rather 
than innocently reflecting or representing 'reality'. The sense-making of the 
consumers interviewed, and indeed the meanings that I ascribe to their interview 
transcripts, are not simple reflections of 'real' meanings. On the contrary, the texts 
which convey these meanings are the products of social conventions. 
'Reality', as a problematic notion, is explored by Allen Curnow (1974, p.63) in 
his poem "A Window Frame". Curnow's earlier works draw from a realist theocy of 
language. He constructs the poet as a stable, accurate and objective source of 
perception. And the text of the poem is intended to be like a mirror: transparent, 
clear, real and true to the reality that he insists exists "prior to the poem" (Horrocks, 
1983, pp.30-31). By contrast, Curnow's later works illustrate a shift in his thinking. 
In "A Window Frame", for example, the narrator of the poem is anxious because he 
cannot capture and document what he sees outside the window of his house. The 
narrator's anxiety and confusion increases as he realises that 'reality' is 'm.essy': 
It is not what you say, 
It is not the way you say it, 
It is not the words in a certain order. 
Look out the window. 
It is on the page. 
Examine the page. 
It is out the window. 
Knuckle the cool pane. 
It is in the bone. 
Why is the mud glassed, 
With mangroves 
Bedded in the glass? 
Why is the cloud 
Inverted in the glass? 
Why are the islands 
In the Gulf stained blue 




The narrator realises that language refuses to perform the function of access 
to the 'real'. The 'reality' outside the window is inextricably mixed with the 'mess' of 
intertextuality, situated 'representations' and a self who spills over into the world 
being 'framed'. The window frame does not innocently frame what is outside. Rather, 
the narrator is involved in the creation of the 'framing' of 'reality' outside the window 
frame. When he sees Hoyte colours instead of the 'real' scene, he realises that art 
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has formed and 'framed' his perceptions. There is no immediate access to the 'real'. 
The narrator is forced to accept that language is not like a transparent window. He 
cannot capture a pre-existing 'reality' that is devoid of perceptions, 'framings', 'mess' 
and constructions. 
Like the narrator in "A Window Frame", I, too, recognise that the participants 
in this study and I are co-producers of 'messy' texts about the 3GOC controversy. 
We are not reflecting aspects of the controversy as they 'really' are. Rather, we are 
aware of our 'framing' of the events through the memories and stories we tell. Just 
as the participants have re-created their lived 'experiences' of a contraceptive 
controversy through sto:rytelling, I have similarly 'messed' the stories that they 
transmitted to me. Part of this 'mess' involves taking ideas from a selection of non-
modernist writers and running these alongside a medical controversy. And the 
reality of this concession is the realisation that people shape and 'frame' worlds just 
as those 'realities' and discourses shape people's subjectivities. 
Bricolage as practice can be illustrated by paying attention to the self-stories 
that some OC users utilise to constitute them/ selves and their consequent actions. 
Contraceptive consumers, particularly during a medical controversy, are exposed to 
multiple sources of information. They engage in a production of the self with 
whatever resources they find 'at hand'. My focus is on subjects' practices of 
bricolage as they constitute their selves in and through the varied discourses with 
which they come into contact. 
The constitution of the 'subject' through discourse is a poststructuralist idea 
(Foucault, 1983; Derrida, 1976; Butler, 1992; Davies, 1997). In contrast to the 
prediscursive humanist subject, the poststructuralist holds that discourses make 
subject positions available (Jones, 1997; Davies, 1992; Davies, 1997, Foucault, 
1972). Further, the poststructuralist subject is de-essentialised, comprised of 
multiplicities and contradictions (Kondo, 1990). Contrary to the supposed risks 
involved in adopting a poststructuralist notion of the 'subject', to "deconstruct the 
subject does not mean to deny its existence" (Derrida, 1976, p.125). Instead, 
poststructuralist positions see the subject as a discursive process, rather than as a 
unique invention. The shift involves reconceptualising the self as a noun to the self 
as a verb (Davies, 1997, p.274). In the latter schema, the self is always in process, 
taJcing shape in and through discursive possibilities. Davies (1997, p.274) 
summarises the poststructuralist subject as having the ability, among other things, 
to "see the constitutive process; read the texts of their selving; .. .look at the 
contradictions within discourses ... ; play endlessly with the discursive possibilities 
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that have been made observable". Such a subject can take up the various subject 
positions made available. 
In Chapter Four, I concentrate on bricolage in action, illustrating the ways 
that some of the subjects 'interviewed' constitute their subjectivity through the 
range of discourses circulating about contraceptive technologies and in doing so, 
make sense of the controversy and embark on actions based on this discursive 
constitution of self. In Chapter Four, I want to isolate several excerpts from the 
transcripts to highlight the discursive possibilities through which selves are made, 
not "born" (Haraway, 1989, p.10). 
The discourse of risk is a primary example from the discursive toolbox which 
subjects take up in the production of their selves and decision making during the 
3GOC controversy. Risks associated with OCs are circulated through use of an 
'immutable mobile' (Latour, 1987,pp.223-227; 1999, p.307) such as a government 
handout.9 These pamphlets can become part of the bricoleur's discursive toolbox 
because they are circulated throughout Aotearoa/New Zealand in health clinics. 
Such documents are important to the notion of bricolage because they are 
conveniently 'at hand', part of the discursive toolbox and utilised in bricoleur's sense 
making and problem solving activities. 
The government documents on risks associated with OCs are readily 'at 
hand' and what Latour (1987, p.224) refers to as 'mobile'. This is because they are 
easily circulated, sometimes travelling long distances and they are also termed 
'immutable' since they preserve stable, 'blackboxed' information without additional 
distortion. Latour (1987, pp.223-227) also adds that 'immutable mobiles' can be 
combined with other disseminated information. 'Immutable mobiles', then, are some 
form of text - pamphlet, doctor's notes, diagram, graphs, writing, pictures - which 
can be moved but remains stable in different contexts and is often combined with 
other such texts. These devices are also capable of linking various actors in a given 
network, such as the State, doctors, OCs, consumers. Latour (1987, pp. 223) 
explains that these texts permit the "mobilisation of worlds" because they are able to 
move through time and space. Finally, 'immutable mobiles' - arguably because they 
comprise the bricoleur's toolbox - are always "conveniently at hand" (ibid, p.227). 
The consumer information contained in the Ministry of Health's (Januaiy 
1992) "advice for women about oral contraceptives" maintains and perpetuates the 
privileged statistical data pertaining to QC use. For instance, a series of numbers 
are presented with the agenda of examining OCs critically in order to prove to 
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consumers that OCs are indeed 'safe'. The Med.safe 'immutable mobile' provides a 
statistical chart which documents the "risk of blood clots per year" that are 
associated with the various formulations of OCs that could be consumed by the 
mysterious 'subject' called the "normal healthy woman". 
Certain subject positions such as the "normal healthy woman" are made 
readily available and 'at hand' for consumers within dominant institutionalised 
discourses. Frequently such positions appear 'natural' and 'normal' and, thus, their 
certainty and inevitability leads to the assumption that they are immutable. I asked 
all OC users who participated in this study about whether they received the 
government handouts, how they accessed them, and how they responded to them. 
Among the variety of responses I received, some explained that they appreciate "fact 
sheets" (Heidi, inteiview 26/8/2000) if you are that "sort of person" (Margaret Kyle, 
midwife, intetview6/9/2000); whereas others, such as Emily (intetview 13/9/2000), 
Ellen (intetview 7/9/2000) and Jacqueline (inteiview 25/8/2000), found the 
presentation of risk as an abstraction required combining the 'immutable mobile' 
with other discursive strategies such as bodily signs. For instance, in an excerpt 
quoted earlier in this chapter, Emily explains that she felt it was necessary to "put 
what the figures say in the context of your own body's responses to the treatment" 
because it is not possible to "simply read the statistics as they appear". And she 
continues her explanation by saying that "those information leaflets ... aren't enough 
by themselves. You've got to read them with other stuff". Emily's description 
indicates that 'immutable mobiles' may be combined with other information, but 
that they are also mutable, something which a number of theorists have argued in 
response to Actor Network Theory's construction of these devices as immutable 
(Winner, 1986; Singleton & Michael, 1993; Dugdale, 1999). 
Following these theorists, I, too, depart from Latour's notion that what he 
refers to as 'immutable mobiles' are primarily immutable. Rather, I would argue that 
they are both immutable and mutable. I am referring here to reader/ consumer 
responses to such objects. 'Immutable mobiles' such as consumer leaflets do indeed 
try to create durable 'facts' and transcend various contexts. However, these attempts 
at fixing information are not always successful. This is shown through an analysis of 
what consumers do with such devices. While Latour (1987, p.259) does state, almost 
as an afterthought, that the "fate of facts and machines is in later users' hands", he 
does, nonetheless, tend to emphasise the immutability of 'immutable mobiles', 
rather than highlighting their malleability through consumer responses. 
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One way to interpret Emily's (inteiview 13/9/2000) response to the 
government handouts on the risks associated with OCs is to read it through the lens 
ofbricolage: a concept which relies on the mutability of tools 'at hand'. According to 
Levi-Strauss, the bricoleur works with the science of the concrete. It is my 
contention that, in practice, bricolage involves reaching conclusions from specific 
examples and accounts, as well as making the abstract concrete. Ellen (intetview 
7/9/2000), for instance, contrasts herself to what she calls the "blind" consumer. 
She concedes that she was once also a 'blind consumer', which indicates that her 
construction of subjectivity is a-process. Ellen's subjectivity involves reworking the 
discourse of risk made available to her through government handouts: 
Yeah, I got those bits of paper. But I just don't think that they mean a thing unless 
you have bodify awareness ... All it is is a bunch of numbers on the page which need 
to be grounded in your own body's experiences. It just isn't the real me, anymore, to 
not listen to what my body says to me. I think being conscious and aware of your 
body opens your eyes up. I wasn't always like this. And, who knows what I'll be like in 
a few years? But once you're not blind, it's possible to read the numbers on the 
handouts, bring them back to your own situation, make them yours and really get to 
the nitty gritty of what they mean. 
Ellen (interview 7/9/2000) constructs her/self as a consumer who becomes 
one who is not 'blind'. Furthermore, she could only become a user who is "conscious 
and aware" by "putting something of [her]self into" (Levi-Strauss, 1968, p.21) the 
activity. The 'blackboxed' numerical abstractions that appear on "those bits of 
paper" do not allow readers to delve into the "nitty gritty" of meanings and self-
production. This can only be achieved through a discursive constitution of the self, 
by making the numbers "yours", and this necessarily involves connecting the 
abstract and the concrete. 
The process of bricolage is intimately connected to the discursive 
construction of subjectivity. (Re)crafting subjectivities is a component of the practice 
of bricolage. As a bricoleur gathers various pieces of information s/he makes sense 
of these knowledges by, in part, placing them in the context of her /his own personal 
biography and subjectivity. The discursive constitution of self entails taking up 
available discourses, making "them yours", and the corollaxy is that subjects often 
consider the creation to be of their own unique, "real me" (Ellen, intetview 
7/9/2000) or authentic self. To put this another way, if subjectivity is constructed 
in the 3GOC controversy primarily through the discourse of risk, then consumers 
can feel that they are not being true to themselves if they do not incorporate the 
notion of risk into their sense of self. In Feminisms and the Self: The Web of Identity, 
Griffiths ( 1995) utilises the metaphor of a web to argue that self-identity is an 
intricate entanglement of multiple selves. She addresses the question of the 
possibility of recognising authenticity. That is, just as Ellen is concerned to identify 
her "real me", Griffiths also writes that the desire to 'discover' the "true me" and to 
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"be myself' (pp.174-175) are legitimate enquiries. However, rather than 
conceptualising this 'search' in humanist terms where the self to be found is a 
unitary, stable, essence, Griffiths argues for selves which have changing cores of 
being-becoming. As she succinctly puts it, authenticity "requires re-assessing the 
changing self, not preserving a sameness" (p.185). In Ellen's (interview 7/9/2000) 
stocytelling, becoming her 'real' self involves a process that uses and reuses 
discursive tools such as risk and bodily signs. 
The narrative convention in the consumer handouts that maintains the 
Cartesian dualism between the compartmentalised head and body is contested by 
Ellen's (intexview 7/9/2000) story which is told through the body. This strategy is 
similar to Frank's (1995) notion of the 'body-self. He notes that this phrase comes 
from Kleinman (p.169). The 'body-self denotes a rejection of the mind/body 
dualism, where the form.er term is privileged over the latter. Frank's argument is 
that selves are found and formed through bodies (pp.180-181). As such, actors do 
not tell stories about their bodies, but through their bodies (p.2). The body creates 
the self. People telling stories about bodies do not simply "describe", according to 
Frank (1995, p.27). Rather, it is "bodies (that] give their stories their particular 
shape and meaning" (Frank, 1995, p.27). Ellen's (interview 7/9/2000) reliance on 
her body's 'experiences' is in itself a discursive strategy. Ellen becomes a consumer 
who is not "blind" and, thus, one who conceives of herself as authentic and "real", 
by discursively elaborating on her "body's experiences" in her story about her 
subjectivity and responses to the controversy. 
Frank discusses the ability for lmowJ.edges and selves to come 'from' bodies. 
While I agree with the need to trouble the body /mind dualism, I think that his point 
would benefit from an inclusion of the idea that discourses also shape embodiment. 
I am referring here not to bodily constituted narratives, but to a discursively 
constituted embodiment. A focus on the discursive constitution of embodiment does 
not eschew the corporeality of physical signs, nor does it deny that there are 
physiological occurrences that affect people's lives and sense of self. Usher (1997) 
provides an excellent collection of the debates in social theory surrounding the 
supposed material, discursive divide. Likewise, Barrett (1997, pp.201-219) considers 
Foucault's imperative to "dispense with things" (p.201) in favour of words. My 
argument is that bodily pain does 'exist', but it is the discursive meanings that 
people attach to embodiment that are vital because meanings are discursively 
apprehended. An understanding of what bodily signs mean is mediated through, 
and is the result of, discourses. 
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Ellen (interview 7/9/2000) has told a unique, 'authentic' story about her 
'experiences' with OCs. However, she has composed this story by adapting and 
combining narrative tools that cultures make available. Her metaphor of the "blind" 
consumer is arguably a (re)appropriation of a well-established notion of self as 
psychological consciousness and deep, reflexive (body)-self awareness. The 
discursive possibility that privileges a self which is not 'blind' is taken up by Ellen. 
This discourse has a long trajectory from the Torah, to strands of Western 
psychology, to modernist writings, and feminist politics which encourage women to 
be lrnowledgeable, aware and anything but blind.10 In Genesis (2:5), the serpent tells 
Eve that her "eyes shall be opened" if she eats from the Tree of Knowledge. And later 
(Genesis, 2:7), the Torah tells readers that "the eyes of them both [Adam and Eve] 
were opened, and they lrnew that they were naked". The metaphor of 
seeing/knowing and blindness/ignorance is one which is deeply entrenched in 
Western culture. Just as Adam and Eve's eyes were "opened" upon gaining 
lrnowledge, Ellen (interview 7/9/2000) also refers to her acquisition of knowledge 
about the effects of OCs as "opening [her] eyes up". The point of this connection 
between the Torah and Ellen's stories is to illustrate that her discursive construction 
of self is just that: discursive. She reworks an old metaphor of self-knowledge/ seeing 
by uniquely deploying it in the context of her own "situation". Even in the process of 
telling her stories to me, Ellen's selves became formed and constituted through the 
discursive tools that she picked up. 
I have italicised picked and picks in order to raise the issue of whether a 
poststructuralist subject can have agency. Just as Eve and Adam pick knowledge, 
can consumers like Ellen (interview 7/9/2000) also be said to be actively engaged in 
picking the discursive tools which constitute selves? This debate is traversed by 
Jones (1997) and Davies (1997) who partake in a disembodied conversation 
concerning whether students who use poststructuralist ideas end up invoking a 
humanist self, there by eschewing the tenets of poststructuralist thought. As Davies 
(1997, p.279) convincingly observes in response to Jones, the 'hand' that picks from 
the discursive possibilities 'at hand' needs to be visible: 
'Choices' must be made (which tool shall I pick up and how shall I use it, how shall I 
take up the possibilities of reconfiguration made possible through contradictory 
discursive injunctions?) She (Butler and by extension Jones] does not, however, make 
the active, choosing subject remain visible in her text. The invisible hand that takes 
up the tool in her metaphor reminds me of the invisible women in men's histories of 
early Australian settlement/invasion, who put the food on the table, who bore the 
children but were never themselves written about as subjects. 
Indeed, the 'invisible hand' and 'invisible women' in Australian history books 
are reminiscent of Levi-Strauss' formulation of bricolage, whereby the agency of the 
bricoleur is circumvented because this figure 'makes do' with what is supposedly 
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easily accessible and 'at hand'. The ta1cing up or picking up of tools is not 
determined by their availability (Davies, 1997, p.279). This entails some degree of 
agency. 
Davies also writes that when you are constituted as a powerful agent it is 
possible to "act powerfully" (p.272). The discourse created by the Cartwright 
Inquiry's construction of a proactive consumer, for exam.pie, constitutes women as 
potential agents in Aotearoa/New Zealand. Indeed, some consumers interviewed, 
like Jacqueline (inteiview 25/8/2000), pick up on this discursive strand and utilise 
it to produce a self who "knows her rights" and, consequently, is capable of exerting 
agency in "getting the information that [she] needs". So it is not that nothing exists 
outside the text (Derrida, 1976) as soon as one pays attention to discursive 
strategies. What exists is a discursively constituted self who feels "in control", as 
Ginny (interview 31/8/2000) indicated in her interview, precisely because she has 
picked up a discursive tool which emphasises the possibilities for agency. By ta1cing 
up the various st.rands that comprise bricolage, and the constituting of selves that 
occurs through that process, the majority of consumers interviewed are able to 
construct themselves as active agents. 
But if the su~ect is picking from a range of discursive possibilities, then the 
su~ect must be fragmented, and a question arises about whether this subject has 
the ability to make a political stance based on his/her 'identity'. Given the currency 
ofthis sort of argument (Jones, 1997; Davies, 1997) and the entrenched figure ofthe 
humanist su~ect, it is not surprising that OC users, such as Phillipa (inteiview 
23/8/2000), experience anxiety concerning their fragmented selves. Phillipa tells 
stories about the difficulty of reconciling her "feminist me"11 with the discourses 
promoted by her mother who is Catholic. Since the trope of the 'warring self' (Du 
Bois, 1969, p.45), who desperately seeks to re-unify her/his essence, is readily 
. available, it is hardly surprising that Phillipa (interview 23/8/2000) expresses 
anxiety about fragmentation and contradictions within her/ selves. Following Flax 
(1993, pp.92-93), I contend that only multiple, fragmented su~ects are capable of 
"invent[ing] ways to struggle against domination that will not merely recreate it". It is 
the active picking up of pieces from the melange of bricolage, and the constituting of 
selves through that process, that enables emancipation. 
It is only through the 'messy texts' of bricolage that active subjects are 
produced. As Frank (1995, p.58) correctly points out, stories about health are 
frequently composed of these multiple, messy strands, spanning time frames which 
makes it harder for the listener to pull out the pieces, and organise them (even if 
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only temporarily). As a researcher, one of my tasks is to pick up some of these 
threads and look at the ways that consumers use them in the context of a public 
controversy about medical technologies. In the next chapter the process of 
constituting selves through bricolage is explored further. It is reiterated that the gulf 
between theory and practice is imagined . .Although a metaphorical, theoretical idea, 
bricolage is practice: a set of practical, everyday strategies for 'making do' and 
constituting selves. This stance has led writers such as Latour (1999, p.267, 
emphasis in original) to posit that the difference between theory and practice is a 
"divide that has been made'. Pursuing a similar line of reasoning, the next chapter 
argues that methodology, theory and 'experience' constitute an intricately 
connected, but nonetheless 'messy' text. I seek to expand the notion of what can 
count as a theory-method package by arguing, like Kondo (1990, p.8, emphasis in 
original), that "experience and evocation can become theory'. 
NOTES 
1 The quote marks here draw attention to many poststructuralist, postmodernist and Actor 
Network Theorists' resistance to having their ideas 'blackboxed' as theories. This label defeats 
the purpose of the ideas that they produce. 
2 The theoretical ideas developed through these substantive examples are explored in further 
detail in Chapter Four. 
3 Please see Chapter Five for an analysis of the sign 'safe'. 
4 Thank you Ima for bringing this to my attention. 
5 Looking at the earlier stages of fact production and construction as this pertains to the 
original formulation of the pill is the focus of Oudshoorn's (1994) book Beyond the Natural. 
Body: An Archaeology of Sex Hormones. She traces the origin of 'facts' about oral 
contraceptives and concludes that these seemingly incontrovertible statements are actually 
"made" rather than innocently "born" (Haraway, 1989, p.10). 
6 I am indebted to Karl Willoughby (an electronics engineer who does white box testing) for 
discussing this technique with me. 
7 For an example see Latour (1987, pp.22-27) for a detailed analysis of the production of 
'facts' and their destabilisation through a controversy. Latour's focus in the initial chapters is 
on the tiny blackboxes that are comprised of statements of 'facts' within facts and the way 
that they become firmly packaged premises. · 
8 The limitations of bricolage that I am referring to differ from those raised by Levi-Strauss. 
While I argue that this process is limited because it does not delve as deep into blackboxes as 
whiteboxing does, Levi-Strauss holds that bricolage is a "closed" (p.17) and "limited" (p.19) 
system because it is always forced to rework the same collection of heterogeneous tools. 
9 Please refer to appendix 7 for two examples of the handouts produced by the Ministry of 
Health which I am calling 'immutable mobiles'. 
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10 Even the titles of contemporary films, such as Stanley Kubrick's Eyes Wide Shut, play with 
the metaphor of being able to 'see' through knowing. 
11 Phillipa (inteiview 23/8/2000) also invokes the discourse of 'choice' during the telling of 
this particular story. The way that subjectivity is constructed through the discourse of 'choice' 
is explored further in Chapter Five. 
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CHAPTER4 
BRICOLAGE AT WORK 
Iron Lung 
The ventriloquist's breath; 
watch, while my lungs compress 
it is the concertina pump that sighs. 
Not a glass coffm, more obscure, 
a dark room I cannot go into 
but am locked into from the neck. 
The pressure: 
your hand on the small of my back, 
a whispered imperative, I rise and fall. 
The recovery of tension, I dream of it -
through a window, adjacent trains in a station, 
how one must be moving if the other is still. 
(Greenlaw, 1997, p.35) 
The narrator in the poem1 above expresses the unease caused by not having 
direct, visual access to her2 body. While visiting the doctor, she becomes :frustrated 
because she is unable to see into her body. Unlike a "glass coffin", readily available 
to sight, her body is "dark" and inaccessible. Although her mind and body are 
seemingly connected, after all she is "locked into [her body] from the neck", her 
:frustration lies with not being able to see/know what is happening in her lungs. The 
corollary of this blindness and darkness is a perpetuation of the Cartesian split: she 
is removed from her body. She is not a body, she has a body. The sounds appear to 
come from another source: it is a "ventriloquist's breath", not her own. And "it is the 
concertina pump that sighs" not her own 'body-self'. 
The anxiety felt by the narrator, when she realises her body is 'dark' and 
unable to be accessed visually, is connected to a pre-existing, circulating 'meta-
narrative'. Vision, in the 'eyes' of much of the Westerp. world, has been privileged 
over other senses. The practice of making images, for example, as a route to 
scientific 'discovery' has a long history (Rorty, 1995; Lynch & Woo]gar, 1988). The 
task of medicine is frequently not the elucidation of what the patient says, but what 
the 'expert' sees in the body.3 As Frances Price (1996, pp.84, 97) argues, visual 
imagery is often presented as able to capture "literal reality" and the images 
produced by the machines are constructed as "truth transporting". In other words, 
the ability to see the inside workings of bodies provides an authoritative knowledge 
about the body, which is either difficult or impossible, to gain through other ways of 
knowing. Seeing (and, by extension, knowing) is a powerful and ubiquitous 
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discursive tool that subjects take up. Given that this discourse is valorised, it is 
hardly surprising that subjects express anxiety when they are rendered 'blind'.4 
Like the narrator in Iron Lung, many of the OC users interviewed in this 
study also express anxieties when they are unable to see /know their bodies and 
selves. Talk about 'blind consumers' (Ellen, interview 7/9/2000), "hidden" (Sarah, 
interview, 26/9/2000) embodiment, being "kept in the dark" (Ginny, interview 
31/9/2000) and becoming "alienated from [your] body" (Zena, interview 13/9/2000) 
abound. As Jacqueline (inteiview 25/8/2000) states, not even the medical 
profession "can see into the body to check how the pill is working". However, in 
contrast to the narrator in the poem, most of the consumers interviewed do not feel 
disconnected from their bodies due to the lack of (literal) visibility. Much of the 
consumers' talk concerns "listening" (Emily, interview 13/9/2000) to their bodies: a 
strategy which is conceived as being tantamount to 'seeing' into bodies. Despite the 
inability of optical technologies to generate images of the pill's workings in their 
bodies, the OC users inteiviewed conceptualise seeing/knowing as the ability to 
'read' the body. Their subjectivities are primarily discursively constituted. What they 
see /know about their bodies is inextricably connected to discourses that they take 
up as their own. 
This chapter develops the notion of bricolage at work that was introduced in 
Chapter Three. I engage with bricolage in action through illustrations of the ways 
that many of the subjects 'interviewed' constitute their subjectivities through 
circulating discourses in order to make sense of the 3GOC controversy and make 
decisions based on their constituted 'body-self. Although there is a proliferation of 
readily available discourses within the discursive toolbox, this chapter isolates 
several primacy discursive strategies for analysis. In particular, I explore the 
discourse of risk as it appears in the 3GOC controversy. I argue that most of the 
consumers interviewed constitute their 'body-self by invoking bricolage which 
makes the abstraction of (statistical) risk concrete through seeing/knowing bodies 
and subjectivities. It is only by treating bodies as "glass coffin[s]" that it becomes 
possible to be what Ellen (interview 7/9/2000) refers to as "physically conscious" 
and, thus, make sense of medical debates and problem solve. While this chapter's 
focus is on the discourse of risk, the consumer's 'talk' on risk is intermingled with 
other, often related, discursive tools such as feminism, choice and rights. In this 
chapter I also explore possible reasons for the uptake of alternative discursive, 
sense-making strategies because two of the eleven women I interviewed did not 
utilise bricolage as an interpretative strategy. 
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Nonetheless, the majority of the consumers interviewed engage in the 
ingenious '(re)polishing' of various sources of information about the risks associated 
with OCs: the process that I call bricolage. A bricoleur reworks material that has 
been "transmitted in advance" (Levi-Strauss, 1968, p.20) and, therefore, s/he does 
not necessarily feel compelled to investigate the matter in great depth. For instance, 
several of the OC users interviewed remark that the risks of 3GOCs are "minutiae" 
(Marion, interview 29/8/2000) or "small" (Heidi, interview 26/8/2000) when 
compared with the risks inherent in eve:cyday living. Marion's reasoning is that there 
is "more chance that [she will] die in [her] car than from the pill!" Marion's and 
Heidi's talk about risk are adaptations of narrative tools made available to them 
during the controversy. The government handouts5 state that the chance of suffering 
thrombosis as a result of the pill is "rare" (Medsafe, Feb 1999; Medsafe, June 2000). 
Similarly, doctors such as Luxi (interview 13/10/2000) reassure clients who are on 
the pill by diminishing the risks of OCs through comparisons with daily dangers 
such as "crossing the road or having a car accident". 
The comments from Luxi, Marion and Heidi highlight an assumption that 
people live in what has been termed a 'risk society' (Beck, 1992). Such a world is one 
in which risks are inevitable. Industrial and technological advances produce risks 
which go unnoticed and undetected. Beck argues that in this 'risk society' 
knowledge becomes an economic commodity and that risk is managed by relying on 
'expert' knowledge. While expert knowledge is certainly utilised, many of the 
consumers I interviewed did not rely on 'expert' knowledge alone. Jacqueline 
(interview 25/9/2000), for example, is not the only participant I interviewed who 
stated that the consumer is an "expert about her own body". Health professionals 
like Margaret, a midwife interviewed (6/9/2000) for this study, argue that there is 
an "equal power base" between client and midwife because the former is the "expert 
in her own life and body experiences". While Beck does concede that personal risks 
are managed on an individual basis (1992, p. 33), he does not acknowledge that the 
management of risks includes consideration of multiple knowledge bases. His 
treatise on risk disallows the possibility that risk can be assessed with reference to 
knowledges. Beck's central thesis, in summary, is that risks are diffused throughout 
society, potentially impacting on eve:rybody. 
Giddens ( 1990), like Beck, also argues that risk is a central feature of 
contemporary social life. Although there are some differences in their theories, 
essentially Beck's and Giddens' approaches are akin inasmuch as they describe 
contemporary social life as characterised by risk. In this time of so-called 'high 
modernity' (Giddens, 1990, p. 25), risk is a central element in calculations of the 
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self. The suqject in both Giddens' and Beck's accounts is singular, autonomous and 
rational who utilises 'expert' systems, albeit with some reflexivity, to manage 
everyday risks. Their contribution to the burgeoning literature emerging on risk is 
unquestionable. However, their modernist approach has limitations. Despite the 
proliferation of socio-cultural analyses of risk, the work of Beck and Giddens 
primarily dominates the field (Douglas, 1990, 1992; Castel, 1991; Luhmann, 1993; 
Kendall, 1995). In my view, this is unfortunate due to the limitations inherent in 
these theorists' approaches to science, 'society' and the self. 
Subsequent to Beck and Giddens, the recent explosion of writing on risk 
(Castel, 1991; Rohrmann, 1996; Gifford, 1986; Lupton, 1999a; Lupton, 1999b; 
Turner, 1995; Irwin, 1995; Parker & Gagnan, 1995; Parsons & Atkinson, 1992) has 
frequently involved profoundly questioning some of the key assumptions regarding 
(modernist) subjectivity. A focus of research on risk concerns the taking up of the 
discursive subject positions of 'expert' and 'lay person' and the ramifications of 
constituting selves in these ways (Irwin, 1995). Other treatments of risk concentrate 
on the connections and differences between the contrasting meanings that 
differently positioned people bring to risk (Gifford, 1986; Parsons & Atkinson, 1992). 
Castel's (1991) Foucauldian-influenced work also questions some of the key 
assumptions regarding subjectivity and 'modernity' on which Giddens' and Beck's 
work depends. According to Castel, there has been a shift from surveillance based 
on face-to-face encounters to abstract calculations of risk (Castel, 1991, p.12; 
Peterson, 1997, p.189). 
It is my argument that many of the contraceptive consumers interviewed 
take up discourses of risk by engaging with the 'science of the concrete' (Levi-
Strauss, 1968). The following extract from Sarah (interview 26/9/2000) provides an 
illustration of the way that the constitution of self, in the context of risk, functions 
as a way to make sense of discourses and take action during a medical controversy. 
Sarah explains that she: 
really tries to think more scientifically, in terms of what the literature says about the 
risks of the pill. But I do think that what other people say, like my friends, influences 
me. I think that there is definite)y a human tendency, which I have got, to take what 
your friends say as more true than what the literature says. For most people, if you 
experience it yourself, and then your friends confirm your experiences, you are 
inclined to make decisions based on this information. But then I also know from my 
psychology training and that side of myself that it is not as reliable as other sources 
of information. It is emotional)y attractive, but not reliable or accurate necessarily. 
And yet, I usually make decisions based on my own experiences of pain instead of the 
research. My head knows that it's not reliable, but emotionally and, in my body, I still 
listen mostly to friends, family and what my body tells me. The scientist in me is 
fighting against the other person in me who believes her own experiences and friends' 
experiences. And it's also that even when I read the literature on the risks of the pill I 
feel that I have a right to decide for myself what to do, even if it's not what the stats 
would suggest that it's safe to do. Because, in the end, I have to decide whether I 
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think that the stats are applicable to me and my body. It's about what feels right for 
me. What's·more me. 
Sandra Gifford (1986, p.224), writing about the many ways that risk is 
understood and 'experienced' in the case of benign breast cancer, has described the 
patient's perception of risk as "lived risk". The way that the woman processes, 
understands and acts on information that the clinician gives her can only be 
understood within the wider circumstances of her life and her own personal 
'experiences'. In the extract above, Sarah illustrates what Gifford calls "lived risk". 
Although Sarah reads the "literature" about the 'scientific' risks of OCs, she 
privileges and "believes her own experiences and friends' experiences". 
Epidemiological research is used to quantify risk by examining the correlation 
between risk factors (such as age, weight) and outcomes (such as paternal mortality) 
within a population as a whole. Such statistical correlations may be evidence of, but 
are not proof of, causation. Health professionals then translate epidemiological risk 
measurements into guidelines for treating consumers. This is a process fraught with 
uncertainty because while data can disclose which people are most likely to 
experience a particular outcome, it cannot determine whether a particular individual 
will experience that outcome. Consequently, other factors, including "listening to 
friends, family and what [the] body tells", go into a consumer's analysis of problem 
so~ving during a medical debate. As Sarah (interview 26/9/2000) puts it, her final 
decision about how to respond to the 3GOC controversy relates to whether the "stats 
are applicable to [her] and [her] body". The information that a health provider can 
(and indeed is obligated to) disclose to a consumer - and any other such 'official' 
information obtained - is only one piece of the entire toolbox of information that 
goes into making health decisions. 
Sarah's (interview 26/9/2000) construction of "lived risk" (Gifford, 1986, 
p.224) can also be interpreted as the practice of bricolage. Bricolage is a concept 
which relies on the mutability of the tools 'at hand'. A bricoleur reworks information 
"transmitted in advance" (Levi-Strauss, 1968, p.20) in order to engage in practical, 
expeditious problem solving. According to Levi-Strauss, bricolage is the science of 
the concrete. Sarah transforms abstract 'literature' on the risks associated with 
OCs, and makes it concrete by relating it to her own life 'experiences'. Sarah "puts 
something of (her]self' (Levi-Strauss, 1968, p.21) into the activity by, for example, 
"making decisions based on [her] own experiences of pain". Through the discursive 
constitution of herself as a person who values emotional and embodied information, 
Sarah appropriates the abstract, makes it concrete and, thus, is able to respond to 
the risks associated with OCs. 
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Sarah (interview 26/9/2000) favours the "emotionally attractive" part of her 
subjectivity. However, she expresses concern that this self is "unreliable" and, thus, 
is "fighting against the other person in her [the psychologist]". The trope of the 
warring, 'fighting' selves has a lengthy trajectocy in the Enlightenment, modernist 
West (Flax, 1993, p.92). It is not uncommon for theorists to discuss the conflict and 
fragmentation of selves. For instance, Kondo (1991, pp.14-17) describes herself as a 
"living oxymoron" because she is both Japanese and yet not Japanese due to her 
Americanisation. The presumption that selves must achieve a neat cohesion is 
inextricably related to the dangerous illusion of a unitary self. Such a troubled 
subject requires a certain form of self that can be accessed through self-study and 
the attainment of truth and also a view of 'reality' which is rational and accessible 
through thought. Further, Sarah's (intetview 26/9/2000) rhetorical strategies 
highlight the importance of discursive practices in the constitution of subjectivity. 
She has taken up the rhetorical devices that give certain discourses, such as 
science, legitimacy. Sarah has constructed the discourse of science as legitimate, yet 
this discourse is in tension with her own and her friends' embodied interpretations. 
This tension is stark as she struggles with her 'toolbox' and the controversy 
surrounding the risks associated with 3GOCs. 
The perceived tension between different, incommensurable discourses, 
described by Sarah (interview 26/9/2000) is also highlighted through my own 
interpretations and writing about the 'talk' of this study's participants. It is 
frequently difficult to escape the ubiquitous narrative conventions of writing that are 
invariably resistant to fragmentation. Although I want to speak of a multiplicity of 
selves, it is easy to slip back into usage of modernist phrases such as the 'cohesion' 
of subjectivity, and, thereby, disrupt notions of the postmodern constitution of 
selves. It is difficult to completely jettison the semantic histocy of the word 'self', as 
Kondo rightly points out (1991, p.42). For example, as I read Sarah's (interview 
26/9/2000) comments about tcying to reconcile her "fighting" selves in order to 
discover "what's more [her]" and her 'real' identity, it is easy to forget that these 
subjectivities are shaped through her process of storytelling and produced within 
and by discourses. Even as I tcy to liberate selves from the confines of modernism, I 
find myself confronted with the anxieties associated with what Haraway refers to as 
a "self-induced multiple personality disorder" (1988, p.578). One challenge, then, is 
to tcy to enact the theoretical message presented in this study and not simply write 
about the ways that those who were 'interviewed' for the study constitute 
subjectivities and are enlivened by multiplicity. 
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It is my contention that despite the persistence of anxiety surrounding 
fragmented selves, it would be preferable to treat contradictory elements of 
su~ectivity as evidence for multiplicity. Subjectivity is a discursive effect, rather 
than a transcendental, unchanging, unitary entity. Since subjects take up multiple 
discourses in the constitution of subjectivity, it is hardly surprising that subjecthood 
becomes a heterogeneous and often contradictory experience, which can lead 
su~ects to describe 'fighting' selves. And yet it is only multiple and fluid subjects 
that are capable of resisting oppressive discourses (Flax, 1992, pp. 93, 110). For 
instance, not only does Sarah (interview 26/9/2000) take up the discursive 
possibility of understanding statistics through embodiment, she also constitutes 
herself as a person with 'rights'. Since she has constituted herself as a person with 
"the right to decide" for herself, she is able to resist ta1cing up discursive strategies 
that undermine the importance of her own embodied knowledge. If the subject is 
constituted discursive]y through 'rights' rhetoric, for example, then if Sarah fails to 
take up the discourse of 'rights' she has also failed to attain her 'true' self. In this 
case, Sarah's (interview 26/9/2000) talk indicates that she feels "right" and "more 
[herself]" when she attends to the knowledge of her friends and her experiences of 
her own body. 
Subjectivities, who people are, are spoken into existence with every utterance 
(Davies, 1992, p.73). Stories read, heard and observed, and which have often been 
"transmitted in advance", form a stock of story lines through which choices can be 
made. The choices made depend on which story line the subject takes her /himself 
to be living at that point in time. This strategy is highlighted by some of the ways in 
which consumers respond to government handouts on the risks associated with 
3GOCs. For instance, the following extract from Marion (interview 29/8/2000) 
illustrates her construction of the professional as 'expert'. She says: 
You do have to trust the doctor because she is the one who knows what is going to be 
best for you. They have been trained to give you the best advice. I think that it's the 
same with the pamphlets that come with the packets of pills. Presumably that's all we 
really need to know to be safe. And with the handouts about the pill and blood clots 
too. The people who wrote those have the qualifications to know what should be 
written there. So I just think that I don't have to bother hunting around for anything 
because it's all there. 
Marion's (interview 29/8/2000) talk conveys "trust" for the professional and 
this, in turn, relieves her of the responsibilities of seeking out further information. 
She says that "hunting around" for additional information is unnecessary when the 
information is "all there", readily accessible and 'at hand'. In contrast to the majority 
of consumers in this study, who have insisted on the importance of adding 
knowledges to the discursive toolbox, Marion does not utilise the strategy of 
bricolage because she only uses 'expert' information. She articulates her faith in the 
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doctor's expertise, based on her /his "training" and "qualifications". Therefore, she 
considers that it is unnecessary to source other types of information, which is 
typically part of the bricolage process. As Peter Kearns (Co-Director of the 
Canterbury College of Natural Medicine in Christchurch, intetview 26/8/2000) says, 
the consumer "has to trust the integrity and the knowledge of the professional 
because that's why they're there". By taking up her allocated position in the 
discursive binary of 'expert' and 'layperson', Marion is able to make decisions based 
upon the information presented to her by the professional. Marion utilises 'expert' 
information, which can be a component in the bricoleur's discursive 'toolbox'. 
However, because she relies on and trusts this knowledge, alone, without combining 
it with other information sources, it is not easy to interpret her strategy as bricolage. 
Marion utilises a different discourse: one which valorises the doctor's expertise. This 
is located in different discourses from the ones that are picked up by many of the 
consumers interviewed in this study. However, Marion is still actively involved in 
making choices about her future contraceptive decisions. 
Indeed, some of the consumers who I have interpreted as bricoleurs 
sometimes adopt Marion's (interview 29/8/2000) approach outside the context of 
medical de bates. For example, Sarah (whose earlier quotations illustrate that she 
privileges embodied knowledges and actively seeks out further information about the 
pill) does not utilise the same strategy when she is purchasing a "herbal remedy". In 
this case, she indicates that she can "rely on the people who know more" because a 
"herb, being natural" is less likely to "have such bad side effects as a drug". To be 
sure it is arguable that Sarah (interview 26/9/2000) has problematically taken up 
discourses surrounding what constitutes so-called 'natural' substances without 
question. However, my point here is that the significance of her talk lies in the way 
that she justifies the different strategies that she uses in various contexts. Whereas 
during the 3GOC controversy she is sceptical about professional expertise, while 
purchasing herbal remedies Sarah constructs the professional as 'expert'. Sarah's 
divergent practices in the different contexts are the product of the discursive 
strategies that she takes up in each case. 
Similarly, Janet (interview 23/8/2000) uses feminist discourses in order to 
constitute herself during the 3GOC controversy, but she contrasts this with her 
behaviour when buying a dress. Janet explains the distinction as follows: 
I actually didn't want to go on the pill. This was partly a feminist thing. I just thought, 
why should I have to be solely responsible? Plus, I thought, it's my body and I don't 
want it ruined with chemicals from the pill ... So that's what I did with this whole thing 
about the pill. I think you have to be careful when it's your body on the line ... But, like 
I said, if it's just buying a dress, or a car, or something like that, I wouldn't be so 
fussy and I wouldn't spend so much time, because we're not talking about your own 
body then. We have the choice to be careful about what we put into our bodies. 
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Although Janet (intetview 23/8/2000) behaves according to bricolage 
practices when confronted with a medical controversy, she does not deploy the same 
strategy when "buying a dress, or a car" or something of a similar nature. Janet's 
utilisation of different discursive strategies is significant because it highlights the 
way that a contraceptive consumer can occupy a number of different positions 
simultaneously. Janet constitutes her 'body-self pursuant to several discursive 
possibilities presented by, for example, 'choice' and 'feminism'. As Frank (1995, 
p.64) and Marcus (1994, cited in Denzin, 1997, p.xvii) both note, discursive 
strategies are rarely neatly deployed. On the contrmy, storytelling creates 'messy 
texts', comprised of multiple discursive strands. The 'talk' of the participants in this 
study is no exception. For example, attention to embodiment is shaped by the 
cultural tools at Janet's disposal. If Janet constructs her subjectivity according to 
the discourse of 'choice', then she is not being 'true' to her 'body-self if she does not 
make appropriate and "careful" choices when her body is "on the line". 
Janet (intetview 23/8/2000) grounds her contraceptive decisions in 
knowledge based upon her "own body", rather than information that is statistical 
and perceived as removed from personal, embodied responses to pharmaceuticals. 
For example, Janet considers "those pamphlets grossly inadequate" because they 
fail to "tell you anything about your own body". Later in the discussion, Janet added 
that she also objected to the way that the pamphlets on the risks associated with 
OCs reduced "women to numbers, because we are people, not numerical figures". 
Similarly, in a study on UK and USA policies on thrombotic disease and OCs 
(Marks, 1999, p.1139), a significant finding was that many consumers objected to 
being constructed by the medical profession and government as "just statistics". 
This objection to abstraction is the impetus behind some consumers' 
decisions to invoke alternative knowledges, such as embodied experiences. For 
instance, Janet (intetview 23/8/2000) makes the "choice to get whatever else [she] 
could that would tell [her] about the pill that matched how [her] own body was 
reacting". By engaging with the 'science of the concrete' (Levi-Strauss, 1968), Janet 
makes the abstract (statistics) concrete by making sense of the numerical 
abstraction of risk with reference to bodily signs and personal contraceptive 
histories. Faced with the abstractions of statistics contained within the government 
leaflets, Janet constitutes herself as a proactive consumer whose embodiment 
requires that she access knowledges that 'match' her bodily signs. 
Janet's (intetview 23/8/2000) talk about the inadequacies of the government 
handouts and her reworking of the information about risks associated with OCs, 
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indicates that such documents are both immutable and mutable. The information 
provided by Med.safe (February 1999, June 2000) about the risks associated with 
3GOCs can be interpreted as what Latour (1987, pp.223-227; 1999, p.307) would 
define as an ':immutable mobile'. This is _because these documents are easily 
circulated and disseminated, sometimes travelling long distances (around New 
Zealand for example) and they are also termed ':immutable' because they preseive 
stable information with little, or no, distortion. However, various theorists have 
contested Latour's claim that ':immutable mo biles' are primarily immutable 
(Dugdale, 1999; Singleton & Michael, 1993). Janet's (re)conceptualisation of the 
risks associated with OCs made available to her through the ':immutable mobile', 
highlights that 'immutable mobiles' can also be conceptualised as mutable. In 
particular, the consumer can transform the supposedly immutable document by 
"putting something of [her]self into it" (Levi-Strauss, p.21). 
The notion of an 'immutable mobile' stems from the work of Actor Network 
Theorists (hereafter ANT) who argue that social orderings are constructed by 
establishing systems of classifications, categories and differences (Latour, 1987, 
p.171). ANT holds that not only humans but also non-humans can be actors. 
Actors, both human (for example, doctors, contraceptive consumers, so-called 
'alternative' practitioners, drug companies, scientists) and non-human (for example, 
government handouts, the pill, prescriptions, imaging devices) actively participate in 
the construction of what constitutes risk. 
Dugdale (1999) considers a case of science policymaking about IUDs in 
Australia She calls into question the claim typically made by ANT theorists, that a 
single, stable, immutable view of the IUD is what is presented in the final consumer 
leaflet. Instead, Dugdale proposes that it is because the consumer information 
leaflet behaves as an actor, actively constituting its readers as informed users with 
choices, that consumers respond to the document by making it mutable and 
unstable. Since they are constituted by the document as active decision-makers, 
they behave accordingly and do not consider that the information provided is 'true', 
but part of an ongoing process of negotiation and interpretation. 
Similarly, a semiotic analysis of two government handouts pertaining to the 
risks associated with 3GOCs illustrates that OC users are also constituted as 
'informed' consumers with 'rights' and 'choices'. For instance, the February 1999 
Ministry of Health/ Med.safe consumer leaflet on 'Oral Contraceptives and Blood 
Clots', reminds readers that doctors are "required to discuss the options with you 
and to explain the risks and benefits". This pamphlet later reinforces earlier 'advice' 
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by stating that consumers "have a right to expect your doctor to explain the risks 
and symptoms with you in a way that you can understand". Likewise, the Ministry 
of Health's/ Medsafe's January 1999 consumer information leaflet contains the 
imperative that "women need to talk to their doctors". And this document even has a 
separate section which canvasses consumers' right to an 'informed choice'. In both 
documents, readers are constituted by textual moves which emphasise the 
importance of attaining an 'informed choice', a concept which will be explored and 
troubled in Chapter Five. The texts are performing their readers in a particular way: 
as informed consumers with choices, as centred subjects. The texts present 
themselves as neutral 'information'. And a 'you' is constructed into a centred 
decision-maker in command of the 'facts' on risk. The facts are presented in order to 
'help you decide and choose what contraceptive is best for you" (MOH). 
Anne-Maree (interview 18/10/2000) illustrates how the discourse of 
'informed choice' presented in the government handouts is taken up by consumers 
in their constitution of subjectivity. Anne-Maree describes her reading of the 
Ministry of Health pamphlet as follows: 
I read that information and, like it says, we do have the right to an 'informed choice'. 
So I went along to my doctor to ask about the pill's risks when I heard about the clots 
in the paper. But, at the end of the day, it was my choice to decide that the stats just 
didn't show what was going on in my own body. I decided to look at the numbers and 
try to put them into myself and my own experiences of being on the pill. I wanted to 
be informed about the factual risks, but I think that in the end it has to relate to your 
own body. 
Here, the leaflet performs its task as neutral information provider and 
transmitter of the 'facts' on risks associated with 3GOCs. Furthermore, the 
consumer, Anne-Maree (interview 18/10/2000), is constituted as an 'informed' user 
with choices 'at hand'. Anne-Maree is situated as a reflexive self, who can make 
rational decisions about the costs and benefits of OCs. 'Choice' is presented as 
systematic. The leaflet is a device that is stable over space and time. It invites 
readers to "consult" and refer back to it on various occasions. But is this leaflet 
really totally stable? Since Anne-Maree picks up the discursive possibility presented 
within the document, she becomes a consumer with 'choices', she constitutes 
herself as an OC user who is capable of reworking the information presented by 
"relating" the "factual risks" to her own body and "experiences of being on the pill". 
Therefore, it is clear that the 'immutable mobile' turns out to be both immutable and 
mutable. The consumer information leaflet is not merely a transmitter of stable 
information, a reflection of knowledge made elsewhere. Rather, it is partly because 
these documents invite consumers to constitute themselves as 'informed' users that 
they do indeed make decisions to rework the data presented in order to make sense 
of the debate in terms of their own embodied 'experiences'. Agency is partially 
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distributed to the consumer who has the responsibility to be 'informed', which, in 
part, entails involvement in a continuing routine of self-surveillance and checking 
for signs and symptoms of clots, such as "breathlessness" and "swelling in the leg" 
(Medsafe). 
I am arguing that the process of bricolage involves the (re)constitution of 
selves. Anne-Maree is not essentially an 'informed' contraceptive consumer. Rather, 
the discursive possibilities presented within the Medsafe document invite her to 
constitute herself as 'informed'. As Kondo (1991, p.48) points out in her analysis of 
Japanese selfhood, subjectivities are "crafted". They are not given or ready-made. On 
the contraiy, subjects actively pick up discursive strands and craft, construct, 
modify, work on, change and enact their identities. The 'identity' of a subject is 
multiple, produced within discourse, potentially contradictory and mutable. 
What I am trying to do is make the constitutive power of the discursive 
toolbox visible. By doing so, it is easier to catch discourses in the act of shaping 
subjectivities. During one interview with a consumer, she conveyed to me her 
awareness of the productive capabilities of possible discursive positionings. Emily 
(interview 13/9/2000) described how she was not inherently an 'informed' 
consumer, but one who took up this subjectivity as her own. She said that she 
"knew about the idea of an informed consumer from reading about it in a magazine 
years ago". And she continued to say that "she thought she could be like that [i.e. 
informed] too when it came to the pill". And, thus, Emily (interview 13/9/2000) 
"acted according to the idea that [she] should be and would make sure that [she] 
knew all about the pill that was necessaiy for [her] to make choices about how to 
handle the clot problem". Clearly, Emily conveys her awareness that her 'identity' as 
informed was not ready-made, as in the modernist model, but that she has actively 
adopted this subject positioning from the discursive possibilities 'at hand'. By 
utilising this particular proactive subjectivity as her own, Emily is able to problem 
solve during a medical debate. Emily's statements suggest that sense-making of 
medical debates involves (re)constitution of subjectivities and that the 'self' is not 
essential, unchanging and cohesive, but mutable and produced by discourse. 
Being 'informed', according to Emily (interview 13/9/2000), does not just 
entail the uptake of the enshrined version of 'inform,ed choice' which typically only 
necessitates knowledge of 'material' risks, as I will canvass in Chapter Five. Like 
many of the consumers involved in this study, Emily also only considers herself 
'informed' once she has made the abstract concrete. She says that the statistics in 
the government handouts make her "feel alienated from [her] body". Her solution is 
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to render these numbers pertinent by positioning herself as a consumer who can 
make choices about what knowledges are applicable to her own 'body-self'. In spite 
of this study's insistence that many consumers do make the abstract concrete, it is 
also clear that the construction of statistical risk is pervasive. Why is the enlisting of 
the term. 'risk', in such a specific context of numerical abstractions, utilised so 
frequently as a discursive strategy? 
The abstraction of risk is arguably connected to the erection of sUtveillance 
and regulatory systems (Castel, 1991). Castel employs Foucault's notion of 
'govern.mentality'' (Foucault, 1991), in constructing an orientation to risk. By 
focussing on statistical correlations and the factors of risk, instead of the individual, 
it is possible to "dissolve the notion of the subject or a concrete individual, and put 
in its place a combination of factors, the factors of risk" (Castel, 1991, p.281). That 
is, govemment regulations have moved from an emphasis on the dangerous 
individual to a new focus on anticipating or preventing the growth of undesirable 
events and deviant behaviour. For example, during the 3GOC controversy, OCs are 
constructed as devices capable of regulating potentially sexually deviant individuals 
who might become pregnant, which is construed as an undesirable event. This is 
demonstrated on CTV News (13/6/2000) through Pippa McKay's comments as 
chairperson of the New Zealand Medical Association. She describes self-regulation 
via use of OCs as "wonderful" and, conversely, she says that it is "disappointing" to 
witness the discontinuation of OCs which has attributed to the rise in pregnancies 
and their terminations. 
By virtue of OCs, the medical profession is able to encourage self-regulation 
as a form. of social management and prevent deviant behaviour/ pregnancies. In this 
process, the individual is effaced and replaced with abstracted statistics such as the 
alleged rising abortion rates due to previous 'pill scares'. It is not my intention to 
'discover' or 'evaluate' whether the statistics associated with the 3GOC controversy 
are correct. 6 My focus is on analysing the function of such a discursive strategy. Why 
is it important that statistical discourses on risk pervade the 3GOC controversy? 
How are they operating? It is my contention that the quantification of risk is 
intended to function as a deterrent mechanism for possible future OC controversies. 
Moreover, risk as an abstracted concept works to ensure that the 'experts' maintain 
their statuses as possessors of the 'true' knowledge concerning risks of OCs. 
When the 'expert' is deemed the only person who can grasp privileged 
knowledge, this positivistic approach negates knowledges and the possibility' that 
'others' can be 'experts' too. Luxi (a Christchurch health provider, interview 
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13/10/2000), for instance, does not believe that medically or scientifically untrained 
people can make sense of the 3GOC debate without reference to statistical 
information which must come from the health professional. She claims that the 
materialistic-positivistic orientation to the 3GOC controversy is the only possible 
way to make sense of it. Further, she maintains her position as the 'expert' when 
she says that "only we have got the knowledge" (my emphasis). Her problematic use 
of the pronoun 'we' signifies medical professionals alone. In Luxi's opinion, it is only 
these actors who are suitably qualified to divulge the appropriate knowledge to 
consumers. This is the only way for OC users to come to terms with the debate. 
Consequently, she insists on the importance of OC users' consultations with doctors 
about the 3GOC controversy. This is because consumers fail to "perceive or 
understand what the numbers mean ... or they just don't know the stats". There is 
clearly no room here for a 'death77 of the author (Barthes, 1977) which would make 
room for a multiplicity of 'readings' of the statistics regarding VTE and 3GOCs. 
Luxi (interview 13/10/2000) argues that consumers are only ready to make 
an 'informed choice' once they have received this specific knowledge from their 
doctors. She says that OC users "need to come and ta1k to us because we can give 
them the right information and then say to them go, you are informed now, make 
the right choice based on the right knowledge". Luxi's repetitive use of 'right' here is 
suggestive of her presumption that only an epidemiological quantification of OC risk 
is the appropriate knowledge base from which to reach an 'informed 
choice/consent'. There is no hint in her remarks, that there are any other valid 
knowledges which are capable of allowing consumers to make 'informed' decisions. 
According to Luxi, it is only right, that a certain type of knowledge is valued and also 
that health providers maintain their privileged position as the sole 'experts' 
concerning disclosure of this information in the controversy. 
When doctors argue that it is only important to disclose the 'right' knowledge 
to OC users, their complaints about the "impossible" (Doctor X, interview 
14/9/2000) requirements of 'informed consent/choice' are problematised. What I 
am arguing is that it is not so much that there is insufficient time available to 
divu]ge knowledges, it is just that only a particular type of knowledge is considered 
worthy of disclosure. Consequently, I would concur that 'fully' informing consumers 
of the risks associated with OCs is an arduous task (Cartwright, 1988, p.139), but 
not for the same reasons. First, I would agree with Cartwright (1988, p.139) that 
'informed choice/ consent' should be the aim "even if the goal is not always 
achieved". Secondly, while doctors argue that 'full' disclosure is unreasonable 
because no one else can ever attain their level of expertise, the comments of this 
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study's participants highlight that medical information alone is insufficient and that 
other knowledges can be useful in the decision-making process. 
In fact, it is often not only consumers who draw on other knowledges, but 
also those who typically privilege solely medical knowledge: health providers 
themselves. For example, Sarah's (interview 26/9/2000) description of her futile 
efforts to get a diaphragm instead of the pill illustrates that, although the 'right' 
information is invoked, 'othered' knowledges may shape the practices of health 
practitioners. Sarah visited her doctor on three occasions to get a diaphragm fitted 
and prescribed and was discouraged each time. Eventually she discovered that it 
was not the statistics on rates of diaphragm failures to prevent conception that lay 
behind her doctor's resistance to the diaphragm. Rather, Sarah's (interview 
26/9/2000) health provider: 
who is the person who usually fits and measures diaphragms, got pregnant 
accidentally using one. She [the doctor] eventually admitted this after my third visit! 
She said that they know it's actually statistically okay for people to use but that she 
was really reluctant to prescribe it to me because of her personal experience. She 
hadn't wanted to tell me about her experience at first but I kept coming back. .. I never 
got one. I stayed on the pill. The clinic didn't want me to have a diaphragm because 
one of their staff members got pregnant using one. I thought that was an interesting 
reason not to prescribe one to me. I mean it's not the run-of-the-mill reason why 
doctors don't prescribe you something, is it? I can understand, though, why she 
would take note of her experience and why that would make her cautious. But you 
just don't expect them to do that. 
As Sarah (interview 26/9/2000) notes, the initial reasons underlying her 
doctor's refusals to prescribe her the diaphragm are "interesting". The "run-of-the-
mill" motive for a doctor not prescribing is usually based on accumulated evidence 
of the impact of particular technologies. This is considered the 'right' type of 
knowledge to adhere to. However, in this case, Sarah's suggests that her doctor 
seems to indicate that just focussing on statistics is too narrow. For instance, Sarah 
suggests that her doctor elevates experiential information above the 'evidence' that it 
is "statistically okay" to use diaphragms. Embodied lmowledge is typically 
considered subjective and unreliable and, thus, the 'wrong' sort of knowledge to 
disclose to consumers. Nevertheless, the doctor's "personal experience" of a 
diaphragm failure, which results in an unplanned pregnancy, is validated as 
knowledge worthy of consideration and disclosure. Granted, the doctor's reasons do 
take three visits to surface. Sarah's surprised comment that she did not "expect" her 
doctor to provide experiential advice suggests that the doctor's reluctance to disclose 
the underlying reason for her resistance to prescribing a diaphragm lies in doctors' 
"run-of-the-mill" position that embodied, subjective knowledge is not 'right' for 
making contraceptive choices. Indeed, Sarah highlights that this is typically the 
shared position of health providers when she says that she did not "expect" her 
doctor's reasoning to be based on subjective knowledges. In light of this example, it 
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is possible to elaborate on the function of the quantitative discursive strategies 
which proliferate during the 3GOC controversy. Not only do these discourses 
function to ensure that the health providers' 'expert' ( detached, scientific) knowledge 
is privileged, but they also enable consumers to hide their own tendency to value 
experiential information as well as- sometimes even over - the 'right' knowledge. 
Like Sarah's (interview 26/9/2000) interpretation of her doctor's 
multifaceted response to diaphragm use, many of this study's contraceptive 
consumers also demonstrate the necessity of considering a variety of knowledge 
bases when making sense of risk in the 3GOC controversy. For instance, several OC 
users I interviewed indicate that statistical constructions of risk are insufficient. 
Rather than representing the 'real' risk, statistics are conceptualised by Marion 
(interview 29/8/2000) as constructions. During her 'talk' about the problematic 
linkage between the 3GOC controversy and rising abortion rates, Marion cites the 
"classic non-example" which calls into question statistical correlations. This 1920s 
example holds that "people eating more ice creams caused more deaths". However, 
Marion goes on to note that causation is frequently not so simplistic and there are 
multiple variables involved. She explains that it is difficult to "imply causation" from 
this example and that the "likely underlying cause" would be "that it's summer, it's 
hotter, there are more people swimming, so there are more people drowning". A 
significant point raised by Marion's example is that it is inherently difficult to locate 
the causal relationship( s) that may explain statistics. 
However, most of the OC users in this study realise that statistics present 
these risks. They are aware, as Zena (interview 13/9/2000) neatly puts it, that 
"statistics are like a bikini: what they hide is much more important than the things 
that they reveal". This statement echoes the oft-cited point that any collection 
suppresses more than it reveals (Wedde, 1995, p.114). Several of the contraceptive 
consumers interviewed suggest that what was disclosed during the 3GOC 
controversy was invariably a tiny portion of what could potentially have been 
divulged. They were aware of the risk in the assertion that the statistics, despite 
their suppressions, represent the controversy as it 'really' (Denning, 1994) is. This 
potential danger is addressed by Zena who stated that "statistics are bent, twisted, 
shaped so that you can do anything that you want with them". According to Zena's 
interpretation, statistics are considered unreliable in their constructions of safety. 
Consequently, Zena (interview 13/9/2000) does not consider this sort of 
knowledge, alone, sufficient. Statistics are not wholly 'right' when trying to make 
sense of the 3GOC controversy. This is primarily because statistics are perceived to 
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construct and point to covert or hidden risks. Claims by the 'experts' that there is 
'no evidence' to support links between certain OC risks and physical manifestations 
are often dismissed because of the potentially "twisted" (Spirer, 1987) nature of the 
statistics which substantiate 'expert' conclusions. That is, the standard of proof is 
sometimes different for OC users than it is in law, or medical science. Consumers, 
like Zena, realise that statistics are not 'objective'. Like experiential knowledges 
pertaining to OC side effects, quantification of risk is also fallible. 
Furthermore, it is not uncommon for these two knowledges to be seemingly 
irreconcilable. This is illustrated through Sarah's (interview 26/9/2000) 
interpretation of the doctor who cannot reconcile the 'fact' that diaphragms are 
"statistically okay" with her "personal experience" that they fail. Similarly, Zena 
(interview 13/9/2000) also mixes statistical constructions of risk with experiential 
knowledge. She contests the elevated status granted to statistics when she insists 
that they are "just not enough and unreliable" because she is "personal proof' that 
OCs cause particular side effects despite the 'evidence' encapsulated in the 
numbers. According to Zena, it is preferable to invoke a variety of discursive 
strategies when assessing risk. Despite the legal and medical constructions about 
what is 'material', Zena demonstrates that the standard is multiple and often 
personal. 
Much of the literature that deals with consumer responses to risk also 
highlights that subjective knowledges are important (Phillimore & Moffatt, 1994; 
Parsons & Atkinson, 1992; Gabe & Bucy, 1996) In particular, Williams and Popay 
(1994, p.120) suggest that 'lay' and medical practitioners exhibit "different ways of 
knowing". Specifically, they assert that consumers privilege experience. While many 
OC users interviewed do privilege experiential knowledge, they often do not do this 
to the detriment of other information. Rather, they invoke multiple sources of 
information in order to assess the risks associated with OCs. It is partly due to the 
limitations of statistics and the recognition that quantification alone is insufficient 
that causes many consumers to opt for what I interpret as bricolage. 
Making sense of medical controversies is, in Zena's (interview 13/9/2000) 
words, a "lived experience, a life choice". Any meaning attached to risk is temporary 
and can only ever be provisional. They are the result of a temporary fixing of 
meaning by the victorious discourse. Yet the victor is not immune to fluidity. Indeed, 
since the bricoleur's assessment of knowledges, risks, controversies is "lived", rather 
than abstracted, information is continually being examined, revisited and 
'(re)polished'. 
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Many of the consumers in this study tell stories about learning about their 
'body-selves' and, thus, resisting the 'victim positions'. The materiality of actively 
seeking information, assessing risk, and building a patchwork of bricolage is 
arduous. It is an active rather than passive practice. This is worthwhile stressing 
because it is easy to mistake the work of an 'artist', such as a bricoleur, as 
undemanding and effortless, especially when 'art' is associated with the discursive 
(Beatson, 1994, p.80). Likewise, Ellen (interview 7/9/2000) explains that being 
active and pursuing "bodily awareness" is hard work: 
Going back to risks again, I have a friend who was four months pregnant before she 
found out. She was on the pill and still getting her periods and didn't realise that she 
was pregnant. And I think that is a risk! ... So I think that for a lot of women the pill is 
an easy option, an easy form of contraception. It is so much harder to get all the 
other information and to learn about your own body. The pill actually denies you this 
bodily awareness, an awareness of what's going on. Oh, I'll just take the pill and dah, 
dah, dah, dah. Whereas, I know it's harder but it's better to make the effort to know a 
bit more about what's going on. 
This passage illustrates that the bricoleur's jobs of sourcing "other 
information" and achieving "an awareness of what's going on" in your 'body-self' is 
"harder". Ellen (interview 7/9/2000) constructs the pill as an "easy" choice, but also 
a risky one because it "denies" embodied knowledge which is an important 
component in the discursive toolbox. Ellen uses her friend's sto:ry to highlight the 
danger posed through an exclusion of bodily knowledges. She becomes pregnant, 
according to Ellen, as a result of her failure to embrace the practice of including a 
variety of discursive strategies. To be like Ellen's friend ('blinded' by the pill), is to 
accept the "victim role" (Emily, interview 13/9/2000). When there is a lack of"bodily 
awareness" there is simultaneously a lack of control which is not empowering. But a 
rejection of victimhood is recognised as "harder" because it involves ongoing "effort". 
Part of the "effort" involved in attaining "bodily awareness" entails rigorous 
self-surveillance. Many of the OC users regulate their 'body-selves' so that they 
avoid the regulation of 'experts'. This is Foucault's ( 1977) panopticon at its best: the 
omniscient 'eye' of the 'expert' induces users to regulate themselves. Indeed, the 
ubiquitous discursive tactic adopted by government and medical practitioners that 
"prevention" (Pippa McKay, CTV News, 13/6/2000) of pregnancy through OC use is 
preferable to termination, instils in consumers the burden of responsibility. They 
feel "guilty' (Jacqueline, interview 25/8/2000) if they are not on the pill because if 
they become pregnant it will be perceived as their "fault" (ibid) since it could have 
been prevented through disciplined OC usage. This rhetoric is taken up by some 
consumers interviewed as they constitute their subjectivities. For instance, Ellen 
(interview 7/9/2000) comments that the notion of the state being responsible for its 
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citizens' health is outmoded. She argues, instead, that individuals should take 
responsibility for regulating and protecting themselves from risks: 
It's people's responsibility to find out all they can about risks etc. I do think that it is 
everybody's responsibility to look after themselves, as much as it is the state's or the 
government's or whatever ... ! think that people are capable of getting all sorts of 
information and being responsible and sort of owning their own decisions ... ! mean 
the health provider still has to give some information, but consumers can't rely just 
on this. The patient has to proactively seek information as well. If people get pregnant 
when they're not on the pill then they are just stupid. Well, no, I don't mean stupid, 
that's harsh. But they obviously didn't have enough information or know about their 
own bodies. They can't have known that there are other options apart from the pill 
either. This is why it's so important to get all the information you can and then work 
out what is best for you to do. What I decide won't be what everyone decides. I mean 
I'm at risk of different health problems than other people. 
In this excerpt, Ellen's (interview 7/9/2000) demand that consumers engage 
in self-surveillance highlights Foucault's (1977) point that surveillance can be 
exercised without any force, or even direct contact, with the actor from the 
omniscient, outside institutions. Ellen insists that it is "everybody's responsibility to 
look after themselves, just as much as it is the state's or the government's". In other 
words, a form of power is operating here that is redolent of Foucauldian versions, 
whereby power is localised over the singular body and the reliance is not on brute 
force but on quasi-voluntary acquiescence. Having gathered their disparate 
knowledges, bricoleurs then engage in decision-making which involves 'making do' 
with an assessment of the information 'at hand'. The evaluation of information 
occurs through self-surveillance. Health consumers make decisions by weighing up 
information based on a complex and ongoing process of surveillance of their bodies 
and selves. This is part of the process of bricolage at work. 
Not only do bricoleurs have to collect information, but they also have to 
embark on the task of evaluation in order to "work out what is best" for the 
individual 'body-self. As Ellen (interview 7/9/2000) explains, this is achieved 
through a consideration of what risks pertain to the 'body-self concerned. For 
example, Ginny (interview 31/8/2000) has a hereditary risk of breast cancer. 
According to Ellen, Ginny's "responsibility" would be to manage this risk by 
collecting knowledges, weighing them up and then making a decision that will be the 
most appropriate for her own 'body-self. Needless to say, such choices pertaining to 
potentially imminent risk of breast cancer involve continual self-surveillance and 
disciplined preventative strategies. Indeed, Ginny (interview 31/8/2000) says that 
she "regularly" conducts her own "breast examinations". She also "keeps her ear to 
the ground" trying to continually collect any information she can about breast 
cancer. In other words, she behaves much like the bricoleur who creates a 
scrapbook of information that might or might not be 'handy' in the future. 
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Ginny's (inteiview 31/8/2000) policing of her 'at risk' 'body-self' can be 
contrasted with the consumers who Ellen (interview 7/9/2000) describes as 
"stupid". Despite her subsequent concession, Ellen describes these consumers in 
this way because they fail to take "responsibility-" for their own self-surveillance. 
They do not seek information, or assess it based on self-sUIVeillance. This failure 
can have dire consequences such as unwanted pregnancies and breast cancer. 
The "responsibility to look after" your own 'body-self', instead of deferring to 
the medical profession and/or government, can involve bricolage and include 
managing your 'at risk' self. Although Foucault did not canvass risk directly, his 
writing on 'governmentality' is cited as being closely related (Peterson, 1997, p.192). 
Moreover, as I have argued, practising bricolage sometimes entails Foucauldian 
notions of self-sUIVeillance. Whereas Beck ( 1992) argues that the corollary of a 
deregulated society is the proliferation of risks, a Foucauldian application to risk 
would contend that risks abound in a disciplined society and that regulation is 
required to manage these risks. 
My argument, in part, follows the latter, Foucauldian stance. Health 
consumers manage their 'body-selves' through vigorous disciplinary practices in 
order to prevent and/or manage risks. This self-management of risk can involve 
bricolage. However, later in this chapter I discuss the complexities of this position 
through an analysis of a consumer who engages in 'docile' self-surveillance, but the 
paradox of the docility is that it is actively chosen in order to become 'healthy'. In 
this way, bricolage (drawing from disparate information sources in order to 'manage' 
bodies) is not only a technique that is voluntarily assumed, but it also often 
conceptualised by consumers as a resistance strategy because it does not simply 
follow the 'official' policies pertaining to what is the 'healthy choice'. For example, 
much television coverage was devoted to encouraging women to adopt the 'healthy 
choice' which was to continue with OCs because they prevent pregnancy. However, 
some consumers (highlighted, for example by Sarah in the extract below) decide to 
utilise different sources of information and adopt varied approaches. Despite 
medical profession and government rhetoric that the 'best' choice for women was to 
remain on OCs, Sarah (interview 26/9/2000) decides that it is 'healthier' to pursue 
alternative contraceptive methods. Consequently, bricolage can be interpreted as a 
resistance strategy that includes both 'management' of bodies and active decisions 
about what type of 'docility' will best ensure 'healthy' bodies. 
It is worthwhile mentioning that such managing of bodies and selves is based 
on a provisionally prioritised 'body-self'. For instance, OC users make decisions by 
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assessing discourses pursuant to what is considered "best' for them at the time. In 
other words, the choice is contingent. It will require further (re)poJisbing in the 
future. Certain information is prioritised and a decision is made depending on the 
'body-self given precedence at the time. This contingent disciplinary regime is 
illustrated by Sarah (interview 26/9/2000). Like some other health consumers, she 
sources variable, and often incommensurable, sets of information. For instance, 
Sarah (intetview 26/9/2000) makes contraceptive choices based on a collection of 
knowledges including: discussions with other contraceptive users about "shared 
experiences", "women's health" books such as Every Woman's Medical Guide (1984), 
the Internet, experiential knowledge, pamphlets ('immutable mobiles), statistics, 
medical information, conversations with her partner and work colleagues and, 
finally, novels and movies. 
This extensive list of information is similar to that utilised by other 
contraceptive users intetviewed (Ginny, interview 31/8/2000; Jacqueline, intetview 
23/8/2000; Ellen, intetview 7/9/2000; Emily, interview 13/9/2000). The inevitable 
inconsistencies in such a collection are not reconciled. Rather, information is ranked 
based on the temporarily prioritised 'body-self. Sarah (interview 26/9/2000) 
descnbes the self-discipline that is required when collecting, sorting and settling on 
a course of action: 
I went off the pill eighteen months ago and we have been using more natural methods 
like condoms and Natural Family Planning. I had been on the pill for so long that I 
didn't even know if I would ovulate! I didn't know how dangerous it was for me to 
have been on the pill for so long. I wanted to sort out what was happening with my 
body and get healthy. It took a long time to work out that that was going to be the 
right thing to do. I had to find out heaps of stuff about the different methods. And so 
much of it conflicted but I had to do what was right for me then. It took a lot of energy 
but I think it was worth it in the long run. We finaiw decided to go the natural way. It 
was the right time to choose that option. So I had to have six months of just 
monitoring my periods and keeping track of dates and thinking that I might want to 
get pregnant. I want to be healthy for pregnancy. I have to fill out the charts and 
check the thermometer eveiyday without fail... Ive also cut out alcohol, I'm doing 
more exercise, that kind of thing. I'm making a concentrated effort to take care of 
myself and my body. I'm careful about what I'm putting into myself, drugs and 
painkillers, that sort if thing. I'm fitter and healthier now than I have been for along 
time. I have generalw just decided that it's time to get healthy: go off the pill, 
exercising, changing my diet. 
Sarah's (interview 26/9/2000) rigorous disciplinary regime, which enables 
her to "get healthy", indicates that managing (or avoiding) risks involves continual 
self-surveillance. Sarah wan.ts to be "healthy" because she has chosen to get 
pregnant. Her attention to exercise and "changing [her] diet' highlights her risk-
mjnjmj~tion practices. She wants to prevent potential risks to her own 'body-self 
and, by extension, her future baby's health. Achieving this goal involves self-
discipline daily and also for extended periods of time. For instance, Sarah had to 
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"monitor" her periods for "six months" and she has to persist with daily charting, 
checking thermometers, and "keeping track of dates". 
Sarah's (interview 26/9/2000) techniques of self-surveillance are reminiscent 
of the Foucauldian (1977) 'docile body'. This body is inscribed with meaning and 
rendered manageable. Foucault (1977, p.136) argues that the 'docile body' is 
manipulated into a useful body which may be "subjected, used, transformed and 
improved". In their analysis of the disciplimny techniques which disabled bodies 
(what they call 'broken' bodies) are subjected to, Shildrich and Price (1996) isolate 
the tiny bodily details a...nd actions that are scrutinised. They use a section from the 
Disabilify and Living Allowance Form to demonstrate their point that no detail 
escapes the target of disciplinary practices (p.103). Likewise, Sarah has to monitor 
her body's tiny changes through charts and thermometers "everyday without fail". 
Just as Ellen (interview 7/9/2000) takes "responsibilify" for her 'body-self, Sarah 
also polices herself. 
Sarah's (interview 26/9/2000) behaviour highlights the paradox of docilify 
because she is actively engaging in disciplinary practices, chosen in order to become 
'healthy' (Borda, 1993). Not only is Sarah 'docile' because of the self-surveillance 
practices, but she is also active because she "decided that it is time to get healthy" 
(my emphasis). Sarah's decision is to actively engage in practices that have the 
potential to render her body 'docile' in order to attain a 'healthy' body. 
Sarah's (interview 26/9/2000) enacted decision is also an explication of 
Foucault's ( 1988) 'technologies of the self' concept. This notion involves actors 
"e:ffect[ing] by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of 
operations on their bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and a way of being, so as 
to transform. themselves" (p.18). The decisions that health consumers make about 
their contraceptive practices involve transformations of their bodies and selves. They 
ontologically recraft themselves. For instance, when Sarah decides to shift from OCs 
to NFP, the "operations" on her 'body-self are extensive. Her "concentrated effort to 
take care of [her]self and [her] body" enables her to redefine her 'body-self. 
The contingency of each decision and transformation is demonstrated 
through Sarah's use of "right". Her repetitive usage of this word highlights that her 
decision is made depending on what is appropriate for the prioritised 'body-self at 
the time. On the one hand, Sarah explains that the pill was the "best option" for her 
"during a time in [her] life when it would have been very inconvenient to become 
pregnant". On the other hand, she describes her subsequent shift to NFP by saying 
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that it was the "right time" for her 'body-self to opt for this choice. In both cases, the 
toolbox still needs to be evaluated based on what seems "right" at the time. What I 
am arguing is that bricolage is not just about collecting and reworking disparate 
discourses. The process also requires an active engagement with incommensurate 
sources in order to make choices which will be based on whatever 'body-self is 
prioritised at a given phase in a consumer's life. In Sarah's (interview 26/9/2000) 
words, the information that she collects frequently "conflict[s]" but she proceeds to 
make choices based on what is "right for [her] then". This decision is by no means 
final. It will need further (re)polishing. The practice of bricolage is an ongoing 
process. 
Authenticity of subjectivity requires reassessing the self, not simp]y 
preserving the existing self. Consequently, Sarah (interview 26/9/2000) talks about 
how her shift from the pill to NFP is involved in creating what she refers to as "a new 
me". As Griffiths (1995, p.191) eloquently puts it, it is "hard to say how many 
makers there are and where all the pieces came from" in the constitution of the 
'webs of identity'. The primary purpose of this chapter has been an exploration of 
some of the discursive strategies that OC users in this study utilise in order to 
construct their subjectivities and, thereby, make sense of a medical controversy. The 
'patchwork' of selves is achieved when subjects take up discursive possibilities as 
their own. Many consumers 'interviewed' feel more 'real' and less 'blind' when they 
make the abstract concrete by paying attention to their bodily signs. In doing so, the 
crafting of selves, albeit from a pre-existing discursive toolbox 'at hand', involves the 
creation of subjectivities that bear the 'unique' mark of the maker. However, this is 
not to say that the consumers interviewed are essential bricoleurs, but that I have 
constructed them as strategic bricoleurs, ingeniously combining various knowledges 
to solve problems. 
I have argued that bricolage is one possible strategy that is deployed by some 
contraceptive consumers interviewed who want to render the workings of the pill 
figuratively 'visible', like the narrator in the poem presented at the start of this 
chapter. This poem also suggests that the narrator feels more comfortable when she 
is not in the "dark" (Greenlaw, 1997, p.35), but aware of the workings her body. The 
next chapter explores the notion of 'informed consent' and argues that many of the 
consumers interviewed also constitute themselves as aware and 'informed' once they 
have considered the embodied workings of their bodies, in addition to the 'material', 
medical 'facts'. The next chapter is also an exploration of the institutional 
mechanisms and recent legal and medical history that construct for health 
consumers the subject position of being active agents with 'rights'. 
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NOTES 
1 I am providing my own reading of this poem, but I recognise that there are a variety of 
meanings. For example, the narrator's feelings of frustration, confinement and restriction 
could stem from outside forces, such as medical technology. 
2 The poem does not indicate whether the narrator is male or female. I am identifying the 
narrator as female. 
3 This is a lesson I learned through having an image of my lumbar spine generated by MRI 
(magnetic resonance imaging). My assessment of the bodily signs from my back indicated that 
there was more than met the doctors' eyes in the MRI pictures, but the discourse of 
transparent and correct representation shifted my questions about meanings and 
interpretations to statistics and what "we [could) see, clearly" in the MRI. Just as Treichler, 
Cartwright and Penley (1998, p.3) have pointed out, I was also complaining that visibility -
provided by the MRI - is not necessarily transparency. 
4 See Chapter Three where I discuss the notion of seeing-knowledge further. 
5 See appendix 7 for the government handouts pertaining to the risks associated with OCs 
and blood clots. 
6 Quite apart from the fact that I look briefly at the function of statistical discourse, rather 
than whether the statistics themselves are correct, the latter task is certainly fraught with 
problems. For example, Doctor X (interview 14/9/2000) argues that the statistics cited in the 
Ministty of Health 3GOC debate consumer handouts ('immutable mobiles1 are "incorrect" and 
"completely wrong'. Furthermore, there are several texts which address the transparency of 
statistics as accurate representations of 'reality' (for example see Huff, 1973; Spirer, 1987). 
7 This reference is taken from Barthes' (1977) famous statement that the "birth of the reader 
must come at the cost of the death of the Author". 
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CHAPTERS 
TROUBLING THE NOTION OF 'INFORMED CONSENT' 
I predict the rise of a more assertive patient who will ask and expect to receive 
information. 
(Cartwright, 1988, p. 174) 
There has to be a balance between the health provider giving the information and the 
time that they have available and tl,ie patient, or whoever, requesting information, or 
assertively and proactively seeking information as well. And not just medical 
information either. I mean a doctor's knowledge only goes so far. He or she doesn't 
know your body like you do. So how can s/he assess the risk for you? In the end, 
you have to put it all together and do it yourself. That's what I'm talking about when 
I say that a lot of people are blind about their body and what's going on with their 
body and that sort of thing. 
(Ellen, interview 7/9/2000) 
In the statements above, both Silvia Cartwright (in the Report on the 
Inquuy into the Treatment of Cervical Cancer at National Women's Hospital) and 
Ellen (interview 7/9/2000) construct an ideal, assertive information seeking 
patient/consumer. However, Silvia Cartwright and Ellen operate with differing 
assumptions about what type of information should be 'proactively' sought. For 
Cartwright, a health consumer is disempowered if medical 'experts' do not share 
information. By contrast, for Ellen, consumers are unaware, or what she calls 
'blind', if they do not combine medical information with other sources of knowledge. 
Cartwright anticipates and predicts patie:nts who will actively seek medical 
knowledge from their health providers. Ellen also concedes that health 
practitioners should disclose information to their clients. However, she also 
recognises that this knowledge, alone, "only goes so far". She advocates the need 
for a "balance" between different knowledges so that consumers can put it "all 
together". Framed in these terms, 'informed' decisions about, for example the risk 
of OCs, can only be assessed through the process of bricolage that I detailed in 
Chapter Three and Four. This, at least in part, involves piecing together disparate 
(and potentially incommensurable) knowledge in order to enable the consumer to 
engage in 'fully informed' decision-making. 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the issues encapsulated in Ellen's 
and Cartwright's understandings of assertive health consumers, especially as this 
relates to 'informed consent/ choice'. This concept was a pivotal concern when the 
Cartwright Committee oflnquiry was appointed in the late 1980s as a response to 
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the Metro magazine article by Phillida Bunkle and Sandra Coney ( 1987, pp.46-68) 
which alleged poor practice in cervical cancer research at National Women's 
Hospital, Auckland. This chapter troubles the notion of 'informed consent/choice' 
encapsulated in the legal precedents. I argue that the majority of contraceptive 
consumers interviewed for this study suggest that the constitution of an 'informed' 
subjectivity is possible through the ingenious combination of a variety of different 
knowledges and not just medical information alone. This positioning is contracy to 
the primary legal precedents which hold that medical information, alone, is 
sufficient to deem a consumer 'informed'. This chapter is about those contrasting 
and, at times, opposing knowledge systems. 
I continue my enquiries into what information is valued by differently 
positioned people and what assumptions underpin these epistemologies. Once a 
'fact' or legal precedent, like 'informed choice/consent', is enshrined, its 
epistemological assumptions become hidden. This invisibility gives these 
knowledges the appearance of being more 'natural', right, unquestionable and 
infallible. But by revealing the masked assumptions that produce 'facts', it is 
possible to argue that these information sources are contestable and potentially 
unstable, rather than inherently "secure" (Doctor X, interview 14/9/2000) and 
"stable" (Dr Rosemary Reid, interview 31/8/2000), as has been suggested by two of 
the health professionals interviewed for this study. 
This investigation into the underlying epistemological assumptions has 
practical implications for the enactment of the 'informed consent/choice' doctrine. 
A principle of informed consent is that the consumer must be 'fully' informed. I ask 
what happens when the epistemological assumptions underlying 'full' disclosure of 
information only include a certain type of knowledge? What is the presumed 
meaning of 'full' here? If this is the way that 'informed consent/ choice' is framed, is 
'informed consent/choice' achievable? I also question why certain people privilege 
particular types of information. How do they utilise the knowledge available to 
them? For example, how are the risks associated with OCs articulated by doctors, 
consumers, drug companies and the media? And what are the meanings attached 
to the risks of OCs that are enshrined in legal precedents? 
In order to analyse these questions, it is also necessary to examine the 
information that gets privileged and legitimised. A perusal of the common law and 
legislation pertaining to 'informed consent/choice', and its attention to disclosure 
of 'risk', highlights the law's resistance to what I call bricolage as a strategy for 
making sense of medical risks associated with OCs. As foreshadowed by the extract 
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from the Cartwright Report, the preference is to frame consumers as 'reasonable' 
people (read disembodied entities) who should only reasonably want access to one 
particular sort of knowledge about possible risks. I argue that this assumption 
requires elaboration to include a recognition of the way that consumers engage 
with and '(re)polish' (Zena, inteiview 13/9/2000) a variety of different knowledges. 
My inteiviews with contraceptive consumers indicate that they engage with a wide 
variety of different sources of knowledge (including medical advice) before 
constructing themselves as sufficiently 'informed' to make decisions. 
The promotion of a bricolage of knowledges rather than access solely to 
medical knowledge, does not undermine the value of medical information on 
contraception, OCs and their associated risks. It was vital that the Cartwright 
Report (1988) insisted that health providers disclose medical information. The 
importance of this decision is a common theme in the interview transcripts. For 
example, Emily (interview 13/9/2000) thinks that many consumers still fail to 
attain Cartwright's construction of the ideal 'assertive patient'. She explains that 
there are "definitely a hell of a lot of women out there who don't feel comfortable 
talking to their doctors and so they don't go after the information. And unless you 
really ask for it, it's often not offered" (Emily, inteiview 13/9/2000, her emphasis). 
This highlights that there are some consumers who fall outside the 'assertive 
patient' ideal. Therefore, it is certainly vital that consumers' rights to information 
are affirmed in law. 
The strategy of bricolage, then, does not contest the validity of the 
regulatory frameworks that uphold patients' rights to information. It does suggest, 
however, that multiple sources of information about health issues, treatment 
options and pharmaceuticals can often be essential in reaching an 'informed 
choice'. Proactive consumers often need to invoke the strategy I call bricolage 
because of the inadequacies of medical knowledge alone. And less assertive actors 
also need to invoke bricolage strategies because their disinclination to 'ask' for 
medical information induces them to utilise alternative knowledge bases, such as 
popular magazine articles and conversations with friends, family and partners. 
Ellen's advocacy of the technique of combining multiple sources of information 
recognises the inadequacies of relying on one type of knowledge and troubles the 
current formulation of 'informed consent/choice' by arguing that 'fully' informed 
decisions can rarely be made solely on the basis of medical advice alone. 
Consumers have often been identified as not being 'fully' informed due to 
health practitioners' failures to disclose the medical knowledge. For example, in 
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The Doctor's Case Against the PW, Seaman (1969, p.73), one of the pill's leading 
critics speaking on behalf of OC users, attacks the common ways that the pill was 
prescribed as a violation of the principle of 'informed consent/ choice'. Similarly, 
Coney and Bunkle's (1987) magazine article on the 'unfortunate experiment' that 
occurred at National Women's Hospital also spoke to the erasure of consumers' 
rights to 'informed consent'. The article highlights that the women who participated 
in Dr Green's experimental treatment of cervical cancer were unaware of their 
involvement in such a clinical trial. They were 'blind consumers' at the extreme end 
of the continuum. For instance, one of the patients, called 'Ruth' in the article, says 
that Dr Green "never informed [her] of [the] condition over the years" (p.58) and 
that "at no time had [she] been fully informed or given any say in the treatment 
[she) received" (ibid). The primary purpose of the Cartwright Report was to examine 
the substance of the Metro article's claims. A pivotal issue revolved around whether 
there had been a research programme into cervical carcinoma involving patients, 
such as Ruth, who participated without knowing or consenting. Without their 
knowledge or consent, patients were divided into groups which were either treated 
with radium and surgery or radium and radiation (Johnson, 2000, p.87). The 
Report found that there had been a study to find out which of two forms of 
treatment for cervical cancer was the best and her Honour concluded that this 
breached the 'informed consent' principle (ibid). 1 
Justice Cartwright's advocacy of the 'assertive patient' stance is arguably 
her attempt to ensure that consumers are also vigorous about upholding the 
'informed consent' doctrine. This principle is harder to maintain in the face of 
passivity or 'victim positions' that are demonstrated by some of Dr Green's 
unknowing participants. For instance, Ruth describes herself as the "sort of patient 
who meekly did what she was told" (Coney & Bunkle, 1987, p.46). Antonia Fisher, 
an Auckland solicitor (interview 11/9/2000), also suggests that a passive stance 
among health consumers is not uncommon. For instance, when I asked about her 
professional experiences and interpretation of health consumers' understanding of 
their 'rights', she said that many of her clients have "little understanding of their 
rights and very little knowledge about their right to question or challenge" (Antonia 
Fisher, interview 11/9/2000). However, Peter Kearns (Co-Director and naturopath, 
CCNM, interview 26/8/2000) draws a distinction between my "generation" and his 
"lot'.2 He says that the former "ask more questions ... and are far less trusting". In 
part, his explanation for this shift is a result of occurrences such as the Cartwright 
Report. Whereas his "lot" were similar to Ruth and would comply because "the 
doctor said so", he argues that this generation do not assume that "these 
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supposedly fine gentlemen of medicine" are the 'experts' and, therefore, questions 
are asked and answers demanded. 
Nevertheless, the image of the passive health consumer also persists during 
the 3GOC controversy. The media presents OC users overwhelmingly as 'victims'. 
The 'victim' trope frequently features in headlines. For example, the Sunday Star 
Times (1990, p.A8) refers to "pill victims [whose] risk factors were missed". 
Similarly, The Press (1999, p.3) talks about a "blood-clot victim [who] advocates 
tests before [the] pill [is] prescribed". In this article, the author quotes the 'victim' 
saying that she was "blissfully unaware" of the dangers associated with 3GOCs. 
The implication here is that failure to achieve 'informed consent/choice' leads to 
'victim positions'. It is my argument, nonetheless, that these depictions of OC users 
as 'victims' negate consumer agency. And further, following Foucault (1982, 
pp.221-222; 1990, p.96), I argue that the potential to resist power always exists, 
either as isolated acts (by OC users for example) or as organised political 
movements. When the possibilities for resistance are not recognised, prickly 
relationships with 'informed consent' are constructed since passivity leaves little 
room for ensuring that the doctrine is met. In Aotearoa/New Zealand through the 
Cartwright Report, related articles and the media, the 'victim' trope ( and its uneasy 
relationship with 'informed consent/ choice') has clearly been disseminated into 
wider 'discursive fields'. 
One of these 'discursive fields' is contraception and, specifically, hormonal 
contraception. While the Cartwright Report focuses on the use of patients for 
research, the principles that her Honour discusses, and her recommendations 
regarding patient rights, apply to all health care encounters. 'Informed 
consent/choice' and the 'assertive patient' re-emerge during the 3GOC controversy. 
In addition to articles in the mass media about 3GOCs, this study's participants 
also highlight the ubiquity of the 'informed consent' doctrine. They raised their 
rights as consumers, specifically pursuant to 'informed consent/choice' as a 
discussion point quite independently of my questions. This highlights that 
'informed consent/choice' has a presence beyond legal discourses and the 
Cartwright Report, and also that this project's participants consider it an important 
issue in contraceptive decision-making. 
Furthermore, the narratives of 3GOC consumers interviewed for this study 
on 'informed consent/ choice' are invariably interconnected with a resistance to 
'victim positions' which they believe compromise 'informed consent'. As Ellen 
(interview 7/9/2000) unequivocally says, she does not "feel like a victim" because 
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she simply resolves to be proactive and "just do something about it, just go and get 
some bits of information". However, the responses of other OC users reveal 
simultaneous compliance with and resistance to 'victim positions'. For instance, 
Emily (interview 13/9/2000) illustrates her ambivalence when she remarks that 
she believes that: 
if a woman isn't able to make an informed choice then perhaps you could see her as 
a victim because she does not have the right means available to her. But I don't like 
the idea of the 'woman as victim'. But at the same time I think that the women who 
didn't get enough information could be seen as victims of the medical profession's 
negligence .. . But I defmitely think of myself as a bit of a feminist. I think that it is 
really important for women to be aware, to have different sorts of information, so 
that they can resist taking on that victim role. This is all that stuff about how with 
knowledge comes empowerment. But for you to break out of the victim role the 
knowledge has to come from you as well as doctors and other things. You are an 
expert too. Then you can really break out of the victim mode by doing this. Victim is 
a really passive word. When I heard it, a part of me just went, oh, yuck! 
(my emphasis) 
A refusal to be depicted as a 'victim' is conveyed here by Emily (inteiview 
13/9/2000). Her stance is similar to the position eventually adopted by Ruth, who 
was one of the primary patients involved during the Cartwright Report in 
uncovering the poor practice of Dr Green3 • Emily and Ruth, two differently 
positioned health care consumers, utilise similar rhetoric in order to resist 
'dominant' discursive strategies which attempt to construct health consumers' 
subjectivities. However, Emily's resistance to "taking on the victim role" is 
shrouded with ambivalence. She oscillates between, on the one hand, the stance 
that describes ignorance as tantamount to victimhood and, on the other hand, the 
position (that she identifies as "feminist") which values women's active pursuit of 
information. Emily's struggle back and forth is indicated by her repetitive use of the 
conjunction 'but'. Her endorsement of each of the stances is qualified and 
reflexively critiqued with the narrative that follows the 'but'. 
Despite the ambivalence projected by Emily (inteiview 13/9/2000) in this 
passage, she does encourage a particular reading of her 'body-self as a non-victim 
who is able "break out of [that] role". This indicates that there is some validity in 
Foucault's suggestion that the "target nowadays is not to discover what we are, but 
to refuse what we are" (1982, p.216). Emily refuses the position of victim and 
argues for consumers generating information, not just relying on doctors' 
knowledge. Emily "refuses" the notion that she is a 'victim' and "discovers" and 
labels a "part" (Emily, inteiview 13/9/2000) of her/self as a "feminist". An implicit 
recognition in Emily's 'story' is that feminists have not just been concerned with 
whether or not women are victims, but also about pursuing changes, being active 
and tackling and reversing victimhood. Emily also recognises that women in 
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general might be 'victims' of misinformation or no information at all, while at the 
same time she is constructing herself as someone who is definitely not one of these 
'victims'. 
In her adamant refusal to be a victim (something she describes as "yuk"!), 
Emily (intetview 13/9/2000) also defines or "discovers" that she draws from 
various knowledges. She says that for women to be "aware", they need to draw from 
"different sorts of information" and this "knowledge has to come from you as well as 
doctors and other things". Conceptualised in this way, resistance does not 
constitute a rejection of 'expert' knowledge (such as medical information), but it 
does constitute a refusal to accept a certain type ofknowledge as the only, one true 
source. Accordingly, 'blackboxed' ('official, 'expert1 knowledge and bricolage is not 
set up as an either/ or scheme. This would simply construct another unwelcome 
dualism. The technique that Emily (and I) are advocating4 is a bricolage that draws 
from both 'official', 'expert' knowledge and other knowledges. In summary, then, 
bricolage does not exclude, nor is it entirely distinguishable from, 'official' 
information. OC consumers, like Emily, "refuse" to be victims in favour of being 
bricoleurs because it is from this vantage that proactively seeking out information 
from different sources becomes possible. 
This overlap between compliance with 'official' information and resistance to 
a unitru.y knowledge, is encapsulated in the term 'expert'. Who is an 'expert'? In the 
3GOC controversy, the media isolates the scientists, researchers, and 
('conventional1 doctors as the 'experts'. As an illustration, a headline in The 
Dominion (1995, p.3.) states that the "experts [will] consider the risks of the pill". 
The article identifies the Health Ministry, medical school professor David Skegg, 
WHO and obstetrics and gynaecology representatives as the 'experts'. By contrast, 
in her passage above, Emily (intetview 13/9/2000) identifies consumers and her 
own 'body-self as 'experts' too. The 'expert' consumer is not a pervasive concept, 
but it is a recurring oppositional discourse in the 'talk' of many of this study's OC 
users. As Margaret Kyle, a Christchurch midwife interviewed for this study 
(intetview 6/9/2000) explains, this unfamiliar construction stems from the view 
that "the consumer is the expert about her own body, life_ and experiences". Indeed, 
the way that the 'expert' experiential knowledge of consumers is assessed along 
with other 'expert' knowledge is highlighted in a discussion that appears later in 
this chapter and the following chapter on the risks associated with OCs. I argue 
that what the supposed 'experts' consider as the 'material' risks are often 
fundamentally different from what OC users decide are significant. 
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In any controversy, like the 3GOC debate, the supposed 'experts' 
vehemently defend the boundaries between themselves and 'others' by reinforcing 
a static meaning of 'expert'. This protective 'boundary-work' (Giecyn, 1983, 1994) is 
exhibited by Doctor X, a Christchurch health professional interviewed for this 
project (interview 14/9/2000). He identifies himself as a "scientific purist" who 
demarcates this self from the 'other' such as "feminists". In his narrative, Doctor X 
delineates his involvement in 3GOC controversy from the "unnecessary" 




I get the feeling that there are feminist issues at play here. I guess 
feminists don't like pills in general (laughs) because it doesn't really 
fit in with their lifestyle. Who knows. Or lesbians I should say. That's 
a bit cynical. I think that there are probably some political things 
that I don't really understand. But there are reasons why some 
feminists are getting involved in this debate, which is unnecessary 
and doesn't really concern them as far as I can see ... 
What do you mean when you say 'feminist'? 
Well, I was thinking in particular of Sandra Coney, who has been 
behind the scenes for quite a long time in this ... she is looking for 
another issue. I don't think that this is an issue. I think that 
perhaps that might be part of the problem, a lot of people are trying 
to make it into one ... And I'm not sure why her opinion about 
medical things would be more valid ... I'm not sure how she can help 
inform the public about medical things. 
Here, Doctor X (interview 14/9/2000) is articulating the boundaries 
between the medical expert and lay political commentator. Part of this process 
involves assigning distinctive characteristics to each realm. In this case, feminists 
are 'othered'. Doctor X homogenises feminists and fails to recognise any diversity 
within this category. The slippage from feminist to "lesbian" betrays his assumption 
that such people do not require contraception because of their (non-heterosexual) 
"lifestyle[s]".5 These constructions provide Doctor X with an explanation for why the 
feminists/lesbians "don't like pills". Their attributes are blurred with the "political", 
and by implication the non-scientific, as opposed to his own scientific position. 
Doctor X speaks from a position of scientific knowledge; whereas, Coney speaks 
from a position of "feminist issues" and politics. This demarcation is used as a 
justification for his claim that the 3GOC controversy "doesn't really concern them" 
(my emphasis). Such claims reveal one of the results of his boundary work: the 
reassertion of his authority and legitimacy as an 'expert' on "medical things" such 
as 3GOCs and the negation of all others. 
Giei:yn (1994, p.424) identifies four types of 'boundary-work': expansion, 
monopolisation, expulsion and protection. Doctor X (interview 14/9/2000) is 
arguably engaging with the latter three types of 'boundary-work'. He maintains his 
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authority over the risks associated with 3GOCs through undermining the authority 
of Sandra Coney and 'other feminists'. At the same time, he describes Coney as 
being "behind the scenes". In other words, she is not in the foreground but in the 
background. She does not occupy the medical interior, but she may threaten to 
contest and rupture it. Consequently, he continues to demarcate the boundaries. 
In this way, the meaning which he attaches to the 3GOC debate is elevated above 
"her opinion" (my emphasis). This eminence is achieved, in part, through discursive 
strategies witnessed in his careful use of words. For instance, he refers to Coney's 
'opinion' which is coded as non-scientific, aligned with synonyms such as 'belief', 
'folklore' that sit in a binary opposition with 'facts' and 'clinical evidence'. In 
addition, Doctor X dismisses Coney's attempt to make the 3GOC controversy an 
"issue" by saying that it is "not a problem". Coney's 'expert' status and her capacity 
to 'inform' consumers is subjected to scrutiny, while the medical professional's is 
not. The assumption underpinning this claim is that only the delegated 'expert' has 
the authority to ensure 'informed consent/choice' is achieved. However, as I have 
argued, the 'expert' knowledge is not of sole significance to health consumers. 
At this point, it is useful to pursue my discussion of the meaning of 
'informed consent/ choice' as it has been developed by the 'experts'. 'Informed 
consent' has become a fundamental requirement of both ethics and law. The 
essence of the concept is that medical treatment cannot be given to 'competent'6 
patients without their informed consent. The Cartwright Report and much of the 
prior case law make no distinction between 'informed consent' and 'informed 
choice'. A solicitor interviewed for this study, Antonia Fisher, explains that the 
latter concept falls under the same doctrine as 'informed consent' (interview 
11 /9 / 00). The standardisation of 'informed consent/ choice' is suggested in a paper 
issued in 1990 by the Medical Council of New Zealand (cited in Collins, 1992, 
p.65). They define 'informed consent/choice' as a "voluntary, uncoerced [sic] 
decision made by a legally competent or autonomous person on the basis of 
adequate information and discussion. This contrasts with the rejection of a 
proposed course of action; in short, it is a choice". Pursuant to this definition, 
'consent' means the same thing as 'choice'. This is arguably an unsatisfactory 
slippage in some health care circumstances. For example, when a consumer is 
making a 'choice' about OCs, although she eventually 'consents' to the proposed 
type of OC, she is certainly not at the extreme end of the 'consent' continuum 
where completion of a formal consent form is required. The vast majority of case 
law in this area deals with consent to participate in medical research/experiments. 
But I do think that it is worth pointing out the fine distinction in the case of 
contraceptive decision-making. In these circumstances, the emphasis is on the 
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choices available to consumers, even though she will inevitably 'consent' 
(informally) to the choice that she makes. Therefore, the law's privileging of consent 
in this area is not altogether applicable to the 'informed choice/ consent' conducted 
by an OC user. 
Given the importance of 'choice' in the contraceptive arena, I asked OC 
users what sort of options their health providers presented when they consulted 
them about contraception. In almost every case it was clear that these consumers 
were unaware of the variety of contraceptive methods available to them. In 
particular, many talked about not being made aware of the different varieties of 
OCs available. Phillipa (interview 23/8/2000), for example, says that when she first 
went on the pill she "didn't know the difference between one and the other" and 
that she was "just told to take that one [ a third generation formulation]" so "in the 
end [she] just ended up doing what he said". Ginny (interview 31/8/2000) 
describes a similar occurrence when she says that she did not "realise that there 
were different generations of pills... And I was really surprised when I went back 
[after the media's release of 3GOC controversy] and found that she [the doctor] had 
a whole book full of all these different kinds of pills. I wish that she had told me 
about this earlier!" (her emphasis). It is clear that in these two cases, Ginny 
(interview 31/8/2000) and Phillipa (interview 23/8/2000) did not have the OC 
options presented to them, therefore, they could not make an 'informed choice'. 
They 'consented' to use of an OC that they might not have chosen themselves. 
Moreover, Ginny certainly conveys that she would prefer that these choices be 
disclosed "earlier", especially when the options are seemingly so vast that there is a 
"whole book" on different OCs. 
Likewise, other OC users also express their desire to have contraceptive 
methods, other than the pill, disclosed to them. Judith, a Christchurch Natural 
Family Planning teacher who participated in this study (interview 28/8/2000) says 
that many of her clients feel "angry" because they go to their health providers to get 
information about "all the contraceptive methods" (her emphasis) but the doctor 
"pushes them into one particular one, often the pill". This same sense of 
dissatisfaction is conveyed by some of the consumers interviewed who say that 
some doctors present the pill as "the only contraceptive, the wonder drug, as if 
nothing else exists" (Phillipa, interview 23/8/2000). This particular consumer goes 
on to bemoan not having been told about NFP earlier, which she now prefers to 
OCs. She learnt about this contraceptive method through a friend rather than her 
health provider. Judith (NFP teacher, interview 28/8/2000) would not be surprised 
about this because she says that health professionals regularly give consumers 
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"biased information". She suggests that doctors fail to meet 'informed 
consent/choice' standards because they scare potential NFP clients when they 
unfairly warn that "if they want to have a baby then go and learn NFP". Such 
failures to meet 'informed choice/ consent' induce consumers like Phillipa 
(interview 23/8/2000) to seek information about particular contraceptive methods 
from other sources. 
Jacqueline (interview 25/8/2000) also discovered NFP through a family 
member rather than her doctor. And like Phillipa (interview 23/8/2000), she, too, 
expresses her frustration that this method was not disclosed at the time of her 
initial health care consultation when the decision-making about contraception 
occurred. Once she had obtained the information about NFP, Jacqueline went back 
to her doctor. She describes her 'experience' there as follows: 
I went in there [to the doctor's] to get a referral to NFP. But the doctor sort of bullied 
me back on the pill. Well, he said that I could do NFP but that I may as well prepare 
myself for pregnancy because it's not a reliable method. I wondered if he were right 
about that at the time. But he did keep saying that it wouldn't work. So I went back 
on the pill, reluctantly. There didn't seem to be anything else. I really felt like I was 
treated like an idiot and I wasn't listened to. 
From Jacqueline's (interview 25/8/2000) perspective, her interaction with 
her doctor is an example of one of the central shortcomings of 'informed 
choice/ consent'. The legal requirements forbid health providers from manipulating 
the consumer's choice through selective provision of information, or playing on the 
patient's fears. Ethically objectionable manipulation, as opposed to what is 
considered appropriate information and persuasion, aims to produce a different 
choice from what a competent patient would have made ifs/he had freely chosen. 
According to Jacqueline, the doctor's disclosure of information about NFP is 
selective. He tells Jacqueline that NFP is "not reliable" and is likely not to "work" 
and, therefore, she should prepare herself for inevitable pregnancy. Playing on her 
fear of pregnancy, Jacqueline feels like she is "bullie[d)" into taking the pill. Her 
use of 'bully' here is indicative of a patient's desire to achieve consent without 
coercion. 
Furthermore, the example recounted by Jacqueline (interview 25/8/2000) 
highlights the importance of 'discussion' instead of the unidirectional flow of 
information from health provider to consumer during the 'informed consent/choice' 
process. It is not adequate to merely be granted a voice. What is important is 
whether anyone will listen. In Jacqueline's (interview 25/8/2000) case she felt that 
the doctor failed to listen or treat her 'voice' seriously, treating her instead, as an 
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"idiot". Here, the dialogue between consumers and health care providers has been 
ousted by a uni-structured transfer of information from one source to another. 
The case law preceding the Cartwright Report, such as Salgo v Leland 
Stanford Uni Board of Trustees and Canterbury v Spence, delves into 'informed 
consent/choice' and tries to counter situations such as those canvassed above by 
ensuring that the consumer is indeed the person who makes the decision (without 
coercion). However, these cases frame the definition of an 'informed' consumer in 
strikingly different terms from the strategy advocated by Ellen (interview 7/9/2000) 
in the quotation at the start of this chapter. This is an approach to 'informed 
consent' that holds that the disclosed information must stem from a tightly defined 
set of 'official', 'expert' knowledge. Jacqueline's doctor considered her NFP choice 
was unreasonable. By paying close attention to the attempts to hide the 
epistemological underpinnings of what is deemed 'reasonable' and 'material', I want 
to illustrate how these meanings are not definitively stable and settled but 
inherently slippe:ry and subject to scrutiny. 
The first effort to officially enshrine information which health consumers 
should 'reasonably' access gained prominence in America in the late 1950s.7 
Specifically, the District Court of Appeal held in the Salga3 case t_h_at the patient 
was "entitled to know the nature, consequences, harm, benefits, risks and 
alternatives [of any treatment] in order to make a reasonable decision regarding 
whether they would accept or reject a treatment option" (p.48). The underlying 
philosophical premise of this decision was that the Court believed in upholding 
autonomous self- determination. In other words, the Court decided that 'patients' 
had a right to "know" and make a 'reasonable decision' about what happened to 
their bodies. The early common law identifies that the onus is on health providers 
to disclose this medical information. 
This precedent challenges the precept that health professionals are the 
"people who have the authority to keep the information" (Jacqueline, interview 
25/8/2000) and that they should be the ~le decision-makers for the patients. 
Medical professionals are not cast as being in the optimum position to decide what 
is best for their clients. As Sarah indicates in her interview (26/9/2000), doctors 
are often constructed as if they are "Godlike". 
The Cartwright Report (1988, pp.127-129) challenged similar notions, 
'therapeutic privilege' and 'clinical freedom', which are related to the degree of 
authority of medical professionals. These two concepts hold that health providers 
103 
have discretionruy powers to stop short of disclosure ifs/he feels that there is a 
clinical reason to justify this and also that health professionals are the best people 
to make decisions about appropriate treatments (Townshend et al, 1998; 
Cartwright, 1988, pp.127-129). 
Despite Cartwright's conclusion that these ideas about medical discretion 
are no longer appropriate - or "dead" (Professor Hamptom, cited by Cartwright, 
1988, p.129) - there is evidence that they linger on, albeit in slightly different 
guises, in some drug advertisements. For example, the persistence of a strand of 
'clinical freedom' is illuminated in advertisements for OCs in the late 1990s that 
appeared in the New Zealand Medical Journal (24 October 1997, no.1054; 9 October 
1998, no.1075). These advertisements (see figure 5.1) emphasise "freedom of 
choice" in bold eye-catching print alongside the silhouette of a woman leaping in 
the air, her arms extended in an expression of liberation. The initial reading 
encouraged by this advertisement is that the 'freedom' accessed is that of the 
woman. In other words, if women choose the brand of OC advertised by the drug 
company Schering, then they, too, will be able to emulate the freedom of the 
silhouetted figure. However, these signifiers are juxtaposed by the accompanying 
small print. Although use of the pronoun "you" seems at first to belong to the 
outlined 'free' woman, the rest of the print quickly disabuses the reader of that 
notion. The excerpt states "proudly" that when "you choose a combined oral 
contraceptive your job is to choose the progestogen that suits your patient best.. .our 
job is to provide it" (my emphasis). By the conclusion of this sentence, it is clear 
that the pronouns actually refer to the doctor's, not the consumer's, "freedom of 
choice". The image and the print are either in juxtaposition, or the corollruy of the 
doctor's choice of COC for the 'patient' is supposed to lead to her freedom. I would 
argue that the 'freedom' and 'choice' reside unquestionably with the doctor in these 
advertisements. They do not even hint at the 'informed consent/ choice' principle 
which holds that consumers are 'free' to make their own contraceptive choices. 
There is little indication of process or partnership within the health care 
consultation in these advertisements. In this sense, the silhouette is apt indeed 
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{) When you choose a combined oral 
~ contraceptive (COC) your job is to 
choose the progestogen that suits your 
patient best ... our job is to provide it. 
Femodene offers your patients excellent 
cycle control' and reliable contraceptive 
protection dinically demonstrat~ in over 
650,000 cycles2. 
Figure 5.1: New Zealand Medical Journal, 9/10/1998, no.1075 
The silhouette, which stands in for the consumer, is also appropriate to the 
dominant reading which the advertisement suggest. The stereofypical female form 
is consistent with the advertisement's construction of a generic female. For 
example, one of this advertisement's strategies is to represent women as menstrual 
cycles. It states that the OCs are "clinically demonstrated in over 650,000 cycles" 
(my emphasis). When women equal "cycles", the similarities between females is 
emphasised. This is consistent with the silhouette which also represents a 
universal "cycle". By replacing women with "cycles", the drug company is able to 
associate individual bodies with a universal, generic process, achieving what 
Haraway would call "sameness" (Haraway, 1991, p. 17). Furthermore, use of 
"cycles" gives Schering the latitude to make their OCs appear more successful: 
650,000 cycles is not tantamount to the same number of women, even though this 
is the reading that is encouraged by the advertisement. 
These tactics are not peculiar to the recent advertising of 2GOCs and 
3GOCs. As Oudshoorn (1994) convincingly points out, the researchers who created 
the original formulation of the pill also represented women as menstrual cycles 
(p.132). Oudshoorn asserts that this scheme had material consequences. She 
explains that "cycles" allowed the researchers to stretch their results so that there 
was a "major increase of scale: the grand totals of the trials [in Puerto Rico] now 
included much more impressive numbers than a focus on the individual subject 
might have achieved". The corollary was that the trials could be presented as 
successful and the pill as 'safe' because the researchers had tested the synthetic 
hormones on "large numbers of cycles/women over long periods". Likewise, the 
advertisements' use of "cycles" also promotes the reading that their OCs are safe 
and successful. The apparent numerical successes presented through the ongoing 
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use of 'cycles', continues to justify the doctor's 'clinical freedom' when prescribing 
OCs. 
Despite these "presumptions that the doctor knows best" (Jacqueline, 
interview 25/8/2000), other case law places the onus on the patient to ask 
questions of the doctor who is then required to provide adequate answers. For 
instance, this is demonstrated in Smith v Auckland Hospi,tal Board9 which is about a 
client who was assured that an aortic angiogram would be a low risk procedure. 
However, during the angiogram the blood fl.ow to his right leg was occluded and the 
ultimate result was that his leg had to be amputated. The Court held that the onus 
is on the patient to ask questions which the health provider is required to 
adequately answer. This standard is often unsatisfactory because it relies on 
consumers who are sufficiently well informed - in terms of the medical knowledge 
component - to know what questions to ask. This problem is highlighted by Anne-
Maree (intetview 18/10/2000), a contraceptive consumer, who has this to say: 
It's hard to know what to ask these doctors. I quite often feel a bit ill or get pains but 
I don't go to my doctor because I just brush it off and don't know what it is. When I 
went to the doctor's to get the pill, I didn't know how it worked so I wasn't sure what 
to ask about. I would've liked to have been told how it works and what the hormones 
are and do before I took it. I didn't even think about it until the big drama hit the 
papers. I'd be willing to bet that that is why those women died from blood clots. They 
wouldn't have known that their sore legs meant they had clots. They would've just 
thought, 'Oh I've got a bit of a sore leg but it'll disappear.' And even if they did go to 
the doctor, they wouldn't have known what questions to ask. They wouldn't have 
thought that it could have been the pill! It's meant to be safe! So, there's definitely a 
problem with knowing what to ask when you're at the doctor's. You need to have 
enough medical, technical information, as well as everything else, to know what to 
ask them. 
Here, Anne-Maree (interview 18/10/2000) clearly describes the difficulties 
faced by some consumers during a health care consultation. In particular, she 
considers herself to be at a disadvantage since she isn't "sure what to ask" the 
doctor. This is because she has not received "enough medical, technical 
information" about the pill from her health provider. Specifically, she has been 
"kept in the dark" (Jacqueline, inteiview 25/8/2000) about how the pill "works and 
what the hormones are and (what they] do". She elaborates on this point by 
explaining that it wasn't until the 3GOC controversy ("the big drama") entered the 
media, that she wanted, "would've liked" to have known more. In other words, she 
now wanted to trace the assumptions that had previously been obscured by the 
neatly packaged, presumably "safe" OCs. This desire includes looking at the 
workings of OCs, their intricacies, hormones, and the assumptions underlying 
medical knowledge that deems 3G0Cs 'safe'. 
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Anne-Maree (intetview 18/10/2000) does not merely retell her own private 
troubles regarding access to medical information. She also speculates confidently 
(she is even "willing to bet"!) that her frustrations are shared by other consumers. 
Specifically, she refers to the 3GOC controversy and contends that "those women 
[who] died from blood clots ... wouldn't have known that their sore legs meant that 
they had clots". That is, Anne-Maree believes that, like her, these women also did 
not investigate the epistemologies that underpin assumptions. The importance of 
attending to this is certainly advocated by Anne-Maree, who essentially argues that 
a failure to interrogate why your body is in pain can even led to death. Anne-Maree 
considers that these OC users were so unaware of medical knowledge about 
thrombosis that this 'blind[ness]' contributed to their deaths. Without such 
information, these consumers "brush" their physiological complications aside and 
are unaware about "what questions to ask" their health providers. Anne-Maree's 
(interview 18/10/2000) recounting of this "problem" illustrates the importance of 
two things: first, that it is crucial to destabilise 'official', 'expert' information (that is 
supposedly 'secure1 by enquiring into underlying assumptions and secondly, that 
'informed consent' principles, which hold that doctors have a duty to disclose 
medical knowledge to patients, are also vital. 
Once again, then, my argument is not that the 'informed consent/ choice' 
concept is invalid or that medical knowledge is unnecessruy, but that it is one, 
albeit an important, component in the collection of information that is necessary 
for a 'fully' informed decision to be made. Furthermore, Anne-Maree's (interview 
18/10/2000) reflections also call into question the adequacy of cases such as Smith 
v Auckland Hospital Board which place the onus of seeking medical information 
enti.rely on the client. This is not to say that the consumer should not ask questions 
and seek explanations for underlying epistemological claims. What I am suggesting 
is that placing the onus solely on consumers, so that doctors are absolved from 
responsibility, is an unsatisfactory solution. 
The inadequacies of such solutions are recognised in the American decision 
Canterbury v Spence. 10 In this case, the nineteen year old plaintiff was admitted for 
back surgery for a suspected ruptured disc. There were complications with the 
surgery, namely partial paralysis, ataxia and incontinence. These <material' risks 
were not disclosed prior to the operation. The Court held that the patient would not 
have consented to the surgery if these risks had have been disclosed. This was a 
seminal decision in changing the focus of 'informed consent' from the 'reasonable 
doctor' standard to that of the 'reasonable patient'. The Judge held that the 
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practitioner had a duty to supply the patient with all the information that she 
might 'reasonably' need to assist her decision-making. 
As the cases Salgo v Leland Stanford Uni Board of Trustees, Smith v Auckland 
Hospital Board and Canterbury v Spence show, the standard of the 'reasonable 
person', and what such a subject should 'reasonably' expect, is a fundamental legal 
concept which is frequently invoked. The 'reasonable person' standard (in the 
context of medico-legal issues) generally involves viewing acts in the light of what 
'reasonable people' would be expected to do and not in light of what the particular 
individual might do (Greenawalt, 1992, p.4). This test is supposedly 'objective'. The 
'reasonable person' becomes the 'unmarked' (Haraway, 1991, p.17) categozy. An 
investigation into the assumptions that underpin the 'reasonable person' standard 
reveal that this subject is made11 not given from a very specific set of 
epistemological and ontological tools. In other words, the figure of the 'reasonable 
person' is the product of discourse, constructed from readily available, familiar and 
enduring narratives. I am referring here to the dualistic tendencies of Western 
logocentrism. The reason/ able person encapsulates the binary opposition where 
reason and mind are privileged over the body, the sensual. The 'reasonable person', 
then, is a disembodied entity.12 This person cannot tolerate a multiplicity of selves 
because the standard presumes the subject to be unified, consistent and 
homogeneous. The 'reasonable person' is "everywhere and nowhere" (Haraway, 
1991, p.163), representative of the ideal consumer who makes reasonable and 
rational decisions. 
Such 'reasonable people' are also supposed to make these nonsubjective 
decisions based on a vezy specific type of information that the courts deem 
'material'. So the law constructs this standard of the 'reasonable person' and also 
decides which knowledge such a person should 'reasonably' wish to access and 
utilise. It should be no surprise that the courts have decided for these 'reasonable 
people' that the information they require is knowledge that is valued for its 
disembodied nature. This typically includes 'scientifically proven' and statistical 
'evidence'. Such knowledge is considered 'material' and worthy of disclosure to 
consumers. For example, the Australian case Rogers v Whittaker13 held that the 
giving of information was to be driven by the health, temperament and information 
needs of that particular person. In this case, a new test for 'informed consent' was 
developed to determine whether a risk was material and, thus, should be disclosed. 
The court held that a risk is 'material' if "in the circumstances, a reasonable 
person, if warned of the risk would be likely to attach significance to it or if the 
doctor is or should reasonably be aware that the particular patient, if warned of the 
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risk would be likely to attach significance to it" (p. 433). The implication here 
appears to be that, if a patient would consider a risk significant, then that will be 
the test regarding whether it should be disclosed. In practice, by invoking the 
'reasonable person' (who is supposed to value a certain type of rational, 
disembodied information), the test maintains that the doctor is permitted to 
presume thats/he only need disclose what risks are statistically probable. In other 
words, it is presumed that a 'reasonable person' is only "likely to attach 
significance" to those risks which are 'material' (read scientifically proven and 
statistically likely given clinical evidence). 
Pursuant to the legal (by virtue of the scientific) definition, a 'material' risk 
is also only one which is deemed to be 'major' rather than 'minor' according to 
clinical testing. Dr Rosemruy Reid, a Christchurch doctor who participated in this 
study (interview 31/8/2000), explains that, medically, a 'major' side effect is 
"anything that interferes with lifestyle"; whereas, a 'minor' side effect is "something 
which tends to go away after you have been on [the drug] for a while". According to 
these definitions, major side effects associated with OC~ include "thrombosis, heart 
disease, stroke, breast cancer" versus "nausea, bloating, irregular bleeding" which 
are classified as minor side effects. The risk of experiencing such side effects is 
assessed clinically and then categorised as either 'minor' or 'major', largely 
according to statistical probability and the numbers in the sample who experience 
particular side effects. 14 A Christchurch doctor interviewed for this study, Luxi 
(interview 13/10/2000) explains that the likely risk of side effects (mainly minor) is 
"measured" by "relying on doctors' notes". She continues to clarify this by way of an 
example: 
Say I was doing a study in this clinic. Then I would have to dig out the notes for 
everybody on the third generation or whatever. And then go through the notes. If 
someone has no problems, then you would write 'no problems'. Or if there is 
bleeding, weight gain whatever. So you would have to go through the notes. Because 
it is difficult to say to someone, okay you're starting on the pill today and here's your 
diary, keep a note. Then it becomes rather subjective doesn't it? It is very difficult to 
make it objective because you are asking them to ask themselves if they have any 
problems. I mean they would say, um, I feel a bit sick today. If you were to give the 
person a chart and say can you tick or whatever, I think that they would be more 
subjective because they are faced with this everyday. There are far too many 
changes. They will be searching for an answer, a side effect, an experience. As a 
doctor, you can't know if this is really a real side effect or risk that the patient was 
experiencing. This is an unreliable method. So I think that the closest way to get 
objectivity is to go back and look at the records because these stay the same. 
In this excerpt, Luxi (interview 13/10/2000) describes the recognisable 
characteristics which are typically associated with doctors/scientists and patients. 
She represents the doctor as a detached observer who has the remarkable ability to 
transparently record 'reality' in her/his notes. Conversely, the patient is depicted 
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as an "unreliable" source of information since his/her knowledge is bodily, 
"subjective" and, thus, cannot possibly be "charted". Quite predictably,15 
subjectivity and objectivity are set up as an incompatible coupling. Luxi (interview 
13/10/2000) is appealing here to the dominant epistemologies of modernity, with 
their Enlightenment legacy and later infusion with positivist-materialist principles, 
which have defined themselves around ideals of pure objectivity and value-
neutrality. These ideals are best suited to govern evaluations of the knowledge of 
knowers who can be capable of achieving a view from nowhere that allows them 
(through the autonomous exercise of reason) to transcend particularity and 
contingency. The ideals presuppose a universal, homogeneous and essential 
human nature. 
In keeping with this epistemological legacy, Luxi (interview 13/10/2000) 
says that the doctor's task is to assess whether a particular side effect is "really a 
real" risk. This process is very difficult when faced with patients whose 
"subjectivity" disturbs access to the 'real'. Luckily, the professed disinterestedness 
of the doctor and the doctor's "notes" erase the possibility of any 
emotional/ subjective-reason interplay. Luxi deems this the "closest way to get 
objectivity". The hidden epistemological assumptions underlying Luxi's comments 
have been exposed as stemming from well-known Western claims about knowledge 
foundations. The apparently easy feat of transparently representing the "really real" 
is a false hope. She does not embrace the possibility that there is no immediate, 
unmediated access to a pre-existing 'reality'. In other words, Luxi is diametrically 
opposed to the narrator in the poem 'A Window Frame'l6 who realises, finally, that 
'reality' is not transparent like a window. Luxi steadfastly believes that the process 
of "going through the [doctors1 notes" - which have transformed patients' 
subjectively discerned symptoms - will provide a disembodied account of the "real", 
'material' risks associated with OCs. 
Luxi's (interview 13/10/2000) consistent presupposition is that patients are 
incapable of keeping a "diacy" or "chart" of their "really real" side effects, but that 
doctors are able to fulfil this task through their "notes". She clarifies her stance by 
claiming that "objectivity" is unachievable through patient charts or diaries 
because "you are asking them to ask themselves if they have any problems". She 
further states that this system is also "subjective because they are faced with this 
everyday ... searching for an answer, a side effect, an experience". It is worth 
highlighting that the doctors' "notes" are elevated above "diaries" or "charts" in this 
hierarchy of 'measured' OC risks. The "notes" are perceived as being endowed with 
the ability to transcend the subjectivity that saturates patients' own records. The 
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"notes" - partly because their own subjective assumptions are eclipsed - appear 
universal, objective, neutral and 'real'. 
But are the processes and the assumptions involved in collecting doctors' 
"notes" very different from the consumers' diary or charting procedures? I would 
argue that doctors' "notes" are, like diaries, subject to unreliability, subjectivity and 
"changes". It is not so much the subjectivity of the doctor that is seen as producing 
the knowledge about OC risks, so much as the objectivity of the scientific method, 
in this case, the "notes". The method itself relies on the so-called subjective 
accounts of users. Doctors think that they are 'translating' patients' narratives 
when they rewrite them as "notes". It is as if the seeming detachment of the :figures 
from embodied, subjective accounts can absolve the numbers from any hint of 
subjectivity. And yet these numbers cannot exist without embodiment. Frank 
(1995, p.11) aptly calls this the "colonization of experience". He likens 
medicalisation to postcolonialism. This is because in both cases the coloniser 
(doctor, imperial power) refuses to recognise the necessity of the 'other's' inputs in 
their supposedly objective, superior accounts. Drawing from Spivak, Frank (1995, 
p.25) elaborates with the observation that the "professional text" - here the doctors' 
"notes" - need subjective embodiment, but that they do not acknowledge that need. 
Similarly, Luxi (interview 13/10/2000) fails to declare her reliance on the 
subjectivity of patient "diaries" and admit that her own "notes" are peppered with a 
collection of subjective narratives from her patients and herself. Subjectivity and 
objectivity become intermingled. Therefore, contrary to universal belief, doctors do 
rely, necessarily, on subjectivity, "diaries", and "unreliable" descriptions of 
physiological symptoms. 
For many QC users, it is the abstraction of so-called objective and reliable 
"notes" and figures that is "unreliable". As Sarah (interview 26/9/2000) explains, 
the abstracted figures presented to her by her general practitioner were 
meaningless until they were not only interpreted by her doctor, but also embedded 
within her own personal embodiment: 
I had a blood cholesterol test because of my father's early death ... [My doctor] got the 
graphs out and showed me that these were the protector factors: being female, 
young and these are the risk factors: smoking, blah, blah, blah. And she showed me 
my file and lots of it I thought, 'that's me' but some of it was very removed. So I was 
glad when she showed me what she thought the figures meant. I was really pleased 
that she had taken the time to do that because not many GPs would bother. Then I 
went home and I put the numbers in context. I thought about what my body had 
been doing before the test and so on. And whether the risks would apply to me. 
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Sarah's (interview 26/9/2000) exposition can be read alongside Luxi's 
(interview 13/10/2000) remarks. Unlike Luxi, Sarah (interview 26/9/2000) 
recognises some of her own subjective account about her 'body-self' in her GP's 
"file" (doctor's "notes"), while at the same time she also finds aspects of this 
information "very removed". Sarah's recognition of subjectivity in the files is 
illustrated when she describes reading her "file" and thinking "that's me". 
Moreover, it is significant that she says her doctor explains what "she thought the 
figures meant" (my emphasis). Sarah does not say that her doctor tells her what the 
figures 'really' meant. There is an implicit assumption in her remark that figures 
carry multiple meanings. Indeed, she does not passively take her GP's 
interpretation of the blood test figures to be the only version. Rather, the numbers 
are placed in the "context" of her body's history and her own reflections on her 
corporeality. This contextual situating of numbers is essential because numbers 
are considered "removed", abstracted from meaning. One way to give them 
meanings is to piece the different interpretations of figures together which includes 
locating the peculiarly abstracted statistics within the 'body-self's' personal and 
social context. Sarah does not accept that the 'real' meaning of her body's 
physiology is encapsulated in the numbers. She even plays down the 'material' 
risks. This is illustrated through her dismissive "blah, blah, blah" and her 
questioning of "whether the risks would apply to" her specifically. Sarah is fulfilUng 
the role expected of her as an 'assertive patient' (Cartwright, 1988, p.174). 
However, unlike Cartwright's ideal consumer, she is not merely seeking 'material' 
information, but mixing positivistic knowledge with other knowledges. Sarah 
(interview 26/9/2000) is implicitly questioning the ability of 'official', 'expert' 
knowledge to maintain its mystique and, more importantly, withstand ruptures 
from strategies such as bricolage. Conversely, Luxi's (interview 13/10/2000) 
position is that there is one truth, one knowledge that can be systematically 
constructed from doctors' notes. The subtext underpinning her quotation is that 
she thinks if it is not possible to transcend subjectivity and the particularities of its 
locations, then there is no knowledge worth collecting or analysing. Consequently, 
there is certainly no point asking patients to "chart" their bodily knowledges. 
The point of this in-depth analysis of Luxi's (interview 13/10/2000) and 
Sarah's (interview 26/9/2000) quotations is twofold: first, to highlight the inherent 
assumptions and secondly, to problematise what is considered a 'material' risk and 
explore the way that these risks are made, or constructed and are not objectively 
given to us by scientists, doctors or the courts. These materialist-positivist 
approaches construct certain knowledge, and the risks they consider 'material'. For 
example, Doctor X (interview 14/9/2000) does not consider the potential risk of 
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thrombosis through use of 3GOCs 'material' or "important" enough to warrant 
mentioning to consumers. He says that "people hardly ever die from this .. .it's a 
very small risk". In his view, the degree of importance of the risk is equated to the 
possibility of mortality. This type of approach minimises risks. It fails to notice that 
in addition to the risk of mortality, the risk of 'minor' side effects is also often 
considered important to users. Moreover, the positivist approach, exemplified by 
Doctor X, excludes the possibility that other knowledges can also be 'material' and 
important when making 'informed' decisions within a 'discursive field'17 (Weedon, 
1987) such as contraception. Indeed, many consumers believe that it is reasonable 
to weigh up and assess a seemingly disparate collection of 'material' knowledges. 
When only the 'material' ('major) risks of a product are disclosed, the corollary is 
sometimes risky. For example, Judith Sim, a Christchurch NFP teacher who 
participated in this study (interview 28/8/2000), describes the adverse 
consequences that can follow when health practitioners fail to disclose 'minor', 
immaterial risks: 
A client asked the doctor to tell her about all the risks with depo provera. She 
eventually chose it, thinking it was safe, that there were no risks. And all her hair 
started to fall out. So she went back to the doctor. And in the end the doctor 
admitted that this was a very rare side effect of depo provera. He hadn't bothered to 
tell her in the first place because it's statistically small. But she had virtually lost all 
her hair! And it took her a long time to realise that it was depo that caused it. So, 
yes, it's difficult to tell people all the information, but I think that it has to be done 
otherwise you get a side effect but don't know what the cause is. She had been told 
other risks but not that one. The doctor probably just hoped that she wouldn't get it 
because there was only a small chance. 
(Judith's emphasis) 
Despite Judith Sim's (interview 28/8/2000) suggestion that this woman's 
request that her doctor disclose "all the risks with depo provera", the information 
divulged is based on an epidemiological construction of risk. Like Doctor X 
(interview 14/9/2000), the possibility that this consumer will experience this rare, 
"statistically small" side effect is constructed as unlikely and, therefore, the 
potential risk is not disclosed. This is a typical epidemiological, positivist approach 
to risk (Gabe, 1995; Gifford, 1986, pp.216-217). Research is used to quantify risk 
by examining the correlation between a risk factor (for example, being over thirty 
five and on OCs) and an expected outcome (for example, mortality rate). Such 
statistical correlation may be evidence of, but is not necessarily 'proof of causation. 
Health providers can only translate epidemiological risk measurements into 
guidelines for deciding what to disclose to 'at risk' consumers. Gifford (1986, 
pp.220-222) highlights that the shift from an epidemiological to a clinical definition 
of risk is fraught with difficulties. This process is uncertain because while the 
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numerical data shows which cype of person is more likely to experience a given 
outcome, it cannot give definitive answers about whether a particular individual 
will be exposed to the risk. Accordingly, the doctor knows that there is a 
statistically "small chance" that his 'patient's' hair will fall out, so he chooses not to 
disclose this potential risk based on the 'evidence'. Herein lies one of the 
limitations of positivist approaches to risk. However, this construction of risk is 
considered reasonable and, thus, consumers, such Judith's client above, are 
judged unreasonable if they want to know "all" the risks, even the 'immaterial' ones. 
The epidemiological and clinical models of risk also hold that it is 
unreasonable to unveil "all" the risks associated with drugs such as OCs because of 
their construction of the meaning of 'safe'. Pursuant to positivist :frameworks, safety 
is primarily construed as being relative to something else. By contrast, when some 
consumers (such as the client Judith describes above) hear that drugs, like depo 
provera are "safe", they think that this means they are safe in absolute rather than 
relative terms. These different terms of reference are analogous in an oral 
contraceptive context. For instance, Djerassi (1979, p.37), who is one of the pill's 
initial researchers and developers, states that "safe does not mean safe". This is 
because it is "not possible to develop a pill that does not have side effects" (ibid). 
Conversely, many OC users have the impression that when a drug is labelled 'safe' 
it means that they will be :free :from harm, danger and risks. The depo provera user 
above (Judith Sim, interview 28/8/2000), for example, suggests that 'safe' means 
risk free. 
Djerassi (pp.36-37) cites a 1970 conversation between Senator Nelson and 
Dr Edwards in order to highlight the mutable meanings affiliated with 'safe'. When 
questioned about the assumptions and procedures that go into classifying a drug 
as 'safe', Dr Edwards concedes that 'safe' only means that it reaches a certain 
standard set down by the Food and Drug Administration's conditions for labelling 
(ibid). Furthermore, it does not follow :from the categorisation that OCs are 'safe' 
that they are "innocuous" or free :from "contraindications" (ibid). The interpretation 
of safety :from one dimension to another requires fundamental transformations in 
meanings. For instance, the depo provera user was under the impression that this 
drug was 'safe' according to the literal meaning of safe, rather than the standards 
for drug safety that must be met. Given that she suggested depo was 'safe', she did 
not link depo provera with causation for the hair loss. Moreover, since the former 
meaning of safe - held by many consumers - is delegitimised in favour of the latter 
'official' knowledge, the physical 'reality' of bodily side effects, such as hair loss, 
remains obscured and in the background. The medical model maintains that the 
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relative safety of OCs justifies their withholding of 'full' information about possible 
risks. 
The unreasonableness of 'fully' informing consumers is also contended 
because of the scant evidence that exists to support the definitive existence of 
'minor' risks. Given that there is "insufficient evidence to warrant changing to other 
brands [of OCs]" (Doctor X, interview 14/9/2000; The Dominion, 1995, p.3), it is 
perfectly reasonable to be "convinced that [OCs] are safe" (Doctor X, interview 
14/9/2000). Indeed, Dr Jessamine, quoted in New Zealand Woman's Weekly (2000, 
p.20), is likely to re-establish the epidemiological meaning of 'safe' by saying, 
without qualification, that OCs are "extremely safe". My concern is not with the 
mutability of meanings associated with 'safe' which seems inevitable. What I am 
arguing is that it is risky and unreasonable to invoke such a meaning without 
qualifying it by making explicit the underlying assumptions: in this case, that "safe 
does not mean safe" as Djerassi insists. The speakers of these accounts are able to 
function like the 'modest witnesses' whom Haraway (1997, pp.23-24) describes. 
The 'modest witness' has the extraordinary capacity for "self-invisibility" (ibid). 
S/he can eschew the epistemological foundations of a meaning like 'safe'. More 
importantly, though, the 'modest witness' is able to avoid responsibility for any dire 
consequences that flow from his/her constructed meanings. The 'modest witness' 
position is indeed 'safe'. Haraway's (ibid) solution is to propose "situated 
knowledges" which would locate the "unmarked" speaker and, therefore, ensure 
thats/he takes responsibility for the ramifications of meanings. 
Despite Haraway's critiques of scientific knowledge production, some 
doctors persist as 'modest witnesses'. For example, Dr Rosemary Reid (interview 
31/8/2000) suggests that concealing is often preferable to disclosure. She says 
that the 3GOC controversy is "misrepresented" and that this is "more harmful than 
hiding the information ... until there is sufficient scientific evidence and scientific 
appraisal". This is a clear indication that "hiding" is valued. Disclosure must only 
occur after the 'modest witness' has evaluated the controversy and established the 
factual evidence. It is only this figure who has the remarkable power to "bear 
witness: he is objective; he guarantees the clarity and :purity of objects" (ibid). It 
should be made plain that Dr Rosemacy Reid is suggesting not that some 
information not be divulged, but that all of it should remain hidden until the 'facts' 
have been surveyed by 'experts'. Some doctors' focus on the insufficiency of 
existing evidence is inadequate as grounds for "hiding" information. When doctors 
refer to the lack of evidence to support the case that OCs pose risks to users, their 
unvoiced assumption is that no evidence exists to "either confinn or deny the 
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concern" (Cannold, p.174, her emphasis). The 3GOC controversy should not centre 
around questions of sufficient medical evidence. My point is that this objective is 
not a reasonable justification for withholding information in the 'informed 
consent/ choice' process. 
The counter argument is that incomplete disclosure of medical information 
is justifiable because it is an "impossible task" (Doctor X, interview 14/9/2000) to 
disclose all the potential minor side effects associated with OCs. Other doctors' 
statements convey analogous dissatisfaction with what they consider an 
"unrealistic requirement" (Peter Kearns, Co-Director and naturopath CCNM, 
interview 26/8/2000) and an "annoying standard" (Luxi, Christchurch doctor, 
interview 13/10/2000). Due to the perceived difficulties in attaining 'informed 
consent/ choice', many health providers choose only to disclose what they deem the 
'material' risks. This involves simply providing consumers with a "quantification of 
the increased risks" (Dr Rosemary Reid, interview 31/8/2000). Reid goes on to 
claim that such numerical knowledge means that "most women, when they see the 
figures, will agree with us that there is not a huge risk at all". And, indeed, some 
OC users do. The perspectives of health providers and users within the 3GOC 
controversy are not consistently diametrically opposed. On the contrary, there are 
sometimes overlapping areas. Marion (interview 29/8/2000), for instance, 
mentions that when she went to her doctor about the potential risks of talring 
3GOCs, she left "thinking, oh, what is the big deal?" Her conclusion is partly due to 
an "examination of the figures which show [her] that the risks are actually quite 
minimal". Likewise, Heidi (interview 26/8/2000) also utilises a discursive strategy 
that is generally associated with health providers when she says that after "looking 
at the stats" and realising that "only one in every thirty thousand people get a clot, 
then, to [her], that is quite a small chance". 
Both Marion (interview 29/8/2000) and Heidi (interview 26/8/2000) invoke 
a discourse that minimises risk. They rely solely on medical knowledge and the 
epidemiological model when making their decisions about how to respond during 
the 3GOC controversy. Based on the statistics, both Heidi and Marion decide to 
continue taking 3GOCs. Their reasons are indicative of an overlap in consumer and 
health provider knowledge bases. However, this merging is not recognised in much 
of the literature that deals with consumer and health practitioner conceptions of 
risk. The rigid separation between the two groups is generally emphasised 
(Phillimore & Moffatt, 1994, p.147; Irwin, 1995; Parsons & Atkinson, 1992). 
Although I concur with this literature that differently positioned people frequently 
speak divergent discourses, I do not want to suggest that there is a firmly 
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entrenched separation. The assumptions underlying these two consumers' 
'informed choices' indicates that there is sometimes overlap between consumer and· 
health provider assumptions during the 3GOC controversy. 
In summary, this chapter has illustrated that most of the OC users 
interviewed are not 'blind consumers' or 'victims', but proactive health consumers 
who engage with information in order to make 'informed' decisions. It is my 
argument that what the health consum~rs in this study consider to be 'informed' 
carries a meaning that is different from that encapsulated in the legal precedents 
pertaining to 'informed consent/ choice' and risk. While health providers are legally 
required to transmit information (and in some situations ensure that consumers 
sign consent forms), 'informed consent' is much more complicated than these 
regulatory practices. Consumers do not magically become 'informed' through the 
disclosure of medical information that the law insists doctors provide. Rather, as 
this chapter and Chapter Four argue, many of the consumers interviewed in this 
study construct themselves as 'fully' informed once they have evaluated a 
compilation of relevant knowledges. It is through engaging in this strategic process 
that consumers feel that they are proactive and 'fully informed' consumers. 
In the next chapter, the discursive 'toolboxes' that differently positioned 
people draw from are highlighted by exploring the ways that bricolage is a process 
much like patchwork, or 'weaving', whereby different, often incommensurable, 
strands of knowledges are pieced together. This concluding chapter illustrates that 
the practice of bricolage is an ongoing process which requires continual and 
ongoing 'weaving'. 
NOTES 
1 The Cartwright Report is persuasive but not binding (Antonia Fisher, solicitor, interview 
11/9/2000). In other words, courts are not bound by the fmding~ but they certainly 
consider her Honour's recommendations seriously. In addition to the common law, there is 
relevant legislation pertaining to 'informed consent/ choice' which is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. Collins' (1992) text on medical law in this country provides a thorough treatment of 
the legislative offspring of the Cartwright Report. Briefly, the doctrine in Aotearoa/New 
Zealand has not developed at the same rate as other countries because of the effect of the 
ACC legislation. Section 5(6) of this Act is pertinent Further, the office of the Health and 
Disability Commissioner and the Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers' Rights 
owe much to Justice Cartwright for their inception (Cartwright, 1988, p.172). Rights 5, 6, 
and 7 of this Code interact to form the nucleus of the doctrine of 'informed consent'. Finally, 
another statute foreshadowed in the Cartwright Report is The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990. In particular, section 11 guarantees the right to personal autonomy. Finally, also of 
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considerable importance throughout the Cartwright Report was the 1947 Nuremberg Code 
and the World Medical Association's Declaration of Helsinki.. The former was enacted after 
revelations at the Nuremberg Trials of Nazi War Criminals who committed experimental 
medical atrocities in concentration camps. This formed the basis of subsequent codes such 
as the latter. The central principles of both Codes are the necessity of 'informed consent' and 
the duty of the investigator to refrain from harming the 'subjects' (Coney, 1988, p.134; 
Cartwright, 1988, p.138). 
2 Peter Keams (Co-Director and naturopath CCNM, interview 26/8/2000) is drawing a 
distinction in approaches to health between the generation born in the 1970s, including 
myself, as opposed to those born in the 1940s, which includes him. 
3 Ruth is not only an example of the media's construction of the patient as 'victim', but also 
an illustration of the ways that patients can resist this positioning. Ruth was the first patient 
who spoke publicly about the 'unfortunate experiment' and who prompted the investigation. 
4 Encouraging women to actively participate in accessing different sorts of information about 
health issues and learning about their bodies is not a new idea. For example, in the late 
1970s, the Boston Women's Health Collective published a book called Our Bodies, Ourselves: 
A Book by and for Women (1998 revised ed., New York, Simon & Schuster) which was an 
outcome of resistance to women health consumers as victims. The book put together 
different sources of information, medical, plus what different women had to say about health 
topics. This book celebrates bricolage without using the term. 
5 Thanks must go to Sarah Bickerton for both confirming my initial thoughts on Doctor X's 
(interview 14/9/2000) quotation and also for her additional erudite comments. In particular, 
she also pointed out that another assumption underlying Doctor X's remarks is that the 
lesbian 'lifestyle' is wrongly equated with an inability to become pregnant. She questions 
what he thinks this 'lifestyle' involves. Furthermore, Doctor X's assumption is another 
attempt to eliminate feminists-lesbians from the 3GOC debate. Given that feminists/lesbians 
do not get pregnant, then they have no need for OCs and, consequently, they have no place 
in the debate. Doctor X (interview 14/9/2000) does not suggest that contraception has a 
very long historical trajectory as a feminist concern. 
6 A 'competent' patient is defined, inter alia, as someone who is not a child or mentally 'ill'. 
See Collins, 1992, pp. 75-104 for more details about this. 
7 This section traverses some of the relevant case law pertaining to 'informed choice/ consent' 
that was considered during the Cartwright Report. It does not, therefore, provide a full 
description or analysis of all the common law in this area. Please see Collins (1992) which is 
a thorough coverage of the pertinent 'informed consent/choice' precedents. 
8 Salgo v Leland Stanford Uni Board of Trustees 317 P 2d [1957) (Cal Dis App) 
9 Smith vAucklandHospital Board 191 NZLR (CA) [1965] 
10 Canterbury v Spence 464 F 2d 772 DC (1972]. 
11 I owe the notion that selves, bodies and nature are 'made' not given to Haraway (1989) and 
Oudshoorn (1994). 
12 The 'reasonable person' standard has also been criticised for other inherent problems in 
addition to the ones that are my focus (Greenawalt, 1992, pp.144-148). In particular, 
opponents of the concept have argued that it is discriminatory. Indeed, one of the original 
formulations of the test found in the Hall v Brooklands Auto Racing Club case (1933, 1 KB 
205 CA) held that the "reasonable man [sic) is the man on the Clapham omnibus" (p.224). 
Pursuant to this case, the 'reasonable person' could only be the 'reasonable man'. The 
universal "everywhere but nowhere» (Haraway, 1997) legal subject was male. This is partly 
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the result of the familiar dualism which constructs women as closer to nature, embodiment 
and, thus, subjectivity and irrationality; whereas men are deemed to be close to the rational 
mind. Even when the crucial language did shift from 'man' to 'person', some feminists 
maintain that this open standard is filled in via a discriminatory process, whereby the 
referent, although hidden now, remains 'man'. Similar arguments are made regarding the 
way that this concept also denotes a heterosexual, Western, white 'reasonable person' and 
does not allow for any difference (Naffine, 1990; Duncan, 1996). 
13 Rogers v Whittaker 175 479 CLR [1992) 
14 Personal email correspondence wit..h. scientific researcher (5 Sept.ember 2000). 
15 Although my prediction that some of the doctors would prefer so-called 'objectivity' was 
often confirmed, this is not to say that my expectations were always correct. On the contrary, 
my preconceptions were frequently disrupted. Please see Chapter Two for a discussion of 
these disruptions. Furthermore, the fact that I entered the 'field' with such ideas highlights 
the inherent problems associated with attempts to conduct 'grounded theory'. I would argue 
that one 'solution' is to adopt a reflexive approach throughout the research process so that 
such presuppositions can be interrogated and destabilised. 
16 See Chapter Three where I discuss this poem in more detail and explain its relationship to 
my theoretical approach throughout this thesis. 
17 A 'discursive field' contains competing meanings and ways of organising procedures and 
institutions (Weedon, 1987, 35). 
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CHAPTER6 
THE IMPERATIVE TO '(RE)POLISH' RATHER THAN CONCLUDE 
The cloth of meaning may have to be woven out of a myriad scraps and off cuts, but 
woven it is, day after day, year after year. 
(Worpole, 1990, pp.44-45) 
This thesis has focused on a strategy utilised by a number of contraceptive 
consumers during the 3GOC controversy which involved evaluating multiple sources 
of information, or a "myriad [ of] scraps", which were refashioned as part of a process 
that I have interpreted as bricolage. This is the process Zena has referred to as 
continual "polishing" through talking and information gathering. I have not argued 
that this process provides neatly "woven" solutions. Rather, I have illustrated the 
ways that bricolage in action is an inherently 'messy' (Denzin, 1997, pp.xvi-xvii) 
process. 
The purpose of this chapter is not to provide definitive conclusions about the 
3GOC controversy, but to highlight the ongoing process, identified by Zena, of 
'(re)polishing' issues surrounding contraception "day after day, year after year". One 
contraceptive consumer, Emily, highlights the necessity of continuing to make sense 
of the "issues" surrounding contraception. She contends that, although she "could 
honestly say that the medics think that there is no debate now ... for us, the ones 
who have to use contraceptives, it's never over. We have to keep working out all the 
issues for as long as we want to prevent pregnancy." Similarly, as I canvassed in 
Chapter Three, the strategy of keeping a 'scrapbook' with a compilation of bits and 
pieces of information which are retained on the principle that they "may always 
come in handy" (Levi-Strauss, 1968, p. 18), also indicates the imperative to 
'(re)polish' rather than conclude. The metaphor of a woven cloth, patchwork or web 
captures the ways that many of the consumers interviewed for this study reworked 
and '(re)polished' various disparate, and often incommensurable, knowledges in 
order to make sense of the controversy. Just as patchwork, weaving and webs can 
connote imagery of different "scraps" and "off cuts" pieced and woven together, the 
process of bricolage also involves recombining strands from the discursive 'toolbox' 
which have often been "transmitted in advance" (Levi-Strauss, 1968, p. 20). 
My primary focus has been to explore the meanings associated with such 
discursive "off cuts" that had been circulating for some time. For example, in 
Chapter Five I illustrated that meanings associated with the perceived 'safety' of OCs 
are highly variable. Similarly, the discursive 'toolbox' connected to risks associated 
with OCs was explored in Chapters Five and Three, but especially Chapter Four, 
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and 'informed consent/ choice' was troubled by illustrating that its meanings are not 
as neat and tightly woven as its legal definition suggests. 
The emphasis in this research and in the thesis has not been on solving, 
proving, or assessing the medical evidence or resolving the physiological debate 
surrounding thrombosis and 3GOCs. My concern was to explore some of the 
meanings, discursive strategies and 'stocytelling' that circulated during the 
controversy. Despite some commentators' insistence that, for instance, the 3GOC 
controversy was solely concerned with "one aspect of pill use: thrombosis" (Doctor 
X), this thesis provides insight into the multiplicity and proliferation of discursive 
strategies circulating before and during the controversy. Instead of being interested 
in whether or not certain medical 'facts' associated with OCs are true, my concern 
was to illustrate the function(s) of discourses by enquiring into the epistemological 
and ontological agendas and assumptions which are often hidden under the guise of 
'objectivity', 'factual' knowledge and 'reality'. 
My theoretical approach throughout the thesis drew heavily from the idea 
that 'reality' is a problematic notion (Butler, 1992; Walby, 1992; Davies, 1992; 
Davies, 1997). This was developed in Chapter Three and illustrated partly by 
Curnow's (1974, p. 63) poem "A Window Frame". Curnow's narrator realises that 
language refuses to perform the function of access to the 'real'. He is forced to 
realise that 'reality' is not like a transparent window, innocently framing what is 
outside. Rather, the narrator is involved in the framing of 'reality' outside the 
window. This thesis has called into question the assumption that language is a 
representational, referential system that innocently reflects 'reality'. For example, in 
Chapters Three and Four, I probed statistical formulations that circulated during 
the 3GOC controversy by suggesting that they are rule governed, constructed 
meanings that are sometimes developed in an endeavour to be neutral and to appear 
as if there is no meaning being applied to an event. 
Some poststructuralist ideas hold that what we refer to as 'reality' is 
constructed through discourse (Butler, 1992; Walby, 1992; Davies, 1992; Davies, 
1997). In this sense, the 'reality' is, or becomes the meanings that are constructed. 
This is not to say that there is no 'reality' and that the. entire world is reduced to 
discourse, but to point out that the representation of that 'reality' is a construction 
of meanings (Jones, 1997; Davies, 1992; Davies, 1997; Butler, 1992; Singer, 1992; 
Flax, 1992). During the research process (and in Chapter Four) I grappled with the 
supposed material, discursive divide. I asked ontological questions about being, 
what exists and what is. Specifically, I was anxious about diminishing and 
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invalidating consumers' 'experiences' of pain associated with OCs by reducing their 
symptoms to mere discursive constructions. I asked what it meant when consumers 
made adamant statements such as Jacqueline's assertion that "there is pain in [her] 
leg that's got something to do with the pill". My interest in discourse does not involve 
assuming_the view that bodily pain does not 'exist', but it does involve attention to 
the discursive meanings that people attach to embodiment. This is vital because 
meanings are discursively apprehended. The same physical sign (a headache, for 
example) is often associated with differing meanings which are utilised to explain 
and articulate pain (Williams & Bendelow, 1998, pp.155-157). By paying attention to 
these contrasting meanings attached to embodiment, the way that material (bodies) 
are mediated through the discursive becomes clear (Shildrick, 1997; Usher, 1997; 
Shildrich & Price, 1996). 
In other words, it is constructed meanings that frame what is referred to as 
'reality'. According to Ackerman (1990, p.301), it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
"leave the palace of our perceptions". Not only did I subscribe to this type of stance 
regarding my theoretical approach throughout the thesis, but I also adopted it when 
formulating my methodology. For instance, the 'storytelling' generated by the 
participants in this study was conceptualised not as accounts of what 'really' 
happened, but stories about what 'actually' (Denning, 1994) occurred. Denning uses 
the terms 'really' and 'actually' in order to demarcate between realism and acting, 
performance and construction. He argues that what really happened, or the so-
called 'real' story, can never be discovered because we can only ever know what 
actually occurred, or a version of 'reality'. Denning argues that the illusion of 
realism needs to be negated by paying attention to innumerable cultural 
constructions and the performance of what 'actually' happened. According to this 
formulation, the interviewees' narratives consist of a layered "myriad" of 
(re)workings, (re)memberings and '(re)polishing[s]'. 
A further aspect of this ontological position is that any meaning that a 
person brings to an 'experience' depends on the discursive resources that are 
available and, thus, it is open to the re-construction and the co-construction of 
stories by both the interviewee and researcher. As I illustrated in Chapters Three 
and Four, many of this study's participants 'made. do' with the discursive 
possibilities readily 'at hand', such as choice, feminism and consumer rights. 
Although my interviews with contraceptive consumers were not extensive or 
statistically representative, the majority of participants, through picking up 
discourses and through the meaning-making processes, constituted their 
subjectivities. 
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The consumers' subjectivities are primarily discursively constituted. The 
ways that they make meanings related to the controversy and how they make sense 
of their bodies is inextricably connected to discourses that they take up as their 
own. It is hardly surprising, then, that some consumers interviewed explained their 
decision-making processes by referring to their perceived 'real' identities. For 
example, it was not uncommon for some OC users, such as Marion, to speak about 
the "real me" as an explanation for her actions during the 3GOC controversy. I 
argued that when a consumer constitutes herself through a certain discourse then it 
appears that she is not being 'real', authentic, or 'true' to herself if she fails to be 
consistent with this discursive strategy. My point is that the realism of appearances 
becomes convincing. 
Certain 'facts' and knowledge also appeared to be 'real' during the 
controversy. For example, statistical and 'material' risks associated with the pill 
were 'blackboxed'. Consequently, they appeared to be settled, "secure" (Doctor X), 
natural and essential. In Chapter Three, I explored how the deaths of some women 
in Aotearoa/New Zealand who had been taking 3GOCs 'opened' some 'blackboxes' 
associated with this medical issue for debate. Prior to this contraceptive controversy, 
it seemed that 3G0Cs were not risky because the safety of this formulation was 
presumed to be 'blackboxed': settled, a well-established 'fact' which was immutable 
and durable across time and space. During the debate, many of the 'experts' 
(medical professionals and government handouts) tried to re-box 'facts' about OCs in 
order to convince users that it was appropriate to continue taking the pill. For 
example, in addition to Doctor X's comment that the data was "secure", Doctor 
Rosemary Reid espoused similar rhetoric when she said that the statistics 
pertaining to mortality and 3G0Cs were "solid". The problem-solving technique here 
is to rearrange the statistical 'blackboxes' into an appropriate pattern by reshuffling, 
but without actually 'opening' them for further scrutiny. In addition to the statistical 
blackboxes that are reinstated by some of the medical professionals interviewed, I 
also trouble what gets stabilised as constituting 'informed consent/ choice' in a 
medical encounter in Chapter Five. 
The common law pertaining to 'informed consent/ choice', explored in 
Chapter Five, also contributes to the supposedly 'real' and natural understanding 
that the subject is singular, autonomous, rational: the 'reasonable person'. Chapter 
Five explored the assumptions underneath this conceptualisation in order to 
illustrate that the invisibility of such epistemologies gives this knowledge the 
appearance of being more 'natural', right, unquestionable and infallible. Although 
the law holds that a person is 'fully' informed when s/he has had the 'material' 
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(read: factual, medical) knowledge disclosed to her/him, this thesis argues that 
many consumers only construct themselves as 'informed' when they have drawn 
from a variety of medical and extra-medical discursive approaches. It is also 
important that they make the connections between the <material' and 'expert' 
information and their experience of bodily sensations, pain, dis-ease and wellbeing. 
Conversations with the contraceptive consumers who participated in this 
study indicated that many of them actively 'took up' the discursive possibility 
articulated by Silvia Cartwright that patients behave assertively in health care 
encounters. This was illustrated by the resistance to 'blind' consumers and 'victim' 
positions espoused by some of the consumers interviewed, such as Ellen and Emily. 
Although this thesis has focused on consumers who constitute themselves as people 
who proactively 'pick up' information in order to make sense of medical 
controversies, not all consumers construct themselves in these terms. Indeed, as I 
outlined in Chapter Four, while most of those I interviewed adopted this process, not 
all the consumers in this study used bricolage during the 3GOC controversy. 
This difference in problem-solving strategies when faced with a medical 
controversy highlights one of the limitations of this study. While this thesis focuses 
on a strategic response to a medical controversy that I refer to as 'bricolage', I 
recognise that this primacy focus eschews alternative responses that participants 
might adopt in response to a medical debate. I only spoke to a limited number of 
people that I contacted through a specific range of contexts. The notices inviting 
participation attracted people who were primarily assertive and had a lot of energy 
for accessing information about the controversy from a variety of sources and 
discussing the issues. Many of the consumers interviewed, but not all of them, 
deploy the 'bricolage' strategy. There are also differences among participants in the 
tactics they utilised to gather and combine information. There are many other 
possible strategies that can be invoked during a medical controversy. Apart from the 
cursory analysis of such approaches in Chapter Four, these aspects were either not 
covered in depth or were beyond the scope of this thesis. Further empirical research 
into the variable range of strategic responses to medical controversies would provide 
a more comprehensive analysis of the ways that people respond to medical debates. 
In part, I tried to acknowledge the multiplicity of approaches to a medical 
debate by recognising that bricolage and 'blackboxing' are not the only possible 
strategic responses to the 3GOC controversy. This was primarily demonstrated in 
Chapter Two by suggesting that there is not a strict demarcation between 
blackboxing and bricolage, and, in fact, that bricolage can even include 'blackboxed' 
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information. I also pointed out in Chapter Five the limitations of bricolage, partly, in 
an attempt to show that this process is not always the most appropriate for all 
differently positioned people and certain circumstances. Since bricolage involves 
working laterally, skimming the surfaces or information sources in order to make 
decisions, rather than delving deeply, this tactic is not necessarily appropriate for 
contraceptive researchers, for example. The point is that bricolage and blackboxing 
are not the only possible strategic responses to a medical controversy and it would 
be interesting for future research to concern itself with the multiplicity of processes 
and dynamics at work during a medical controversy. 
Research into the multiplicity of processes in action during a contraceptive 
controversy could involve applying what I referred to in Chapter Three as a 
'whiteboxing' methodology. Borrowing from software engineers' use of 'white box 
testing', I have invoked the term 'whiteboxing'. The purpose of this notion was 
twofold. First, this term requires attention to processes and dynamics by 
investigating blackboxes that pertain to internal workings and complexities (rather 
than simply inputs and outputs). Secondly, I described one of my tasks as a 
researcher to engage in 'whiteboxing'. This meant that I selected certain 'boxes' to 
explore such as those that pertained to knowledge, information and meaning 
constructions and appropriations. While my initial aim was to engage in 
'whiteboxing', as the research progressed the complexity and detail required to 
thoroughly investigate the internal workings of blackboxes relevant to the 3GOC 
controversy meant that what I did, in the end, was a mutated version of 
'whiteboxing'. However, the conceptual possibility of undertaking 'whiteboxing' 
allowed me to recognise the importance of re-examining the intricacies and 
complexities of meanings circulating during a medical controversy. 
Paying attention to some of the processes and strategies, such as bricolage, 
invoked by the participants in this study during a medical controversy, also 
highlighted that responses to· debates are complex interventions rather than 
opportunities for one type of action or another. For example, many of the consumers 
interviewed did not base their responses to the controversy on either medical 
knowledge or 'other' information. Instead, they took action based on a 'both-and' 
schema which included a (re)combination of various discursive and embodied 
knowledges. This thesis has tried to resist reinstating dualistic thinking. By using 
examples, such as the doctor in Chapter Four who drew from her own embodied 
experiences of diaphragms and statistical data, I have troubled binaries which posit 
health providers' and consumers' responses to medical debates at opposite ends of 
the continuum. This example, in addition to examples of consumers in this study 
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who invoke various discursive strands, unsettle thinking that rigidly places health 
professionals as 'experts' who only utilise objective medical knowledge and 
consumers as the lay 'victims', using subjective understandings of health issues 
such as risk. 
Throughout this thesis the contraceptive consumers who participated in this 
study engage actively in critical commentary on 'expert• information sources. This 
sort of interaction during a medical controversy, in combination with attention to 
the specificity of bodily signs, ensures that as consumers they are 'informed' rather 
than 'blind'. Much of the frameworks of understandings used by 'experts' during the 
3GOC controversy centred around the statistical chance and frequency of the risk of 
thrombosis to OC users. Some of the medical professionals' responses to the debate 
also focussed on placing the risk of thrombosis in a relative relationship to the risk 
of pregnancy. These 'expert' responses were illustrated in Chapter Four through an 
exploration of the government handouts pertaining to 'blood clots' and 3GOCs which 
were distributed during the controversy. 
Many of this study's consumer participants constructed an alternative 
framing of the 3GOC controversy which accessed 'expert' information, such as 
statistics, but critically framed these 'facts' by grounding them in relation to how 
their bodies reacted to pharmaceuticals. The consumers interviewed utilised 
discursive resources already available to them. They are not outside discourse, 
rather, they are discursively constituted (Jones, 1997; Davies, 1997). Through 
picking up certain discursive strands and through the meaning-making process, 
these consumers are able to constitute their subjectivities so that they are not dupes 
of 'experts' or pharmaceutical companies. 
By utilising the tools 'at hand', the consumers in this study generate new 
forms of understandings for themselves. They create new knowledges based on the 
specifics of their own embodied signs, which then provide new frameworks for 
decisions about contraceptive use that enable them to "move forward", as Zena puts 
it. The consumers in this study are active theorists who do not merely piece together 
disparate pieces from the toolbox, but who engage with knowledge in use: practical 
formulations of information that are based on their own personal biographies and 
physicali1;y, generating new understandings specific to themselves. 
Partially, the consumers who participated in this research are a product of 
the issues that I valorised. As Cotterill (1992, p.604) points out, in the end, it is the 
researcher who has "control and power" over the material because it is s/he "who 
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eventually walks away" and begins to work on the final account. Furthermore, the 
"responsibility for how the data is analysed and interpreted is entirely" (Cotterill, 
1992, p.604) the researcher's. Researchers are "data creating social beings" 
(Ribbens, 1989, p.592) and I acknowledge my analytical presence within the 
accounts of this study's participants. Given that the 'talk' of this study's participants 
is a result of co-creation, there is always room for additional perspectives, 
approaches and research. 
Importantly, there is a general need for additional research into contraceptive 
controversies, and contraception in general, because a number of consumers 
interviewed, such as Emily, indicated not only the "importance" of accessing 
contraceptive information, but also the ongoing importance of analysing 
contraceptive issues. Furthermore, much of the 'talk' surrounding OCs indicated 
that the amount and type of information that is deemed pertinent by some health 
providers and statutory regulators is inadequate, in part, because it fails to include 
a "myriad" of knowledges, including embodied strategies for making sense of medical 
controversies. The contrast between the law's approach to problem-solving in the 
medical encounter and the strategy utilised by many consumers in this study (where 
they "put all [the information] together"), indicates that further research is required 
to suggest changes in the direction of policy decisions surrounding such issues. 
Despite the contrast between medical, legal and consumer approaches to the 
3GOC controversy traced in this thesis, I have also pointed out that there are not 
simply differences in discourses utilised and strategies invoked, but also 
connectivity. For example, I provided examples of consumers who drew from similar 
positivist discourses as health providers and a doctor who invoked embodied 
'experiences' when advising a consumer about using diaphragms. 
Similarly, in addition to choice, feminism and rights, the interview 
transcripts also highlight the ubiquity of 'talk' about 'natural' and 'unnatural' 
contraceptives by both health providers and consumers. For instance, Peter Kearns 
(a Christchurch naturopath and Co-Director of CCNM) claims that 'natural' is 
"misleading in that synthetic drugs use natural hormones... The labs isolate the 
biologically active materials and synthesise it in the laboratory". Likewise, Janet, an 
OC user, also problematises the commonsensical understandings of the definition of 
'natural' when she says that "people perceive that natural is much better ... but we 
are easily duped about what is natural ... A natural formulation often has the active 
ingredient in it... Pharmaceutical companies are always trying to make their 
products more like the natural hormones because people think it's better and will 
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buy more". There is the potential for future research into OCs, and other 
contraceptive technologies, to ask questions about why people conceptualise certain 
methods as 'natural' or 'unnatural'. What discursive strategies are invoked when 
consumers make statements that they have "real periods" (Heidi) when they are not 
on the pill. What are the meanings that differently positioned people bring to 
'unnatural' and 'natural' as it relates to contraceptives? 
It would also be useful to conduct further research which recognises the pill, 
itself, as having the ability to shape people's perceptions about whether, for 
example, they are 'natural', 'real' and 'authentic' based on their choice of 
contraceptive methods. I am suggesting that the 3GOC controversy could also be 
analysed using Actor Network Theory (Latour, 1987; Latour, 1999; Callon & Law, 
1997; Law & Hassard, 1999) as the primary theoretical orientation. Utilisation of 
this framework would explore, among other things, the possibility that the pill, itself, 
is a powerful actor that constructs bodies and is involved in the crafting of 
su~ectivities. Due to my focus on the discursive toolboxes, meanings and 
consumers' responses to the 3GOC controversy, I did not explore fully how the 
3GOC controversy might be analysed using an ANT approach. Further research 
using this theoretical orientation would recognise the pill and media as significant 
actors within the controversy. Issues relating to Pharmac's decisions to subsidise 
particular formulations of oral contraceptives would also be an important field of 
investigation here. 
This thesis, albeit briefly, has traced some of the ways in which the media 
constructed various subjectivities, such as 'victims' and 'experts', during the 3GOC 
controversy. For example, in Chapter Five, I looked at the construction of the 
contraceptive consumer as victim by, in part, analysing how this figure was 
represented in the mass media during the 3GOC controversy and preceding the 
Cartwright Report. However, it would be productive for future work to provide an 
analysis of the media's treatment of the 3GOC controversy.1 This type of analysis 
could include an exploration of consumers' sense of "frustration" (Sarah) and 
"annoyance" (Phillipa) that they were dealing with information that had been 
"transmitted in advance" (Levi-Strauss, 1968, p.20) to groups of professionals and 
the media and that they, as consumers, only got to access it well after the actual 
event. 
This study is based on conversations with a small number of people who 
cannot 'represent' all OC users in Christchurch let alone Aotearoa/New Zealand. 
Clearly, the interviewees are not a statistically representative group of people, but 
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the thesis provides a sense of how predominantly active consumers negotiate a 
medical controversy. The research illustrates some of the possible ways of 
responding to a medical controversy, which I have identified under the framework of 
bricolage. A different study accessing a wider range of women would provide varying 
information. 2 
There are three additional limitations in the research process of this thesis 
which would benefit from further work. First, this study focussed primarily on 
people who were 'European', middle class, well educated and employed (as many 
described themselves in the demographic forms distributed in each interview). 
Future work would benefit from inclusion of wahine Maori strategic responses to 
contraceptive controversies. Secondly, although I did not only interview 
contraceptive consumers, the analysis itself was strongly focussed on their strategic 
responses rather than those of the state, drug companies, health providers and 
scientists. Thirdly, as one OC user, Ellen, pointed out, it would be useful to conduct 
further research in order to investigate "how males see the [3GOC controversy] as 
well in terms of their experiences of being with partners on the pill during the 
scare". 
This testimony to the involvement of differently positioned people who bring 
various discursive tools to the debate, is but one example of the ways that a medical 
controversy is rarely just about the issue at hand: in this case, the risk of 
thrombosis to those on 3GOCs during the 3GOC controversy. Any medical 
controversy is likely to be set within a web of discursive strategies and a multiplicity 
of meanings that are continually being 'woven' and '(re)polished'. In Emily's words, it 
is important to continue the process of 'polishing' and 'weaving', even after a medical 
controversy, because contraception is a 
really huge part of every woman's life. And it should be treated as such. This 
[controversy], for me and my friends, is not just about the third generation pill but 
about the pill. Women have been talking about it for years and we'll keep talking 
about it even if the medical profession say that the 'case is closed'. 
It is important to note that, although many of this study's participants 
focussed on issues other than thrombosis, that particular medical threat and risk 
was the basis for their concerns about this pharmaceutical and, thus, the starting 
point for the controversy and their 'talk' about related, broader contraceptive issues. 
Even though the epidemiological evidence appears to be neatly 'blackboxed' 
(indicating that 3GOC usage is not directly linked to thrombosis), much of the 
consumers' 'talk' in this study illustrates that the 'real' basis for many consumers' 
action is not the definitive 'expert' statements, or the documentation of statistical 
risk. Rather, the primary basis for responding to a medical controversy and the 
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strategy utilised by this study's consumers is an ongoing process of 'weaving' 
information sources: the process of constant bricolage. This thesis has attempted to 
document this 'messy' but vital process. Further research is needed to explore how 
widespread this strategy is and the specifics of its utilisation in the context of other 
medical controversies. 
NOTES 
1 See appendix 8 for a summruy of the media's treatment of the 3GOC controversy. 
2 It would be difficult to generate a sample for this fype of project because there is not a 
reliable list of all women in Christchurch or Aotearoa/New Zealand who are on 3G0Cs, or 
even OCs in general. 
130 
REFERENCES 
Abraham, J. 1994, 'Bias in Science and Medical Knowledge: The Opren Controversy', 
Sociology, vol. 28, no. 3, pp. 717-736. 
Ackerman, D. 1990, Natural History ofthe Senses, Vintage Books, New York. 
Aggett, M. 1997, 'Anatomy of a Decision - Pills Under Scrutiny', New Zealand 
Doctor, 25 June, pp.19-20. 
Arksey, H. 1994, 'Expert and Lay Participation in the Construction of Medical 
Knowle~ge', Sociology of Health and nlness, vol. 16, no. 4, pp. 448-468. 
Atkinson, P. 1989, 'Go:ffinan's Poetics', Human Studies, vol. 12, no.1-2, pp.59-76. 
Atwood, M. 1972, Suroival: A Thematic Guide to Canadian Literature, Anansi, 
Toronto. 
Awatere, D. 1984, Maori Sovereignty, Broadsheet, Auckland. 
Barrett, M. 1992, 'Words and Things: Materialism and Method in Contemporary 
Feminist Analysis', in Destabilising Theory: Contemporary Feminist Debates, 
M. Barrett & A. Phillips (eds) Polity Press, Cambridge. 
Barthes, R. (trans. Heath, S) 1977, Image, Music, Text, Hill & Wong, New York. 
Baudrillard, J. 1968, Le Syseme des Objets, Denoel-Gontbier, Paris. 
Baudrillard, J. 1970, Societe de Consummation, Gallimard, Paris. 
Beatson, P & D. 1994 The Material Infrastructure', in The Arts in Aotearoa New 
Zealand, Massey University, Palmerston North. 
Beck, U. 1992, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity, Sage, London. 
Becker, H. S. 1998, Tricks of the Trade: How to Think About Research While You're 
Doing it, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London. 
Beizer, B. 1995, Black-Box Testing: Techniques for Functional Testing of Software 
Systems, Wiley, New York. 
Blackbox Testing and Whitebox Testing, (Online], Available: 
http:/ /www.student.math.uwaterloo.ca/ cs241 / a/ 1 /blackbox.html 
Bloemenkamp, K., Rosendaal, F., Helmerhorst, F., Buller, H. & Vandenbroucke, J. 
1995, 'Enhancement by Factor V Leiden Mutation of risk of Deep-Vein 
Thrombosis Associated with Oral Contraceptives Containing a Third-
Generation Progestagen', Lancet, vol. 346, pp. 1097-1101. 
Bloom, A. 1987, The Closing of the American Mind, Dordrecht, D. Reidel, Holland. 
Bloom, L. R. 1998, Under the Sign of Hope: Feminist Methodology and Narrative 
Interpretation, University of New York Press, Albany. 
Bordo, S. 1993, Unbearable Weight: Feminism, Western Culture and the Body, 
University of California Press, Berkeley. 
Boston Women's Health Collective, 1998, Our Bodies, Ourselves: A Book By and For 
131 
Women, Simon& Schuster, NewYork. 
Bunkle, P. 1992, 'Withdrawal of the Copper 7: The Regulatory Framework and the 
Politics of Population Control', in For Health or Pro.fit? Medicine, the 
Pharmaceutical Industry, and the State in New Zealand, P. Davies (ed) Oxford 
University Press, Oxford. 
Butler, J. 1992, 'Contingent Foundations: Feminism and the Question of 
"Postmodernism"', in J. Butler & J. W. Scott (eds) Feminists Theorize the 
Political, Routledge, NewYork, London. 
Callon, M. & Law, J. 1997, 'After the individual and Society: Lessons on Collectivity 
from Science, Technology and Society, The Canadian Journal of Sociology, 
vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 165-182. 
Cannold, L. 1997, '"There is no evidence to Suggest ... ": Changing the Way we Judge 
Information for Disclosure in the Informed Consent Process', Hypatia, vol.12, 
no.2, pp.165-184. 
Carnall, D., Karcher, H., Sheldon, T., Lie, L., Spurgeon, D. & Josefson, D., 1995, 
Third Generation Oral Contraceptives - The Controversy', British Medical 
Journal, vol.311, pp.1589-1590. 
Cartwright, S. 1988, The Report on the Committee of Inquiry into Allegations 
Concerning the Treatment of Cervical Cancer at National Women's Hospital 
and into other Related Matters, Government Printing Office, Auckland. 
Castel, R. 1991, 'From Dangerousness to Risk', in The Foucault Effect: Studies in 
Govemmentality, (eds) G. Burchell & P. Miller, University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago. 
Collins, D. 1992, Medical Law in New Zealand, Brooker and Friend Ltd, Wellington. 
Coney, S. 1987, 'Behind the News: The Pill/The IUD', Broadsheet: New Zealand's 
Feminist Magazine, March, pp. 6-7. 
Coney, S. & Bunkie, P. 1987, 'An Unfortunate Experiment At National Women's' 
Metro, vol. 7., no. 72., pp. 46-68. 
Coney, S. 1988, The Unfortunate Experiment, Penguin, Auckland. 
Cook, J. A. & Fonow, M. M. 1986, 'Knowledge and Women's Interests: Issues of 
Epistemology and Methodology', Sociological Inquiry, vol. 56, no.1, pp.2-29. 
Cotterill, P. 1992, 'Interviewing Women: Issues of Friendship, Vulnerability and 
Power', Women's Studies Int Forum, vol. 15, nos. 5/6, pp.593-606. 
Coulter, A. 1985, 'Decision-Making and the Pill: The Consumer's View', The British 
Journal of Family Planning, vol. 11, pp. 98-103. 
Curnow, A. 1974, Collected Poems 1933-1973, Reed, Wellirigton. 
Daly, M. 1978, Gyn/ Ecology: The Metaethics of Radical Feminism, Beacon Press, 
Boston. 
Darling-Wolf, F. 1997, 'Framing the Breast Implant Controversy: A Feminist 
Critique', Journal of Communication Inquiry, vol. 21, no. 1, pp. 77-97. 
Davies, B. 1992, 'Women's Subjectivity and Feminist Stories', in Investigating 
132 
Subjectivity:Research on Lived Experience, (eds) C. Ellis & M. G. Flaherty, 
Sage, London, New Delhi, Newbury Park. 
Davies, B. 1997, The Subject of Post-structuralism: A Reply to Alison Jones', 
Gender and Education, vol. 9, no.3, pp.271-283. 
Davis, P. 1992, For Health of Profit? Medicine, The Pharmaceutical Industry, and 
the State in New Zealand, Oxford Universi1y Press, Oxford. 
Denning, G. 1994, The Theatricali1y of Being Observed: Eighteenth-Century Europe 
"Discovers" the ? Century Pacific', :in Implicit Understandings: Observing, 
Reporting, and Reflecting on the Encounters Between Europeans and Other 
Peoples in the Early Modem Era, (ed) S. B. Schwartz, Cambridge Uni.versify 
Press, Cambridge. 
Denzin, N. K. & Lincoln, Y. S. (eds) 1994, Handbook of Qualitative Research, Sage, 
London. 
Denzin, N. K. 1997, Interpretive Ethnography: Ethnographic Practices for the 21st 
Century, Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA. 
Derrida, J. 1976, Of Grammatology, Johns Hopkins Universi1y Press, Baltimore. 
Derrida, J. & Caputo, J.P. 1997, Deconstruction in a Nutshell: A Conversation with 
Jacques Derrida, Fordham Universi1y press, New York. 
Djerassi, C. 1979, The Politics of Contraception, W.W. Norton and Company, New 
York and London. 
Douglas, M. 1990, 'Risk as a Forensic Resource', Daedalus, vol.119, no.4, pp.1-16. 
Douglas, M. 1992, Risk and Blame: Essays in Cultural Theory, Routledge, London. 
Dreyfus, H.& Rabinow, P. (eds) 1982, M. Foucault Beyond Structuralism and 
Hermeneutics, Universi1y of Chicago, Chicago. 
Du Bois, W.E.B. 1969, The Souls of Black Folk, Signet, NewYork. 
Dugdale, A. 1999, 'Materiali1y: Juggling Sameness and Difference', in Actor Network 
Theory and.After, (eds) J. Law&J. Hassard, Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 113-135. 
Duncan, S. 1996, The Mirror Tells the Tale: Constructions of Gender in Criminal 
Law', in Feminist Perspectives in the Foundational Subjects of Law, ( ed) A 
Bottomley, Cavendish Publishing, London, pp. 173-89. 
Du Plessis, R., Higgins, J. & Mortlock, B. 2000, 'Narratives, Community 
Organisations and Pedagogy', Unpublished paper presented at ISA Biography 
and Socie1y Conference, Tavistock Centre, London. 
Edwards, R. G. & Cohen, J. (eds) 2000, Human Reproduction Update. Reproductive 
Choices in 2000: The Relative Safety of Current Oral Contraceptives, vol.5, 
no.6, November/December 1999, Oxford Universi1y Press, Oxford. 
Egermayer, P. & Roke, C. 2000, 'OCs and the Risk of Thrombosis', New Ethicals 
Journal, January, pp. 49-55. 
Fanner, R., Newson, R., MacRae, K., Lawrenson, R. & Tyrer, F. 1997, 'Mortality from 
Venous Thromboembolism Among Young Women in Europe: No Evidence for 
any Effect of Third Generation Oral Contraceptives, Journal of Epidemiology 
133 
and Community Health, vol. 51, pp. 630-635. 
Firestone, S. 1973, The Dialectic of Sex -A Case for Feminist Revolution, Paladin, 
Herts, St Alban. 
Flax, J. 1992, The End of Innocence', in Feminists Theorize the Political, (eds) J. 
Butler & J. W. Scott, Routledge, New York and London. 
Flax, J. 1993, Disputed Subjects: Essays on Psycfwanalysis, Politics and Philosophy, 
Routledge, New York and London. 
Fleming, D. 2000, 'Could Taking the Pill Kill?', New Zealand Woman's Weekl.y, 3 
July, pp.20. 21. 
Foucault, M. (trans. Sheridan, A) 1972, The Archaeology of Knowledge, Pantheon 
Books, NewYork. 
Foucault, M. 1988, Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interoiews and Other Writings 1977 
1984, (ed) L. D. Kritzman, Routledge, New York and London. 
Foucault, M. (trans. Sheridan, A) 1977, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the 
Prison, Vintage Books, New York. 
Foucualt, M. (trans. Sawyer, L) 1982, The Subject and Power', in Beyond 
Structuralism and Hermeneutics, (eds) H. L. Dreyfuss and P. Rabinow, 
Harvester Press, Brighton. 
Foucault, M. 1988, Technologies of the Self, (eds) L. H. Martin, H. Gutman & P.H. 
Hutton, University of Massachusetts Press, Amherst. 
Foucault, M. (trans. Hurley, R) 1990, The History of Se,cuality, Volume One: An 
Introduction, Vintage, NewYork. 
Foucault, M. 1991, 'Govemmentality', in The Foucault Effect: Studies in 
Govern.mentality, {eds) G. Burchell & P. Miller, University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago. 
Frances, R. 1995, 'Experts Consider Risks of the Pill', The Dominion, 25 October, 
p.3. 
Frank, A. W. 1995, The Wounded Storyteller: Body, mness, and Ethics, University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago and London. 
Gabe, J. 1995, Medicine, Health and Risk: Sociological Approaches, Blackwell, 
Cambridge. 
Gabe, J. & Bucy, M. 1996, 'Risking Tranquillizer Use: Cultural and Lay Dimensions', 
in Modern Medicine: Lay Perspectives and Experienoos, (eds) S. J. Williams & 
M. Calnan, UCL Press, London. 
Gavey, N. 1989, 'Feminist Poststructuralism and Discourse Analysis: Contributions 
to Feminist Psychology', Psychology of Women Quarterly, vol.13, no.4, 
pp.459-475. 
Geertz, C. 1973, The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays, Basic Books, New 
York. 
Giddens, A. 1990, The Consequenoos of Modernity, Polity Press, Cambridge. 
134 
Giecyn, T. 1983, 'Boundary Work and the Demarcation of Science from Non-Science: 
Strains and Interests in Professional Identities of Scientists', American 
Sociological Review, vol.48., pp. 781-795. 
Giecyn, T. 1994, 'Boundaries of Science', in Handbook of Science, Technology, and 
Society, (eds) S. Jasanoff, G. Markle, J. Peterson & T. Pinch, Sage, California. 
Gifford, S. 1986, The Meaning of Lumps: A Case Study of the Ambiguities of Risk', 
in Anthropology and Epidemiology: Interdisciplinary Approaches to the Study 
of Health and Disease, (eds) C. R. James, R. Stall & S. Gifford, Dordrecht, D 
Reidel. 
Glaser, B. & Strauss, A. 1967, The Discovery of Grounded Theory, Aldine, Chicago. 
Grace, P. 1998, Baby No-Eyes, Penguin, Auckland. 
Graham, B. T. A. 1995, 'Riding Someone Else's Waka: Academic Theory and Tribal 
Identity', Meridian, vol. 14, no. 2, pp.45-63. 
Grant, E. 1985, The Bitter Pill: How Safe is the Perfect Contraceptive?, Elm Tree 
Books, Great Britain. 
Greaves, M. & Tabener, D. 1996, Thrombotic Disease', in Oxford Textbook of 
Medicine, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Greenawalt, K. 1992, Law and Objectivity, Oxford University Press, New York, 
Oxford. 
Greenlaw, L. 1997, A World Where News Travelled Slowly, Faber & Faber, London. 
Griffiths, M. 1995, Feminisms and the Self: The Web of Identity, Routledge, London 
and New York. 
Grimes, D. A. 1990, 'Breast Cancer, The Pill and the Press', in Oral Contraceptives 
and Breast Cancer: The Implications of the Present Findings for Informed 
Consent and Informed Choice, (ed) R. D. Mann, Parthenon Publishing Group, 
Carnforth. 
Hall, S. 1990, The Emergence of Cultural Studies and the Crisis of the Humanities', 
October, vol. 53, pp.11-23. 
Hammersley, M. 1999, 'Not Bricolage but Boatbuilding: Exploring two Metaphors for 
Thinking About Ethnography', Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, vol. 28, 
no. 5, pp.57 4-585. 
Haraway, D. 1989, The Biopolitics of Postmodern Bodies: Determinations of Self in 
Immune System Discourse', Differences, vol. 1., pp. 3-43. 
Haraway, D. 1991, Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature, 
Routledge, New York. 
Haraway, D. 1997, Modest Witness @Second Millennium. FemaleMan Meets 
Oncomouse: Feminism and Technoscience, Routledge, New York. 
Harding, S. 1983, Discovering Reality: Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology, 
Metaphysics,Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Simon & Schuster, New 
York. 
Harding, S. 1987, 'Is there a Feminist Method?', in Feminism and Methodology, 
135 
Milton Keynes, Bloomington. 
Hess, D. J. 1997, Science Studies: AnAdvancedlntroducti.on, New York University 
Press, New York and London. 
Roby, K. 1999, 'Blood-Clot Victim Advocates Tests Before Pill Prescribed', The Press, 
17 March, p.3. 
Hooks, B. 1992, Black Looks: Race and Representation, South End Press, Boston. 
Horrocks, R. 1983, The Invention of New Zealand', And, vol. 1, pp.9-30. 
Huff, D. 1973, How to Lie with Statistics, Victor Gollancz Limited, London. 
Irwin, A. 1995, Citizen Science: A Study of People, Expertise and Sustainable 
Development, Routledge, London and New York. 
Irwin, A. & Wynne, B. (eds) 1996, Misunderstanding Science? The Public 
Reconstructi.on of Science and Techrwlogy, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge. 
Jick, H., Jick, S., Gurewich, V., Myers, M. & Vasilakis, C. 1995, 'Risk ofldiopathic 
Cardiovascular Death and Non-Fatal Venous Thromboembolism in Women 
Using Oral Contraceptives with Differing Progestagen Contents, Lancet, vol. 
346,pp. 1589-1593. 
Johnson, S. 2000, Health Care and the Law, Brooker's, Wellington. 
Jones, A. 1997, 'Teaching Post-structuralist Feminist Theory in Education: Student 
Resistances', Gender and Education, vol. 9, no. 3, pp.261-269. 
Katovich, M.A. 1995, 'Couch the Bricoleur: Using Ethnographic and Laboratory 
Traditions to Establish Data Careers', Symbolic Interaction, vol. 18, no. 3, 
pp.283-301. 
Kendall, C. 1995, The Construction of Risk in AIDS Control Programs', in 
Conceiving Sexuality: Approaches to Sex Research in a Postmodern World, 
(eds) R. G. Parker & J. H. Gagnan, Routledge, London and New York. 
Ketting, E. 1996, 'Third Generation Oral Contraceptives: CSM's Advice will Harm 
Women's Health Worldwide', British Medical Journal, no. 312. 
Klein, R. D. 1983, 'How to do What we Want to do: Thoughts about Feminist 
Methodology', in Theories of Women's Studies, (eds) G. Bowles& R. D. Klein, 
Routledge & Keagan, London, Boston, Melbourne. 
Klein, R. 1996, '(Dead) Bodies Floating in Cyberspace: Post-modernism and the 
Dismemberment of Women', in Radically Speaking: Feminism Reclaimed, D. 
Bell & R. Klein (eds), Spinifex Press, Melbourne. 
Kondo, D. 1990, The Eye/I', in Crafting Selves, Chicago University Press, Chicago. 
Latour, B. 1987, Science inActi.on, Harvard University press, Cambridge. 
Latour, B. 1999, Pandora's Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science Studies, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge and London. 
Law, J. & Hassard, J. (eds), 1999, Actor Network Theory and After, Blackwell, 
Oxford. 
136 
Ledingham, JGC. & Weatherall, DJ. 1996, 'Pulmonary Embolism', in Oxford 
Textbook of Medicine, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Levi-Strauss, C. 1968, The Savage Mind, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London. 
Luhmann, N. 1993, Risk: A Soci.ologfoal Theory, Aldine de Gruyter, New York. 
Lupton, D. 1994, The Great Debate about Cholesterol: Medical Controversy and the 
News Media', Australia and New Zealand Journal of Sociology, vol. 30, no. 3, 
pp. 334-339. 
Lupton, D. 1999a, Risk, Routledge, London and New York. 
Lupton, D. (ed) 1999b, Risk and Soci.ocultural Theory: New Directions and 
Perspectives, Cam.bridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Lynch, M. & Woolgar, S. 1988, 'Introduction: Sociological Orientations to 
Representational Practice in Science', Human Studies, vol. 11, nos. 2-3, pp. 
99-116. 
MacKinnon, C. A. 2000, 'Points Against Postmodernism', Chicago-Kent Law Review, 
vol. 75, pp.687-711. 
Marks, L. 1999, "Not Just a Statistic: the History of USA and UK Policy over 
Thrombotic Disease and the Oral Contraceptive Pill, 1960s-1970s', Social 
Science and Medici.ne, vol. 49, pp. 1139-1155. 
Marscia-Lees, F. Sharpe, P. & Cohen, C. B. 1989, 'The Postmodern Turn in 
Anthropology: Cautions from a Feminist Perspective', Signs, vol.15, no.l, 
pp.7-33. 
Medsafe (New Zealand Medicines and Medical Devices Safety Authority, A Business 
Unit of MOH), February 1999, Oral contraceptives and Blood Clots, Medsafe, 
Wellington. 
Medsafe (New Zealand Medicines and Medical Devices Safety Authority, A Business 
Unit of the MOH), June 2000, An Update on Oral Contraceptives and Blood 
Clots, Medsafe, Wellington. 
Middleton, S. 1993, Educating Feminists: Life Histories and Pedagogy, Teacher's 
College Press, New York and London. 
Mies, M. 1983, Towards a Methodology for Feminist Research', in Theories of 
Women's Studies, (eds) G. Bowles & R. D. Klein, Routledge and Keagan, 
London, Boston, Melbourne. 
Ministry of Health (MOH), January 1999, Advice for Women about Oral 
Contraceptives: Consumer Information, MOH, Wellington. 
Miriyana, A. 1999, 'Pill Victims' Risk Factors Were Missed', Sunday Star Times, 30 
May,p.A8. 
Myers, G. F. 1979, The Art of Software Testing, Wiley, NewYork. 
Naffine, N. 1990, Law and the Sexes, Unwin Hyman, London. 
Oaks, L. 1994, 'Fetal Spirithood and Fetal Personhood: the Cultural Construction of 
Abortion in Japan', Women's Studies Int Forom, vol. 17, no. 5, pp. 511-523. 
137 
Oudshoorn, N. 1994, Beyond the Natural Body: An Archeology of Sex Hormones, 
Routledge, London and New York. 
Parker, R. G. & Gagnan, J. H. 1995, Conceiving Sexuality: Approaches to Sex 
Research in a Postmodern World, Routledge, London and New York. 
Parsons, E. & Atkinson, P. 1992, 'Lay Constructions of Genetic Risk', Sociology of 
Health and Rlness, vol. 14, no. 4, pp. 437-455. 
Pegasus Medical Group, 2000, What you should Know about the Risks of Taldng 
Oral Contraceptives, Pegasus Medical Group, Christchurch. 
Peterson, A. 1997, 'Risk, Governance and the New Public Health', in Foucault, Health 
and Medicine, (eds) A. Peterson & R. Bunton, Routledge, London and New 
York. 
Pharmac, 1996, 'Return to Monthly Dispensing', Pharmac, Wellington. 
Pharmac, 1998, 'New Zealand Pharmaceutical Schedule', Pharmac, Wellington. 
Pharmac [online] http:!Avww.pharmac.govt.nz [2001, November 5]. 
Phillimore, P. & Moffatt, S. 1994, 'Discounted Knowledge: Local Experience, 
Environmental Pollution and Health', in Researching the People's Health, 
(eds) J. Popay & G. Williams, Routledge, London and New York. 
Pihama, L. 1988, 'No, I will not be a Post. . .', Te Pua 2, Te Puawaitangi., Whare 
Wananga o Tamaki Makaurau, pp. 35-37. 
Pool, I. 1999, New Zealand's Contraceptive Revolutions, Universify of Waikato, 
Hamilton. 
Powers, A. 1999, 'Newspaper Coverage of the Breast Implant Controversy', Women 
and Health, vol. 30, no. 2, pp. 83-98. 
Preston, L. 1996, 'Women and Alcohol: Defining the Problem and Seeking Help', 
International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy, vol. 16, no. 5, pp.52-72. 
Price, F. 1996, 'Now You See it, Now You Don't: Mediating Science and Managing 
Uncertainfy in Reproductive Medicine', in Misunderstanding Science? The 
Public Reconstructi.on of Science and Technology, (eds) A. Irwin & B. Wynne, 
Cambridge Universi.fy Press, Cambridge. 
Ribbens, J. 1989, 'Interviewing-An Unnatural Situation?', Women's Studies Int 
Forum, vol. 12, no. 6, pp.579-592. 
Rohrmann, B. 1996, Perception and Evaluation of Risks: Findings for New Zealand 
and Cross-Cultural Camparisons, Lincoln University, Lincoln. 
Rorty, A. 0. 1995, The Science of the Humane and the flumanism of Science', 
Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry, vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 217-223. 
Safer, D. Krager, J. 1992, 'Effect of a Media Blitz and a Threatened Lawsuit on 
Stimulant Treatment', Journal of American Medical Association, vol. 268, no. 
8, p. 1004. 
Sartwell, P. & Stolley, P. 1982, 'Oral Contraceptives and Vascular Disease', 
Epidemiological Reviews, vol.4, pp.95-109. 
138 
Saussure, F. Course in General Linguistics, McGraw Hill, New York. 
Scott, J. W. 1992, 'Experience', in Feminists Theorize the Political, (eds) J. Butler & 
J. W. Scott, Routledge, London and New York. 
Seaman, B. 1969, The Doctor's Case Against the Pill, Hunter House, Alameda, CA. 
Sheldon, S. & Thomson, M. 1998, Feminist Perspectives on Health Care Law, 
Cavendish, London, Sydney. 
Shildrick, M. & Price, J. 1996, 'Breaking the Boundaries of the Broken Body', Body 
and Society, vol.2, no.4, pp.93-113. 
Shildrick, M. 1997, Leaky Bodies and Boundaries: Feminism, Postmodernism and 
(Bio)Ethics, Routledge, London and New York. 
Shilling, C. 1992, The Body and Social Theory, Sage, London. 
Singer, L. 1992, 'Feminism. and Post:m.odernism.', in Feminists Theorb.e the Political, 
(eds) J. Butler& J. W. Scott, Routledge, London and New York. 
Singleton, V. & Michael, M. 1993, 'Actor-Networks and Ambivalence: General 
Practitioners in the UK Cervical Screening Programme', Social Studies of 
Science, vol. 23, pp.227-64. 
Smail, S., Muir Gray, J. & Tilden, E. 1984, Every Woman's Medical Guide: To Help 
You Understand and Care for your Body, Octopus Books, London. 
Smyth, H. 2000, Rocldng the Cradle: Contraception, Sex and Politics in New Zealand, 
Steele Roberts Ltd, Wellington. 
Somers, M. 1994, The Narrative Constitution ofldentity: A Relational and Network 
Analysis', Theory and Society, vol.23, no.5, pp.605-649. 
Spirer, H.F. 1987, Misused Statistics: Straight Talk/or Twisted Numbers, Marcel 
Dekker Inc, New York. 
Spitzer, W. 0., Lewis, M.A., Heinemann, L., Thorogood, M. & MacRae, K. 1996, 
Third Generation Oral Contraceptives and Risk of Venous Thromboembolic 
Disorders: An International Case Control Study', British Medical Journal, vol. 
312, pp. 83-88. 
Spitzer, W. 0. 1997, The 1995 Pill Scare Revisited: Anatomy of a Non-Epidemic', 
Human Reproduction, vol. 12, pp. 2347-57. 
Spivak, G. C. 1993, Outside in the Teaching Machine, Routledge, New York. 
Spivak, G. C. 1999, A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Towards a History of the 
Vanishing Present, Harvard University Press, Cambridge. 
Spretnak, C. 1996, The Disembodied Worldview ofDecotistructive Post-Modernism', 
in Radically Speaking: Feminism Reclaimed, D. Bell & R. Klein (eds), Spinifex, 
Melbourne. 
Stacey, M. 1994, The Power of Lay Knowledge', in Researching the People's Health, 
(eds) J. Popay& G. Williams, Routledge, London and New York. 
Stadel, B. 1981, 'Oral Contraceptives and Cardiovascular Disease', England Journal 
of Medicine, vol.305, pp.612-617. 
139 
Stanley, L. & Wise, S. 1983, 'Back into the Personal or: Our Attempt to Construct 
Feminist Research', in Theories of Women's studies, (eds) G. Bowles & R. D. 
Klein, Routledge, London and New York. 
Star, S. L. & Griesemer, J. R. 1989, 'Institutional Ecology, Translations and 
Boundary Objects: Amateurs and Professionals in Berkley's Museum of 
Vertebrate Zoology', Social studies of Science, vol. 19, pp. 387-420. 
Suleri, S. 1989, Meatless Days, Chicago University Press, Chicago. 
The Dominion, 1995, 'Ministry Says Pills Safe to Keep Taking', 27 October, p.3. 
The Jerusalem Bible, 1992, Koren Publishers Ltd, Jerusalem. 
Thompson, D. 1996, The Self-Contradiction of"Post-modernist" Feminism', in 
Radically Speaking: Feminism Reclaimed, D. Bell & R. Klein, Spinifex, 
Melbourne. 
Tolich, M. & Davidson, C. 1999, starting Fieldwork: An Introduction to Qualitative 
Research in New Zealand, Oxford University Press, Auckland, Oxford, New 
York, Melbourne. 
Townshend, P., Sellman, D. & Haines, R. 1998, The Cartwright Report Ten Years 
on: The Obligations and Rights of Health Consumers and Providers', New 
Zealand Medical Journal, 9 October, pp. 390-392. 
Treichler, P.A., Cartwright, L. & Penley, C. (eds) 1998, The Visible Woman: Imaging 
Technologies, Gender and Science, New York University Press, New York and 
London. 
Tuckett, D., Boulton, M., Olson, C. & Williams, A. (eds) 1985, Meetings Between 
Experts: An Approach to Sharing Ideas in Medical Consultations, Tavistock, 
London and New York. 
Turkle, S. & Papert, S. 1990, 'Epistemological Pluralism: Styles and Voices within 
the Computer Culture', Signs, vol. 16, no. 1, pp.128-157. 
Tuhiwhai Smith, L. 1999, Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous 
Peoples, Zed Books, University of Otago, London, Dunedin. 
Turner, B. S. 1995, 'Risk Society and the New Regime of Disease', in Medical Power 
and Social Knowledge, Sage, New Delhi and London. 
Usher, J.M. (ed) 1997, Body Talk: the Material and Discursive Regulation of 
Sexuality, Madness and Reproduction, Routledge, London and New York. 
Vessey, M. P. & Inman, W. H. W. 1973, 'Speculations about Mortality Trends from 
Venous Thromboembolic Disease in England and Wales and their Relation to 
the Pattern of Oral Contraceptive Usage', The Journal of Obstetrics and 
Gynaecology of the British Commonwealth, vol. 80, pp. 562-566. 
Wallace, D.R. 1986, An Overview of Computer Software Acceptance Testing, US 
Department of Commerce, Gaithersburg, MD. 
Waters, K. 1996, '(Re)Turning to the Modem: Radical Feminism and the Postmodern 
Turn', in Radically Speaking: Feminism Reclaimed, D. Bell & R. Klein (eds), 
Spinifex, Melbourne. 
140 
Wedde, I. 1995, The Tyranny of the Collection', in How to be Nowhere, Victoria 
University Press, Wellington. 
Weedon, C. 1987, Feminist Practice and Poststrncturalist Theory, Basil Blackwell, 
Oxford. 
Weinstein, D. 1991, Heavy Metal: A Cultural Sociology, Lexington, New York, Oxford. 
Weinstein, D. & Weinstein, M.A. 1991, 'Georg Simm.el: Sociological Flaneur 
Bricoleur', Theory, Culture & Society, vol. 8, pp.151-168. 
Weinstein, D. & Weinstein, M.A. 1993, 'Postmodernizing (Macro)Sociology', 
Sociological Inquiry, vol. 63, no. 2, pp.224-238. 
Whiteman, M., Cui, Y., Flaws, J., Langenberg, P. & Bush, T. 2000, 'Media Coverage 
of Hormone Replacement Therapy (HRT) and Breast Cancer: Stop the 
Presses', American Journal of Epidemiology, vol. 151, no. ill, p. 592. 
Williams, G. & Popay, J. 1994, 'Lay Knowledge and the Privilege of Experience', in 
Challenging Medicine, (eds) J. Gabe & D. Kelleher, Routledge, London and 
NewYork. 
Williams, S. J. & Bendelow, G. (eds), 1998, The Lived Body: Sociological Themes, 
Embodied Issues, Routledge, London, New York. 
Winner, L. 1986, 'Do Artifacts have Politics?' in The Whale and the Reactor: A Search 
for Limits in an Age of High Technology, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
World Health Organisation Collaborative Study of Cardiovascular Disease and 
Steriod Hormone Contraception. 1995a, 'VTE Disease and Combined Oral 
Contraceptives: Results of an International Multi-Centre Case-Control 
Study', Lancet, vol. 346, pp. 1575-1581. 
World Health Organisation Collaborative Study of Cardiovascular Disease and 
Steriod Hormone Contraception. 1995b, 'Effect of Different Progestagens in 
Low Oestrogen Oral contraceptives on Venous Thromboembolic Disease: 
Results of an International Multi-Centre Case-Control Study', Lancet, vol. 
346,pp. 1582-1588. 
Worpole, K. 1990, Total Culture', in Marxi.sm Today, Communist Party of Great 
Britain, London. 
Yeats, W. B. 1928, The Death of Synge and other Passages from an Old Diary, 
Macmillan, London. 
Yokohama, M. 1993, 'Emergence of Anti-Prostitution Law in Japan -Analysis from 
Sociology of Criminal Law', International Journal of Comparative and Applied 
Criminal Justice, vol. 17, no. 2, pp. 212-218. 
Yokohama, M. 1995, 'Analysis of Prostitution in Japan', International Journal of 
Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice, vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 48-60. 
141 
CASE LAW 
Canterbury v Spence 464 F2d 772 DC [1972] 
Hall v Brooklands Auto Racing Club 1 KB 205 CA [1933] 
Rogers v Whittaker 175 479 CLR [1992] 
Salgo v Leland Stanford Uni Board of Trustees 317 P2d (Cal Dis App) [1957] 
Smith v Auckland Hospital Board 191 NZLR (CA) [1965] 
142 
APPENDIX 1 
RESEARCH ON THE CONTRACEPTIVE PILL 
Shalom! I am researching the use of oral contraceptives for my 
MA degree in sociology at the University of Canterbury. My 
research explores the ongoing controversy in the mass media 
about the third generation oral contraceptive pill in 
Aotearoa/New Zealand. It looks at different responses to this 
controversy. I am interested in talking to women who were/are 
using the third generation oral contraceptive pill. Please contact 
me if you are prepared to talk about your use of oral 
contraceptives and your responses to media debate about this 
contraceptive. 
Confidentiality is assured. This project has ethical approval 
from both the University of Canterbury and the Canterbury 
Ethics Committee. An information sheet is attached which 
provides further detail about my study. 
Thank you for taking the time to read this notice. 








1. Who is the Researcher? 
I am conducting this research as part of my MA thesis in sociology at the University of 
Canterbury. I would like to invite you to participate in my study. 
2. Research T~tle: The 1999/2000 Aotearoa/New Zealand Oral Contraceptive Pill 
Controversy: Alternative Stories 
3. What is the study about? 
The goal of this study is to explore the ongoing third generation oral contraceptive pill 
controversy that is occurring in this country. Several women have died from blood clots 
allegedly caused by the pill and others are experiencing health difficulties. Many different 
people are involved in this controversy: medical professionals, consumers, the media, the 
government, drug companies etc. I would like to hear what people in these different positions 
have to say about the pill controversy. I will also be analysing media representations of this 
controversy. 
I am particularly interested in the stories of women who were on this type of oral 
contraceptive when they heard about the health risks associated with it. Specifically, I am 
interested in talking to women who are aware of this contraceptive controversy. I am 
interested in speaking to women who consulted health providers about the pill during this 
controversy. However, I would also like to talk to women who have not consulted health 
providers about this pill controversy. 
These are some of the questions I would like to ask: 
How did you become aware of this contraceptive controversy? What were your responses to 
it? If you consulted a health provider, what were your experiences during your consultation(s) 
about the pill? Did you continue taking the third generation pill or not? Did anything 
influence your decision? What did you think of the way that the media portrayed this pill 
controversy? 
4. What is a Third Generation Oral Contraceptive? 
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The formulation of oral co~aceptives has changed since they were introduced in the early 
1960s. The hormonal content, particularly of oestrogen, has been reduced. Third generation 
pills contain the progestogens desogestrel, gestodene and norgestimate, in combination with 
oestrogen. Consequently, they are often called combined oral contraceptives. 
There are currently four main brands of combined oral contraceptives containing either the 
progestogen desogestrel or gestodene available in New Zealand. These products have the 
following brand names: Femodene, Marvelon, Mercilon and Minulet. These contraceptive 
pills were introduced into New Zealand during the 1980s. 
5. What will you have to do? 
If you agree to participate in this study, you will be asked to meet with Jenny McDonald for 
one interview which will be about one hour to one hour and thirty minutes in duration. This 
interview will take place at a time that is convenient to you. It will normally be conducted in 
private. The interview will be audio tape recorded. The interview will ask you about the 
length of time you have been on various types of oral contraception, but especially third 
generation pills. I will also ask you questions about your responses to this contraceptive 
controversy. Finally, I will talk to you about your responses to the media's treatment of this 
ongoing contraceptive pill controversy. 
6. Ethical Approval 
This study has been given ethical approval from both the University of Canterbury Human 
Ethics Committee and the Canterbury Ethics Committee. 
7. What are the participant's rights? 
Participation in this study is voluntary. If you decide not to participate, this will not affect 
your ongoing health care. 
If you agree to take part in this study, you have the right to: 
(a) decline to participate at any time without having to give a reason. If you decide to 
withdraw none of the information you have provided will be used in the study. 
Your withdrawal will also have no effect on your ongoing health care 
(b) refuse to answer any particular question. 
(c) ask any further questions about the study that occur to you. 
(d) ask for the audio tape to be turned off at any time during participation. 
(e) discuss your participation in this study with the researcher, the researcher's supervisors, 
or anyone else you choose. 
(f) ask to review your interview transcript. 
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(g) be given a summary of the study's findings when it is concluded. 
(h) provide information on the understanding that it is completely confidential to the 
researcher and that you will not be able to be identified from the reports, publications and 
seminars that are prepared from the study. 
(i) detennine the disposal of interview tapes, transcripts of interviews and any other personal 
documents made available to the researcher. 
If you have any queries or concerns regarding your rights as a participant in this study, you 
may wish to contact a Health and Disability Services Consumer Advocate, telephone (03) 377 
7501 or 0800 377 766 outside Christchurch. 
You are also welcome to contact any of the following people for further information, 
clarification or questions about this study: 
Jenny McDonald (postgraduate researcher) 389 9231 (hm) or _,;;;,rr, :5·,t,_,,;;.~,,, ,c ,,,,.~+.,,,..,. :ic.rn-
Rosemary Du Plessis (primary supervisor) 364 2878 (wk) or r ,:h,Dkssis•;0]·c:,-:ci c'.;ntc:-tE.'."'' :,c.nz 




The 1999/2000 Aotearoa/New Zealand Oral Contraceptive Pill Controversy: Alternative 
Stories · 
I have read and understood the description of the above-named project which is provided on 
the Information Sheet. My questions about the study have been answered to my satisfaction 
and I understand that I may ask further questions at anytime. 
I agree to provide information to the researcher on the understanding that confidentiality will 
be preserved and that the information will only be used for this research, seminars, 
conferences and publications arising from this research project. 
I also understand that I may withdraw from the project, including withdrawal of any 
information that I have provided, at any time. 
I agree to the researcher audio taping the interview with me. I understand that direct 
quotations from the interview may be used in reports about the study but that I will not be 
identified. The audio tape and transcripts will be destroyed when the study is concluded. I 
also understand that I have the right to ask for the audio tape to be turned off at any time 
during the interview. 
If you would like to receive a summary of the results of the study please indicate and fill out 
your postal address below. 
"I would like to receive a copy of the study' s findings" 
Delete one: YES/NO 
If yes, please fill in your postal address: 









INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR HEALTH PROVIDERS 
* QUESTIONS FOR ALL HEALTH PROVIDERS 
1. Questions for the Researcher 
Is there anything that you would like to ask me about this study? 
2. Current Third Generation Oral Contraceptive Debate 
How did you first become aware of the debate surrounding third generation oral 
contraceptives? 
What was your initial reaction(s) and response(s) to this contraceptive debate? 
Has your position on this contraceptive controversy changed? 
3. The Media 
Are you aware of the media coverage of the third generation 'pill scare' over the last 
five years? 
If so, what is your response(s) to the media's representation of this debate? 
4. Professional Opinion on Contraception 
What is your professional opinion about the third generation oral contraceptives? 
What side effects or risks do you associate with oral contraceptives? 
What side effects or risks do you associate with third generation oral contraceptives? 
What benefits do you associate with oral contraceptives? 
What benefits do you associate with third generation oral contraceptives? 
Are third generation oral contraceptives safer/the same/more dangerous than older 
products? 
According t.o your knowledge, have third generation pills ever been promoted as 
being safer than older formulations? 
How important is the safety of contraceptive methods? 
How important is the effectiveness of contraceptive methods? 
How do you assess the risk for patients associated with different contraceptive 
methods? 
5. Doctor-Patient Relationships 
Have any of your patients spoken to you about the debate surrounding the third 
generation pills? 
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Approximately how many patients have contacted you about issues relating to the 
current third generation oral contraceptive debate? 
What was discussed? 
Do your patients speak to you about their contraceptive options? 
What advice or information do you give to patients about contraception? 
What is your understanding of 'informed consent/ choice'? 
How can this be achieved in relationships with consumers of health care? 
Do you find it easy/ difficult to convey medical information, such as contraceptive 
details, to patients? 
What sort of information is available to women who are making decisions about 
contraceptive options? 
How do women get access to this information? 
Of your patients who use contraception, approximately what percentage are Maori, 
Pacific Island, Pakeha, Asian, Jewish, or other ethnic identities? 
6. Impact of Controversy 
Have you seen an increased/ decreased/ static number of patients about 
contraception in the last five years since this controversy began? 
Did any of your patients stop using third generation oral contraceptives as a result 
of this debate? 
Approximately what percentage of your patients stopped using third generation oral 
contraceptives as a response to the debate about theses pills? 
Do you have any opinion about why patients would continue or stop usage of the 
third generation pill? 
Are there any differences/similarities reflected in this contraceptive controversy as 
opposed to earlier 'pill scares'? 
7. Other 
Are there any other relevant issues/concerns that you would like to raise? 
* QUESTIONS FOR THE HEALTH ALTERNATIVES FOR WOMEN (THAW) 
How did you become involved with THAW? 
How long have you been with THAW? 
Can you tell me about THAW's approach to health care in general? 
What is THAW's position on contraceptive choices? 
How do you advertise the services provided by THAW? 
Do you need to? 
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*QUESTIONS FOR NATURAL FAMILY PLANNING (NFP) 
Can you please explain to me what NFP is? 
How did you become interested in NFP? 
How long have you been involved with NFP? 
What are the advantages and disadvantages of this contraceptive method? 
Are there any side effects or risks associated with NFP? 
How do you define the 'natural' in Natural Family Planning? 
What is the difference between natural and synthetic hormones? 
How do you 'recruit' prospective patients? 
Do you need to? 
I have noticed some of your advertisements in The Observer. 
Why do you choose to advertise in this publication? 
Do you advertise in any other publications? 
What is different about your approach to contraceptive issues? 
What is different about your approach to health care in general? 
* QUESTIONS FOR CANTERBURY COLLEGE OF NATURAL MEDICINE (CCNM) 
Can you please explain to me what natural medicine is? 
How did you become interested in natural medicine? 
How long have you been practising as a naturopath? 
Do you prescribe oral contraceptives? 
If not, who would you refer patients to? 
Why? 
How would you define natural as opposed to synthetic hormones? 
Are these appropriate labels? 
What constitutes a natural contraceptive method? 
Why? 
What is different about your approach to contraception? 
What is different about your approach to health care in general? 
How do you 'recruit' prospective patients? 
Do you need to? 
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APPENDIX4 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR ORAL CONTRACEPTIVE USERS 
1. Questions for the Researcher 
Is there anything else that you would like to ask me about this research or interview? 
2. Contraceptive History 
How long have you used a third generation oral contraceptive? 
What brand (e.g. Mercilon, Marvelon, Femodene, Minulet) were/are you using? 
Have you been on any other type of oral contraceptive? 
Was a third generation pill the first type of oral contraceptive that you were prescribed? 
Why were/are you taking oral contraceptives? 
(For example, was it to prevent conception, regulate menstruation, regulate hormonal 
imbalance, reduce headaches or acne, or for any other reason.) 
Have you used any other contraceptive method, such as Natural Family Planning, IUD, 
condoms etc? 
If you changed contraceptive methods, why did you make this shift? 
What benefits/risks do you associate with different contraceptive methods? 
3. Prescription of Oral Contraceptives 
Was there any particular reason why you were prescribed a third generation oral 
contraceptive? 
Were any other contraceptive methods discussed with you? 
How did you decide what sort of contraception to use? 
Does anything influence your choice of contraception? 
Who did you seek advice from? 
Why? 
Are there any cultural and/or religious issues, that you are comfortable discussing, that are 
relevant to contraceptive choices that you make? 
Are these concerns respected and understood by members of the medical profession, family, 
friends etc? 
In your experience, is it easy or difficult to talk about oral contraception (or contraception in 
general) with: 
a) your health provider? 
b) your family? 
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c) your friends? 
d) your partner? 
4. Ongoing Debate Surrounding Third Generation Oral Contraceptives 
Are you aware of the current debate surrounding the safety of third generation oral 
contraceptives? 
If yes to the question above, how did you become aware of the controversy? 
(e.g. through family, friends, media?) 
Have you spoken to other people about the contraceptive pill during/since this controversy 
was debated in the media? 
If so, what did you talk about? 
What action, if any, did you take after you read or heard about the side effects of using this 
contraceptive? 
Why did you choose to take this action? 
Why did you choose not to take any action? 
Has your response to this controversy changed over time? 
5. Experiences with Health Providers 
Did you consult a health provider after reading or hearing about the side effects of third 
generation oral contraceptives? 
What sort of health provider did you consult? 
(For example, a naturopath, family GP, specialist, Student Health etc?) 
Why did you decide to consult this health provider? 
Why did you decide not to consult a health provider? 
Did you talk to anyone else about the contraceptive pill at this time? 
If you consulted a health provider, what were your experiences during this consultation? 
Were you satisfied/dissatisfied with the information about oral contraceptives and other 
contraceptive choices that was presented to you? 
Do you feel that you have enough information about the pill? 
How much do you think that users/consumers of the pill should know about their 
contraception? 
Did your health provider give you this document about third generation pills? 
(RESEARCHER SHOW DOCUMENT TOP ARTICIP ANT) 
Did you read it? 
Why/Why not? 
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Did your response to the controversy change after your consultation with this health provider 
about third generation contraceptive pills? 
6. Media's Representation of Controversy 
Do you think that the media provided useful information about the third generation pill? 
Some media reports suggest that abortion rates rise after 'pill scares'. What do you think 
about this? 
7. Side Effects and/or Benefits of Oral Contraceptives? 
Have you had any side effects, either "minor" or "major", from using the pill? 
(Minor side effects include headaches and dizzy feelings; whereas major side effects include 
blood clots.) 
If so, how do you feel about this? 
Did you consider third generation oral contraceptives to be safer/the same/or more dangerous 
than older types of oral contraceptives? 
Is the safety (e.g. minimal side effects) or effectiveness (e.g. how well it prevents conception) 
of a contraceptive method more important to you? 
In your experience, what are the benefits of using oral contraceptives? 
Do you think that you are a "responsible" user of contraception? 
Has your health provider helped you to choose among different forms of contraception? 
Has being on the pill made any significant changes to your life? 
8. Extras? 
Do you have any other thoughts/concerns/issues that you would like to raise? 
Is there anything that you would like to ask me about my experiences on the pill? 
Is there anything that you would like to comment on about the interview? 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH!! 
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APPENDIX4 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR MEDICAL LAW SPECIALIST 
I. Questions for the Researcher 
Is there anything that you would like to ask me about my study? 
2. Background 
Why did you become interested in medical law issues? 
Do you mainly represent health consumers or health professionals? 
How would you explain this? 
In your experience, what are health consumers' expectations about and understandings of 
their rights? 
In your experience, have health consumers been proactive about medico legal issues or not? 
Are medical legal issues in New Zealand different from other countries? 
If so, why do you think this is? 
3. Current Third Generation Oral Contracq,tive Debate 
Are you aware of the ongoing debate surrounding the safety of third generation oral 
contraceptives? 
How did you become aware of this debate? 
In your opinion, what are the key medical legal issues highlighted by this contraceptive 
controversy? 
4. Legislative Codes 
What are the principal legislative codes (i.e. Acts, regulations, ethical standards etc) that 
pertain to medico legal issues? 
What are the principal legislative codes that pertain to reproductive rights? 
Have there been any reported cases in this area in New Zealand? 
How authoritative is the Cartwright Inquiry decision? 
Are any of the Cartwright Inquiry findings relevant to the current oral contraceptive debate? 
5. Rights 
How do you define a "right"? 
What constitutes reproductive rights? 
What are patients' rights during consultations with health providers? 
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What are the legal rights of patients with respect to the health risks associated with the 
prescription of contraceptives? 
What are health providers' rights during consultations with patients? 
What are health providers' responsibilities during consultations with patients? 
Do patients have any right to claim damages from phannaceutical companies? 
Is it possible for the courts to reconcile universal human rights with some religious laws 
which regulate women's contraceptive choices? 
6. Informed Consent and Informed Choice 
What is your understanding of the concept 'informed consent'? 
Do you think that this concept is realistic and/or attainable? 
How much information are health professionals required to disclose to patients? 
In what ways are health providers required to disclose such information? 
(For example, is a pamphlet satisfactory?) 
To what extent are health professionals required to canvass the side effects and risks of 
products such as third generation oral contraceptives? 
To what extent is it possible for the consumer, rather than the health provider, to make 
contraceptive choices? 
What is your understanding of the doctor-patient relationship? 
Is there are legal concept called 'informed choice'? 
If so, how would you define this concept? 
What does informed choice involve? 
How is it different from and/or similar to informed consent? 
How can informed choice be achieved in health care relationships? 
7. The 'Legal Body' 
Legal theorists have considered how the law defmes the female reproductive body and also 
the question of ownership of the body. 
How are these issues addressed in New Zealand law? 
What is your response to the adequacy of this law? 
Is the law in New Zealand explicit about rights pertaining to bodies? 
What law is relevant? 
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How is it relevant? 
8. Contraception Advertisements 
Are there any regulations which pharmaceutical companies must follow when they advertise 
oral contraceptives in medical journals? 
Is there anything else which you would like to raise? 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH!! 
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APPENDIXS 
INTERVIEW PARTICIPANT DETAILS 
• Contraceptive Consumers 
p d seu onym lge rac A B ket C ontraceptive status A ccess 
Former OC user. Responded to 
1. Emily 20-30 Currently uses notice placed at 
condoms. Plans to THAW. 
learnNFP. 
2. Anne-Maree 20-30 Used OCs prior to Contacted through 
and during 3GOC 'snowballing'. 
controversy. 
Currently an OC 
user. 
3. Zena 20-30 Former OC user. Contacted through 
Currently uses a representative 
NFP. associated with a 
NFP or~anisation. 
4. Marion 20-30 Used OCs prior to Contacted through 
and during 3GOC 'snowballing'. 
controversy. 
Currently an OC 
user. 
5. Phillipa 20-30 Used condoms for Contacted through 
5/6 years. a representative 
Used OCs prior to associated with 
and during 3GOC Canterbury College 
controversy. ofNatural 
Currently an OC Medicine. 
user. 
6. Sarah 30-40 Previous, long-term Responded to 
OC user. newspaper notice. 
Currently uses 
NFP. 
7. Jacqueline 40-50 Previous OC user. Contacted through 
Currently uses a representative of 
NFP. a health 
or~anisation. 
8. Ginny 20-30 Previous OC user. Responded to 




9. Janet 30-40 OC user prior to Responded to 
and during 3GOC notice placed at 
controversy. Christchurch 
Currentlv OC user. School of Medicine. 
10. Heidi 20-30 OC user prior to Contacted through 
and during OC 'snowballing'. 
controversy. 
Currentlv OC user. 
11. Ellen 20-30 Previous OC user. Contacted through 
Currently 'snowballing'. 
dia:ohrwmi user. 
• Health Providers 
Name or Pseudonym Age Bracket 
1. Margaret Kyle 20-30 
2. Cindy 30-40 
Carmichael 
3. Peter Kearns 50 and above 
4. Judith Sim 40-50 
5. Rosemary 40-50 
Reid 
6. Luxi 30-40 
(pseudonym) 
7. Doctor X 50 and above 
(pseudonym) 
• Medical Law Specialist 
1. Antonia Fisher 
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Health Care Position Access 
Midwife Contacted through 
'snowballing'. 
THAW employee. Letter to THAW. 
Remstered nurse. 
Co-Director of Letter to 
Canterbury College Canterbury College 
of Natural of Natural 
Medicine and Medicine. 
naturopath. 
NFP practitioner Letter and phone 
and teacher. call to her NFP 
practice. 
Doctor at a Responded to a 
Christchurch notice placed at a 
Hospital. Christchurch 
hospital. 




Doctor at a Responded to 
Christchurch notice placed at a 
Hospital. Christchurch 
hospital. 
Age Bracket Access 




PARTICIPANTS' DEMOGRAPHIC FORM 
1. Please indicate your age bracket by circling a category below: 




50 and above 
2. How would you describe your ethnicity? 
3. Do you identify with a particular religious group? 
If yes, how would you describe your religion? 
4. What is your principal occupation? 
5. What is your highest educational qualification? 
6. Do you have any other training or expertise? 
7. Would you like to tell me anything else about yourself that you think is relevant for this 
study? 
*** Thank you very much for participating in this study! 
June 2000 
An Update on Oral 
Contraceptives 
and Blood ·clots 
M<=DS/i\F<E 
NEW ZEALAND MEDICINES 
AND MEDICAL DEVICES 
SAFETY AUTHORITY 
A aUSIN!:15 UNIT OF TH!: MINISTRY OP H • ALTH 
Before prescribing a contraceptive, your doctor is required to discuss the options with you and to explain 
the risks and benefits. Your doctor will rusu need to check whether you have any risk factors that would 
. -
prevent you trom using an oral contraceptive ('the Pill') or increase your risk of having a blood clot or 
other side effect. All benefits and risks need to be considered when deciding which contraceptive is best 
for the individual woman. 
This informatiop is about blood clots that may, although very rarely, occur with some combined oral 
' contraceptives. 
What is a blood clot? 
The blood clots associated with oral contraceptives occur in the veins of the legs and cause a blockage. 
They may cause death when pieces of the clot dislodge and travel to the lungs, but this happens rarely. 
(These blood clots are not those that may occur with your period.) 
How often do blood clots occur with oral contraceptives? 
Blood clots occur rarely with oral contraceptives, and deaths from blood clots are even more rare. 
The risk of having a blood clot depends on a number of factors. It increases with age and is also affected 
by which pill is taken. For every 100,000 women taking the pill for a year, approximately 35 will develop 
a blood clot. One woman will die as a result of the blood clot. Compared to women not taking the pill, 
the odds of having a blood clot increase by 3-4 times for those on second generation pills and 6-8 times 
for those on third generation pills. Women using progestogen-only pills are thought to be at little or no 
increased risk of blood clots. 
The following table lists the types of oral contraceptives available in New Zealand. 
How often are blood clots fatal? 
Of those y.,ho get a blood clot, about 3% will die. Given the wide use of oral contraceptives, two deaths 
a year from blood clots would be expected in New Zealand. 
Frnm 1990 -1999, 20 women using oral contraceptives died in New Zealand of a blood clot on the lungs. 
Of those who died 12 were using third gene:.ation pills. The risk or death with second generanon pws 1s. 
10wer but still present. 
What increases the risk of blood clots? 
· Some of the risk factors for blood clots are a previous blood clot, a close family member who has had a 
blood_ clot, being overweight, cancer, recent surgery, being immobilised and bad varicose veins Women 
·who have had a previous blood clot should not take a contraceptive pill containing oestrogen. You should 
tell your doctor if any of these risk factors apply to you. 
Your risk of having a blood clot can be increased temporarily, for example by a long flight, being 
immobilised by injury or illness, or by having surgery. 
What are the symptoms and what should I do about them? 
The symptoms of a blood clot in the leg are swelling, tenderness and pain, but a blood. clot may occur 
without symptoms. Breathlessness and sharp chest pain can occur with a blood clot on the lungs. These 
symptoms can also occur for other reasons. 
If you are taking an oral contraceptive pill and you develop any of these symptoms you should see a doctor 
immediately. You should be particularly alert to these symptoms if you have a risk factor for blood clots. 
Your doctor may refer you to hospital for tests and treatment with blood-thinning medication. Treatment 
may last for several months and some women may have ongoing problems such as pain or swelling. 
Who should I discuss this information with? 
You should discuss your risk of blood clots with you JOcto1 There are a number of different types of 
contraceptives ava11ao1e, mcmctmg non-hormonal barrier methods e.g. condoms. You should discuss with 
your doctor which type is likely to suit you best. You ~ave a right to expect J~UJ doctor to explain ~is 
information in a way that you c.an understan_d. 
Remember that blood clots are rare events in h~althy women taking the contraceptive pill. Serious 
consequences are even more unlikely to occur. Your risk will be reduced even further if you see a doctor 
immediately if you get any symptom of a possible blood clot. 
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and Blood Clots 
M<EDSfa\F<: 
NEW ZEALAND MEDICINES 
AND MEDICAL DEVICES 
SAFETY AUTHORITY 
A aus1NESS UNIT OF THE MINISTRY OF I-I EAL TH 
Before prescribing a contraceptive, your doctor is required to discuss the options with you and to 
explain the risks and benefits. Your doctor will also need to check whether you have any risk factors 
that would prevent you from using an oral contraceptive ('the Pill') or increase your risk of having 
')lood clot or other side effect. All benefits and risks need to be considered when deciding which 
contraceptive is best for the individual woman. 
This leaflet is designed to give you information about blood clots that may occur with some oral 
contraceptives. 
What is a blood clot? 
The blood clots associated with oral contraceptives occur in the veins of the legs and cause a blockage. 
They may cause death when pieces of the clot dislodge and travel to the lungs, but this happens rarely. 
(These blood clots are not those that may occur with your period.) 
How often do blood clots occur with oral contraceptives? 
Blood clots occur rarely with oral contraceptives, and deaths from blood clots are even more rare. 
The risk of a normal healthy woman developing a blood clot in one year is 1 in 30,000. The risk of 
1- i'>od clots is increased by pregnancy. Taking oral contraceptives containing oestrogens also increases 
Lue risk of blood clots, but not as much as being pregnant. The risk depends on the _type of oral 
contraceptive (see table). 
· Thifd-generatiori.,J;;5· .. '":S1- . 
·· ·Pil_ls·containi~gjh~.~rq'·_ 
·desogestrel-01\gestoden 
· I in I 0,000 woril~n · . 
(3 ti~es the normal risk) 
I in I 0;000 women 
·(3 times .the norm.a.I risk) . · · · 
How often are blood clots fatal? 
Of those who get a blood clot, 1-2% will die. Onto u.;;ai:h in about two years would be expected in 
New Zealand women using oral contraceptives. 
•' 
Up to the end of 1998, at least seven women using oral contraceptives died in New Zealand of a blood 
clot on the lungs. Five of these deaths occurred in 1997 and 1998. All of those who died were using 
third generation pills, the first of which became available in 1982. The reason for the higher than 
expected number of deaths in the recent years is unclear. Sometimes natural fluctuations can cause 
unexp_ectedly high or low numbers of events. 
What increases the risk of blood clots? 
Some of the risk factors for blood clots are a previous blood clot, a close family member who has 
had a blood clot, bad varicose veins, being overweight, cancer, recent surgery and being immobilised. 
Women who have had a previous blood clot should not take a contraceptive pill containing oestrogen. 
You should tell your doctor if any of these risk factors apply to you. 
Your risk of having a blood clot can be increased temporarily, for example by a long flight, being 
immobilised by injury or illness, or by having surgery. 
What are the symptoms and what should I do about them? 
The symptoms of a blood clot in the leg are swelling, tenderness and pain, but a blood clot may occur 
without symptoms. Breathlessness occurs with a blood clot on the lungs. These symptoms can also 
occur for other reasons. 
If you are taking an oral contraceptive pill and you develop any of these symptoms you should see 
a doctor immediately. You should be particularly alert to these symptoms if you have a risk factor 
for blood clots. 
Treatment for blood clots in the legs or lungs is straightforward. 
Who can I discuss this information with? 
You should discuss your risk of blood clots with your doctor. You have a right to expect your doctor 
to explain the risks and symptoms to you in a way that you can understand. 
Remember that blood clots are rare events in healthy women taking the contraceptive pill. Serious 
consequences are even more unlikely to occur. Your risk will be reduced even further if you1 see a · 
doctor immediately if you get any symptom of a possible blood clot. 
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{Updated January 1999) 
ADVICE FOR WOI\.1EN ABOUT ORAL CONTRACEPTIVES 
Consumer Information 
This leaflet is for women taking, or thinking of talcing, oral contraceptives ("The 
Pill"). 
Recent studies have shown some oral contraceptives have a higher risk of blood 
clots than others. Because of these studies the Ministry of Health has sent new 
advice to doctors about oral contraceptives. 
Women need to talk to their doctor about whether they are taking the pill that is best 
. for them, next time they renew their prescription. • Meanwhile women should 
continue taking the same pill to prevent pregnancy. 
Types of oral contraceptives 
Most New Zealand women on oral contraceptives take a combined pill containing 
an oestrogen plus a progestogen. Most of these women use the oral contraceptives 
containing the progestogens called desogestrel or gestodene. These oral 
contraceptives have the brand names Femodene, Marvelon, Mercilon and_ Minulet. 
The other commonly prescribed combined contraceptives are the pills containing the 
progestogens levonorgestrel or norethisterone. These haye the brand names 
Brevinor, Microgynon, Nordette, Synphasic, Triphasil and Triquilar.- There are 
also other combined pills. · 
Some women take a contraceptive containing only a progestogen. These have no 
increased risk of blood clots. 
Benefits and risks 
Each kind of pill has benefits and risks. A woman may find that one pill is better 
for her than another. 
• All oral contraceptives if taken correctly are very effective in preventing 
pregnancy. 
· • The pills containing desogestrel or gestodene have a high(?r risk. of blood 
clots than some o~er pills. 
• A woman may find that she feels better or has less side effects while taldng 
one 1dnd of pill than another. 
• The pills containing desogestrel or gestodene possibly reduce the risk of 
heart attack and stroke. 
Contraceptive pills cause a small increase in the risk of breast cancer. 
• Contraceptive pills reduce the risk of cancer of the ovaries and womb, pelvic 
infection and lumpy breasts. 
Risk of blood clots 
Most oral contraceptives increase the risk of a woman developing a blood clot. But 
t.µe risk is very small. Pregnancy also increases the risk of developing a blood clot. 
Some women have a higher personal risk of blood -clots than others. Some of the 
risk factors are a previous blood clot, a close family member who has had a blood 
clot, bad varicose veins, being overweight, cancer, surgery and being confined to a 
wheelchair. 
Without the use of oral contraceptives, approximately 1 healthy (non-pregnant) 
young woman in 30,000 per year will develop a blood clot. 
From the recent studies the risk of blood clots for women using the oral 
contraceptives containing desogestrel or gestodene is 2 in 10,000 per year. The risk 
~ith most oral contraceptives that do not contain desogestrel or gestodene is around 
1 in 10,000 per year. 
In pregnancy the risk of blood clots is 6 in 10,000 per year. This risk is three times 
greater than the greatest risk with the combined oral contraceptives. 
Almost all women who develop a blood clot will recover completely after treatment. 
Informed choice 
Before being prescribed a contraceptive, women should ask their doctor to explain 
the benefits and risks for them. The doctor will need to -ask about the woman's 
health to check whether she has any risk factors before advising her which 
contraceptive she could use. Then the woman and her doctor will be able to choose 
the best contraceptive for her. 
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What you should know about .the risks of 
taking oral contraceptives. 
This leaflet ts for all women t.aking, or thinking of ~-~Ing oral contraceptives ("The Pill"). 
Studies have shown that some oral contraceptives have a higher risk of .causing blood clots than 
others. You should talk to your doctor about what oral contraceptive is best for you, however 
in the ~eantlme.conanue taru, ,y your pill to prevent pregnancy. ' 
There are three types of oral contraceptives available in New Zealand. . 
1._ Those containing oestrogen and a progestogen called desogestrel or gestodeAe e.g. 
Fe~odene, Marvelon, Mercllon and Minulet. 
2. Those containing oestrogen and a progestogen called levonorgestrel or norethlsterone e.g. 
Brevinor, Microgynon, Synphasic, Tlphasll and Trlqullar. 
3. Progestogen only contraceptives (mini pill). This type of oral contraceptive does not cause 
an Increased risk of blood clots. 
Each type of pill has risks and benefits. You may find that one pill suits you better than 
another. 
Risk of blood clots 
Most oral contracepttves increase the risks of developing a blood clot, however, this risk is very 
small. The pills containing desogestrel or gestodene carry a slightly higher risk of causing blood 
dots than some other pills, however they may reduce the risk of heart attack and stroke. 
Without the use of oral contraceptives, approximately 1 healthy (non pregnant) young wornan 
in 30,000 per year will develop ·a blood clot. 
The risk for women who take oral contraceptives that do not contain desogestrel or gesttx:lene · 
is 1 in 10,000 per year. 
The risk for women who take oral contraceptives that contain desogestrel or gestoclene has 
been shown In studies to be 2 in 10,000 per year. 
During pregnancy the risk of blood clots is 6 In 10,000 per year. This risk Is three-times greater 
than the greatest risk with the combined oral contraceptives. 
Almost all women who develop a .blood clot will recover completely after treatment. 
Please discuss the Information In this leaflet with your doctor. Your docto_r will need ·to know If 
you have any health problems or risk factors for developing blood clots before advising on the 
best oral contraceptive for you. 
Pegasus Medical Group 
Putti,w the ~ back into hell1lhcare 
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2 (c) New Zealand Doctor 
2 (d) Healthy Options 
3. Other National Publications 
Evening Post 
'Clot Risk Caution on Some Contraceptives', Evening Post, 20 October 1995, p.1. 
'Contraceptive Study Fuels Fears', Evening Post, 21 October 1995, p.3. 
'Costs Cuts Blamed for UK's Pill Move', By Nicholas Maling, Evening Post, 23 
October 1995, p.1. 
'New Pill Cases Follow Warning', Evening Post, 24 October 1995, p.8. 
'EU Body Faults British Pill Scare', Evening Post, 30 October 1995, p.8. 
4. International Publications (not necessarily the print media) 
In 19951 there were five unpublished but important epidemiological studies that investigated 
the relationship between current oral contraceptive use and venous thromboembolic disease 
(VTE). These studies influenced the 18 October 1995 decision made by the UK Committee 
on Safety of Medicines. All five of these studies were published in medical journals by 
January 1996. The references for these studies are below: 
Lancet 
'World Health Organisation Collaborative Study of Cardiovascular Disease and Steriod 
Hormone Contraception. VTE Disease and Combined Oral Contraceptives: Results of an 
International Multicentre Case-Control Study', Lancet, 1995, 346, pp.1575-1581. 
'Risk ofldiopathic Cardiovascular Death and Nonfatal Venous Thromboembolism in Women 
using Oral Contraceptives with Differing Progestagen Components', ByH Jick, S.S. Jick, V. 
Gurewich, M. W. Myers, C. Vasilakis, Lancet, 1995, 346, pp.1589-1593. 
1 1995 is the year which is consistently cited as the third generation oral contraceptive controversy. 
This date, however, can be called into question because women started to die from VIE caused by 
third generation oral contraceptives in 1993. Indeed, oral contraceptives have been surrounded with 
controversy since they entered the market in the 1960s. The particular oral contraceptive debate, which 
is the focus of my thesis, is arguably different (although related) to older oral contraceptive 
controversies because this new 'scare' stems from different honnones which cause a different disorder 
(VIE). An important question is who decides what the start date should be for a medical controversy 
and for what purpose? 
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'Enhancement by Factor V Leiden Mutation of Risk of Deep-Vein Thrombosis Associated 
with Oral Contraceptives Containing Third-Generation Progestagen ', By KWM 
Bloemenkamp, FR Rosendaal, FM Helmexhorst, HR Buller, JP Vandenbroucke, Lancet, 
1995, 346, pp.1593-1596. 
'Population Based Study of Risk of Venous Thromboembolism Associated with Various Oral 
Contraceptives', By RDT Farmer, RA Lawrenson, CR Thompson, JG Kennedy, IR 
Hambleton, Lancet, 1997, 349, pp.83-88. 
British Medical Journal 
'Third Generation Oral Contraceptives and Risk of Venous Thromboembolic Disorders: An 
International Case-Control Study', By W. 0. Spitzer, M. A. Lewis, LAJ Thorogood, KD 
MacRae, British Medical Journal, I 996, 312, pp. 83-88. 
1. National Newspapers 
1 (a) The Press 
1 (b) The Sunday Star Times 
1 (c) TheDominion 
'Freephone Disconnected', By Frances Ross, The Dominion, 10 January 1996, p.11. 
'Abortions Rise After Pill Scare', The Dominion, 16 April 1996, p.4. 
'Birth Control Pills Safe-Australia', The Dominion, 24 July 1996, p.7. 
'Blood Clot Risk in Contraceptive Pills', The Dominion, 25 July 1996, p.3. 
2. National Magazines 
2 (a) The Listener 
2 (b) The New Zealand Woman's Weekly 
2 ( c) New Zealand Doctor 
'Low Dose Pill Still Safe Option, Experts Say', By Mary-Anne Aggett, New Zealand 
Doctor, 6 March 1996. 
1996. 
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'Mum's the Word on Contraception', By Mary-Anne Aggett, New Zealand Doctor, 1 
May 1996. 
'Phannac Yet to Decide which Pills will be Free', By Mary-Anne Aggett, New 
Zealand Doctor, 29 May 1996. 
'Pill Cleared of Late Cancer Link', By Hugh Paterson, New Zealand Doctor, 24 July 
'GPs Left in the Dark', By Louise Pemble, New Zealand Doctor, 24 July 1996. 
'Softly on the Pill', By Mary-Anne Aggett, New Zealand Doctor, 7 August 1996. 
'Small Stroke Risk with Low Dose Pill', By Mary-Anne Aggett, New Zealand 
Doctor, 21 November 1996. 
2 ( d) Healthy Options 
'Oral Contraceptives and Blood Clots', Healthy Options, August 1996, p.83. 
3. Other National Publications 
Evening Post 
'Pill Safe- Australia', Evening Post, 24 July 1996, p.13. 
4. International Publications (not necessarily media) 
1. National Newspapers 
1 (a) The Press 
1 (b) The Sunday Star Times 
'Contraceptive Pill Lawsuit Raises Concern', By Ruth Berry, Sunday Star Times, 9 
February 1997, p.5. 
1 ( c) The Dominion 
2. National Magazines 
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2 (a) The Listener 
2 (b) The New Zealand Woman's Weekly 
'Kiwi Abortions', Donna Fleming, New Zealand Woman's Weekly, 23 June 1997, 
pp.14-16. 
'The Pill: Do You Know the Risks?', Donna Fleming, New Zealand Woman's 
Weekly, 25 August 1997, pp.42-43. 
'Breast Cancer Risk Factors', New Zealand Woman's Weekly, 20 October 1997, p.66. 
2 ( c) New Zealand Doctor 
'Pill Sales Switch After Warning', By Mary-Anne Aggett, New Zealand Doctor, 19 
February 1997. 
'Free Pill Brings Change to Market', By Mary-Anne Aggett, New Zealand Doctor, 5 
March 1997. 
'Subsidised Pill Popular', By Mary-Anne Aggett, New Zealand Doctor, 14 May 
1997. 
'Anatomy of A Decision', By Mary-Anne Aggett, New Zealand Doctor, 25 June 
1997. 
2 (d) Healthy Options 
'Natural Fertility Management - What is it all About? Conscious Conception! 
Preconception Care for Both Parents! Overcoming Fertility Problems! Confident 
Contraception!' Healthy Options, March 1997, p.61. 
'Natural Family Planning: The Non-Chemical, Non-Invasive Alternative', By Annie 
Oliver, Healthy Options, September 1997, p.68. 
3. Other National Publications 
Evening Post 
'Pill-Popping Scary', Evening Post, 8 March 1997, p.6. 
Evening Standard 
'Contraceptive Pill Not Foolproof', Evening Standard, 21 October 1997, p.7. 
4. International Publications (not necessarily media) 
Family Planning Perspectives 
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'New Study Casts Doubt on the Association Between Third-Generation Pills and 
Venous Thromboembolism', By M L O'Connor, Family Planning Perspectives, 
July/August 1997, Volume 29, Issue 4, p.192. 
Modern Medicine 
'Third-Generation Oral Contraceptives are Safe for Most Women', By A N 
Poindex.ter,ModernMedicine, September 1997, Vol 65, Issue 9, p.58. 
Lancet 
'End of Line For 'Third-Generation-Pill' Controversy?', By Jan P Vandenbroucke & 
Frits R Rosendaal, Lancet, 19 April 1997, Vol 349, Issue 9059, p.1113. 
'Third-Generation Pill Warnings Were Premature', By Anne Szarewski, Lancet, 16 
August 1997, Vol 350, Issue 9076, p.497. 
'Balanced View of Risks of Oral Contraceptives', By Walter O Spitzer, Lancet, 29 
November 1997, Vol 350, Issue 9091, p.1566. 
1. National Newspapers 
1 (a) The Press 
1 (b) The Sunday Star Times 
1 ( c) The Dominion 
2. National Magazines 
2 (a) The Listener 
2 (b) The New Zealand Woman's Weekly 
2 ( c) New Zealand Doctor 
2 (d) Healthy Options 
3. Other National Publications 
The New Zealand Herald 
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'A Century of Two Halves', By Gordon McLauchlan, The New Zealand Herald, 21-
22 November 1998, p.Hl. 
4. International Publications (not necessarily media) 
Women's Health Weekly 
'Contraception', Women's Health Weekly, 2 February 1998, p.26. 
Journal of Obstetrics & Gynaecology 
'The 1995 Pill Scare and its Aftermath: Lessons Learnt', By R. K. Bhathena, Journal 
of Obstetrics and Gynaecology, May 1998, Vol 18, Issue 3, p.215. 
Lancet 
'Pregnancies and Terminations after 1995 Warning About Third-generation Oral 
Contraceptives', by Susan S. Jick, Catherine Vasilakis et al, Lancet, 9 May 1998, Vol 
351, Issue 9113, p.1404. 
'Increased Risk of Cerebral Venous Sinus Thrombosis with Third-generation Oral 
Contraceptives', By S. F. T. M. De Bruijn, J. Stam et al, Lancet, 9 May 1998, Vol 
351, Issue 9113, p.1404 
Journal of Nutritional and Environmental Medicine 
'Thrombosis and Heart Attacks with Contraceptive and Menopausal Hormones', By 
Ellen C. G. Grant, Journal of Nutritional and Environmental Medicine, June 1998, 
Vol 8, Issue 2, p.159. 
1. National Newspapers 
1 (a) The Press 
'Women Still Taking the Pill Despite Deaths', The Press (Wellington NZPA), 25 
January 1999, p.9. 
'Call not to Panic Over Pill Scare', By Katherine Hoby, The Press, 26 January 1999, 
p.6. 
'Call to Check Risk Before Taking Pill', By Kathryn McNeil, The Press, 9 February 
1999, p.3. 
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'Ministry Stands by Contraceptive Pill', By Kathryn McNeil, The Press, 2 March 
1999, p.9. 
'Concern at Pill Deaths', By Kathryn McNeil, The Press, 5 March 1999, p.2. 
'Pill Users Panic After Seven Deaths', The Press (Wellington NZPA), 8 March 1999, 
p.9. 
'Killer Clots from Pill', By Kathryn McNeil, The Press, 9 March 1999, p.13. 
'Revival in Drug-Free Sex Methods', The Press, 13 March 1999, p.35. 
'Blood Clot Victim Advocates Tests Before Pill Prescribed', By Katherine Hoby, The 
Press, 17 March 1999, p.3. 
'Pill Use Drops Off', The Press (Auckland NZPA), 20 September 1999, p.9. 
'New Doubt on Latest Birth Pills', The Press (London Reuters), 25 September 1999, 
p.16. 
'Pharmac Phases Out Contraceptive Subsidy', The Press (National Briefing NZP A), 
29 October 1999. 
1 (b) The Sunday Star Times 
'Six Die in Women's Health Scandal', By Alexander Miriyana, Sunday Star Times, 
24 January 1999, p.1. 
'Who's To Blame for Pill Deaths?', By Sandra Coney, Sunday Star Times, 24 January 
1999, p.7. 
'Robbed of his Wife', By Alexander Miriyana, Sunday Star Times, 31 January 1999, 
p.1. 
'QC Follow-Up Proves a Bitter Pill For Ministry to Swallow', By Sandra Coney, 
Sunday Star Times, 31 January 1999, p.7. 
'Doctors Lax Over Pill Advice, Says Coney', By Alexander Miriyana, Sunday Star 
Times, 1 February 1999, p.A4. 
'Free Phoneline for Pill Users', By Alexander Miriyana, Sunday Star Times, 14 
February 1999, p.A6. 
'Seventh Woman Dead in Major Pill Scandal', By Alexander Miriyana, Sunday Star 
Times, 28 February 1999, p.Al. 
'Drug Firm's Pill Figures Denied', By Alexander Miriyana, Sunday Star Times, 1 
March 1999, p.4. 
'How Many Women have to Die?', Sunday Star Times, 1 March 1999, p.10. 
'Pill Warning for GPs', By Donna Chisholm, Sunday Star Times, 14 March 1999, p.4. 
'Ads Rate Women as Bimbos, Says Pill Campaigner', By Alexander Miriyana, 
Sunday Star Times, 21 March 1999, p.7. 
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'Pill Advice Upsets Husband', By Alexander Miriyana, Sunday Star Times, 11 April 
1999, p.2. 
'Drugs Firm Tried to Stop Pill Warning', By Alexander Miriyana, Sunday Star Times, 
2 May 1999, p.Al. 
'Taking Our Pills Not a Matter of Blind Faith', By Alexander Miriyana, Sunday Star 
Times, 2 May 1999, p.8. 
'Fatal Blood Clots Missed by Doctors', By Alexander Miriyana, Sunday Star Times, 
9 May 1999, p.11. 
'Being Informed', By Dr Gill Boddy, Sunday Star Times (Wellington), 9 May 1999, 
p.12. 
'Pill Pointer', By Hannah Edwards, Sunday Star Times (Auckland), 23 May 1999, 
p.12. 
'Ministry is Dragging the Chain', By Sandra Coney, Sunday Star Times, 30 May 
1999, p.6. 
'Pill Victims' Risk Factors Were Missed: Case Notes', By Alexander Miriyana, 
Sunday Star Times, 30 May 1999, p.8. 
'Secret Plans Threaten Drug Safety', By Sandra Coney, Sunday Star Times, 6 June 
1999, p.4. 
'Group Suing Drug Companies on Pill', By Alexander Miriyana, Sunday Star Times, 
20 June 1999, p.4. 
'Who's Responsible for Pill Problem?', By Sandra Coney, Sunday Star Times, 25 
June 2000, p.C6. 
'Pill Change Rejected', Sunday Star Times, 27 June 1999, p.4. 
'Picking Up the Pieces After the Pill', By Alexander Miriyana, Sunday Star Times, 11 
July 1999, p.C5. 
'Abortion Fears Unfounded', By Alexander Miriyana, Sunday Star Times, 11 July 
1999,p.A7. 
'Third Generation Pill Use Slump', By Alexander Miriyana, Sunday Star Times, 19 
September 1999, p .13. 
1 ( c) The Dominion 
'Too Many women on third Generation Pill', The Dominion (NZPA), 25 January 
1999, p.2. 
'Discuss Pill Use Concerns - Doctor', The Dominion, 28 January 1999, p.7. 
'Debate Over Pill Not so Clear Cut', By Chris Kalderimis, The Dominion, 9 February 
1999, p.14. 
'Don't Panic Women Told', By Joanna Norris, The Dominion, 1 March 1999, p.l. 
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'Anxious Women Overload Helpline', by Cathie Bell, The Dominion, 2 March 1999, 
p.1. 
'Warnings Over the Pill Ignored Says King', By Christine Langdon and NZPA, The 
Dominion, 3 March 1999, p.1. 
'Many Likely to Stop Using Suspect Pills', By Christine Langdon, The Dominion, 4 
March 1999, p.3. 
'Pill Users Running Scared', By Christine Langdon, The Dominion, 6 March 1999, 
p.l. 
'Time to Panic', By Justin Riggir, The Dominion (Letters to Editor), 6 March 1999, 
p.18. 
'Pill Fear May Cause Pregnancy Boom', The Dominion, 12 March 1999, p.3. 
'Doctors Warned on Risk of Legal Action', The Dominion, 15 March 1999, p.3. 
'Pill Publicity Campaign', The Dominion, 19 March 1999, p.2. 
'Women Can Swap Pill-Delamere', By Cathie Beli The Dominion, 22 March 1999, 
p.2. 
'Men Cut up by Pill Scare', The Dominion, 3 April 1999, p .1. 
'Details Sought on Pill Report', The Dominion, 6 April 1999, p.3. 
'Stance on Pill Safety Backed', The Dominion, 10 April 1999, p.7. 
'Drug Firm Tried to Stop Pill Warning', The Dominion, 3 May 1999, p.3. 
'Ministry's Pill Warning Faces Investigation', By Christine Langdon, The Dominion, 
12 May 1999, p.2. 
'Two More Deaths Linked to Pill', By Bernadette Courtney, The Dominion, 26 May 
1999,p.1. 
'Contraceptive Advice Challenged Over Death', The Dominion (NZPA), 27 May 
1999, p.10. 
'Blood Clot Victim was High Risk on Pill - MP', The Dominion (NZP A), 27 May 
1999, p.10. 
'Clot Victims Should Not Have Had Pill', The Dominion (NZP A), 31 May 1999, p.3. 
'Pill Scare means Rise inAbortions', By Christine Langdon, The Dominion, 11 June 
1999, p.3. 
'Contraceptives Subsidised', The Dominion, 19 July 1999, p.3. 
'Contraceptive Pill Report Delayed', The Dominion, 17 September 1999, p.12. 
'Third Generation Pill Use Dives Since Deaths Link', The Dominion (NZP A), 20 
September 1999, p.11. 
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'New Doubts About the Pill', The Dominion (Reuter}, 25 September 1999, p.4. 
2. National Magazines 
2 (a) The Listener 
'In the Blood: The Deaths of Six Women have put third Generation Contraceptive 
Pills Under the Microscope', By Margo White, Listener, 13 February 1999, p.32. 
2 (b) The New Zealand Woman's Weekly 
'How the Pill Can Kill', By Lisa Turner, NZWW, 8 March 1999, pp.20-21. 
2 ( c) New Zealand Doctor 
'Deja vu Over Pill Story', By Barbara Fountain, New Zealand Doctor (Editorial), 3 
February 1999. 
'Link Between Pill and VTE Deaths Scrutinised', By Mary MacKinven, New Zealand 
Doctor, 3 February 1999. 
'At Issue with Pill Story', By MAH Baird, New Zealand Doctor, 3 March 1999. 
'Pill Review Due', By Mary MacKinven, New Zealand Doctor, 17 March 1999. 
'Putting 1999 Under the Media Microscope', New Zealand Doctor (Feature), 8 
December 1999. 
2 ( d) Healthy Options 
'A Bitter Pill To Swallow: The Devastating Risks of Oral Contraceptives', By 
Sherrill Sellman, Healthy Options, July 1999, pp.17-21. 
'Natural Birth Control: A Holistic Approach to Contraception', Healthy Options, July 
1999,p.23. 
3. Other National Publications 
Evening Post 
'Pill Gets the All-Clear in 25 Year Study', By Jeremy Laurance, Evening Post, 21 
January 1999, p.20. 
'Women told To talk to GPs about Pill Blood Clot Risks', By Anne-Marie Johnson, 
Evening Post, 1 March 1999, p.2. 
'GPs Told to Warn All Patients of Pill Peril', By Anne-Marie Johnson, Evening Post, 
10 March 1999, p.1. 
'Pill Advice Conflicting for Last Two Years - GPs', By Anne-Marie Johnson, 
Suzanne Green, Evening Post, 11 March 1999, p.3. 
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'Pill Deaths Spark Interest in Drug-Free Birth Control', By Anne-Marie Johnson, 
Evening Post, 12 March 1999, p.3. 
'Third Generation Pills Given OK', By Anne-Marie Johnson, Evening Post, 12 April 
1999, p.6. 
'Blood Clot Victim was on Third Generation Pill', By Bob Shaw, Evening Post, 19 
April 1999, p.1. 
'Wainui Mum Among Blood Clot Dead', Evening Post, 23 April 1999, p.2. 
'Two More Pill Users Dead - Doctor', Evening Post, 26 May 1999, p.2. 
Grace 
'Birth Control: what Next?', by Dr Roderick Mulgan, Grace, February 1999, p.108. 
'Women's Deaths Spark Abortion Boom Fears', By Gary Maryvonne, Truth, 12 
March 1999, p.4. 
North & South 
'Keep Taking the Pill', By Scott Duffton, North & South, May 1999, p.104. 
Observer 
'Natural Contraceptive Alternative', Observer, 23 August 1999, p.22. 
Daily News in Taranaki 
'Pill Risk Story Unbalanced', Daily News in Taranaki, 2 February 1999, p.6. 
Southland Times 
'Oral Contraceptives Risk is Real But Rare', By Caroline Corkill, Southland Times, 2 
February 1999, p.7. 
'Bitter Pills', Southland Times, 2 March 1999, p.6. 
'Southland Women go off the Pill', By David Cosgriff, Southland Times, 20 March 
1999, p.5. 
Evening Standard 
'Inquiries Flood in from Worried Women on the Pill', By Rachel Forde, Evening 
Standard, 3 March 1999,p.l. 
'Better Information Needed on the Pill', Evening Standard, 6 March 1999, p.8. 
SNE 
'Women Turn Off the Pill', SNE, 1 March 1999, p.9. 
Nelson Evening Mail 
'Advice on Pill Risks', Nelson Evening Mail, 10 March 1999, p.2. 
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Ministry of Health Website C::: _ .. ···:·. ·•·.•. 
'Media Release: Ministry Reinforces Advice on Third Generation Contraceptives', 25 
May 1999. 
New Zealand GP 
'OCs - Emotional Journalism?' By Dr Jennifer Martin, New Zealand GP (Letters to 
the Editor), 7 April 1999, p.13-16. 
'The Full Story ... ', By Dr Karen Poutasi, New Zealand GP (Letters to the Editor), 7 
April 1999, p.13. 
' ... Well, maybe not entirely', By Patricia Rasmussen, New Zealand GP (Letters to 
the Editor), 7 April 1999, p.13. 
• "Consumer Information,, Distributed by GPs 
'Advice for Women about Oral Contraceptives: Consumer Information', Ministry of 
Health, updated January 1999 (first published July 1996). 
'Oral Contraceptives and Blood Clots', New Zealand medicines and Medical Devices 
Safety Authority (MEDSAFE), January 1999. 
'The 7 Day Rule', Pegasus Medical Group, January 1999. 
4. International Publications (not necessarily media) 
Lancet 
'Deaths Linked to Third Generation Contraceptives', By Sandra Coney, Lancet, 30 
January 1999, Vol 353, Issue 9150, p.389. 
'Contraceptive Pill Approved in Japan', By Megan Rowling, Lancet, 12 June 1999, 
Vol 353, Issue 9169, p.2048. 
'Venous Thromboembolism Among New Users of Different Oral Contraceptives', By 
RMC Herings, J Urquhart, HGM Leufkens, Lancet, 10 July 1999, Vol 354, Issue 
9173, p.127. 
British Medical Journal 
'The Third Generation Oral Contraceptive Controversy', By Paul A O'Brien, British 
Medical Journal, 25 September 1999, Vol 319, Issue 7213, p.795. 
International Family Planning Perspectives 
'Recent Trends in Abortion Rates Worldwide', By Stanley K Henshaw, S. Singh, T 
Haas, International Family Planning Perspectives, March 1999, Vol 25, Issue 1, p.44. 
1. National Newspapers 
1 (a) The Press 
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'Health Miracles', Professor Andrew Homblow, The Press, 1 January 2000, p.27. 
'Abortions at Record Lever, The Press (Wellington NZPA), 9 June 2000, p.8. 
'Abortion Rise After Scare', By Victoria Clausen, The Press, 12 June 2000, p.6. 
'Calm Urged as Pill Deaths Totted Up', By Diana McCurdy, The Press, 17 June 
2000, p.l. 
'Call for more Money to Monitor the Pill', The Press (Wellington NZPA), 19 June 
2000,p.19. 
'Contraception Should be More Critically Prescribed', By Victoria Clausen, The 
Press, 20 June 2000, p.3. 
1 (b) The Sunday Star Times 
'Drug Companies to Testify at Pill Inquest', By Alexander Miriyana, Sunday Star 
Times, 18 June 2000, p.5. 
1 (c) The Dominion 
'Pill Deaths - Who is at Risk?', By Sarah Prestwood, The Dominion, 17 June 2000, 
p.1. 
2. National Magazines 
2 (a) The Listener 
2 (b) The New Zealand Woman's Weekly 
'Could Talcing the Pill Kill?', By Donna Fleming, New Zealand Woman's Weekly, 3 
July 2000, pp.20-21. 
2 (c) New Zealand Doctor 
2 (d) Healthy Options 
3. Other National Publications 
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Christchurch Star 
'Contraceptive Use', By W. D. Pascoe, Christchurch Star (Readers' Letters), 12 January 
2000, p.A6. 
'Rise in Abortion Rate Sad', By K OSMERS, editor Men for Equal Rights Association, 
Christchurch Star, 19 July 2000, p.A6. 
'Caution Urged Over Pill', By K ORR spokesperson Society for the Protection of the 
Unborn Child, Christchurch Star, 19 July 2000, p.A6. 
Observer 
'Contraception for the 90's', Observer, 21 February 2000, p.26. 
'Natural Family Planning: A Safe Contraceptive', Observer, 24 April 2000, p.17. 
Consumer 
'Problems with the Pill', Consumer, March 2000, Issue 390, pp. 10-11. 
'Deaths From Third Generation Oral Contraceptives'. 
* Pegasus Medical Group Consumer Information 
'What you Should Know About the Risks of Taking Oral Contraceptives', undated but 
collected from Sumner Medical Rooms on 20 June 2000. 
Metro 
• Metro has not published any articles on the third generation oral contraceptive 
debate and does not intend to at this stage (see email correspondence with Metro 
editor, 17 July 2000). 
• Listener has no "immediate plans" to publish another story on the third 
generation oral contraceptive controversy (see email correspondence with 
Listener 18 July 2000). 
4. International Publications (not necessarily media) 
Health Facts 
'Birth control Pills: Which Type is Best?', Health Facts, June 2000, Vol 25, Issue 6, p.2. 
Population Reports 
'Health Risks of Oral Contraceptives', Population Reports, Spring 2000, Vol 28, Issue 1, p.13. 
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APPENDIX9 
CHRONOLOGY OF PRINT MEDIA TEXTS ON ORAL CONTRACEPTIVES 
BEFORE 1995 
LISTED BY DATE AND PUBLICATION 
The Dominion 
'Pill Back Under Suspicion', By Nigel Hawkes, The Dominion, 14 June 1994, p.3. 
New Zealand Woman's Weekly 
'What Contraception Should I Choose?', By Leigh Parker, New Zealand Woman's Weekly, 14 
January 1991, pp. 46-47. 
The Dominion 
'Weighing up the Pill Thirty Years on', By Ann Kent, The Dominion, 16 April 1990, p.11, 
(additional reporting from 'Doctors Clash in the Big Controversy on Contraception - The Pill: 
Three New Warnings Given', The Times). 
New Zealand Woman's Weekly 
'Lowering the Pill's Risks', By Jennifer Little, New Zealand Woman's Weekly, 28 May 1990, 
pp.44-45. 
The Listener 
'Perfecting the Pill', By Peter Radetsky, Listener and TV Times, I October 1990, pp .106-107. 
182 
New Zealand Woman,s Weekly 
'Family Planning ... The Natural Way', By Rosemary Vincent, New Zealand Woman's 
Weekly, 14 December 1987, pp.42-43. 
From the release of Oral Contraceptives onto the market (1960s) to 1986 
Broadsheet canvasses many oral contraceptive, and other medical controversies, pertaining -
approximately - to the aforementioned dates. 
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APPENDIX 10 
CHRONOLOGY OF PRINT MEDIA COVERAGE OF OTHER MEDICAL AND 
ESPECIALLY CONTRACEPTIVE CONTROVERSIES 
- LISTED BY DA TE 
'An Unfortunate Experiment at National Women's Hospital', By Phillida Bunkie and Sandra 
Coney,Metro, June 1987, pp.46-65. 
'Next Stop ... A Pill For Men?', By Sandra Goodwin, New Zealand Woman's Weekly, 16 May 
1988, pp.52-53. 
1989 
'A Link Between Depo-provera and Cancer?', By Glenys Bowman, New Zealand Woman's 
Weekly, 13 November 1989, pp.32-33. 
'New Pill Could be a Cocktail of Hope', By Alan Bums, New Zealand Woman's Weekly, 13 
November 1989, p.34. 
'Profit and the Pill', By Gordon Campbell, Listener, 12 February 1990, pp 14-17. 
'Women at Risk: The Dangers of Depo-provera', By Sandra Coney, Listener, 12 November 
1990, pp.10-15. 
'The Claims Against the Copper 7', By Phillida Bunkie, Listener, 10 December 1990, pp.10-
15&108. 
'Copper 7: The Company Response', By Kay Bruno, Listener, 11 December 1990, pp.19-20. 
'Women at Risk', Listener (Letters to the Editor), 17-23 December 1990, pp.84-85. 
'An Abortion Pill for NZ Women?', By Leigh Parker, New Zealand Woman's Weekly, 21 
January 1991, pp.44-45. 
'Covering Up With Condoms', By Gordon Campbell, Listener, 23 September 1991, pp.20-23. 
'Copper 7 Users Ready to Fight', By Rosemary Vincent, New Zealand Woman's Weekly, 20 
April 1992, p.66. 
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'If Only Someone Had Warned Me', By Julie, HealthyOptions, February 1994, pp.49-50. 
'Bill's Baby: The New Health Minister May Block Abortion Drugs on Principle', By Gordon 
Campbell, Listener, January 25-311997, pp.28-30. 
'My IUD Nightmare', By Donna Fleming, New Zealand Woman's Weekly, 22 September 
1997, pp.20-21. 
1998 
'Secret Lives', By Pamela Stirling, Listener, 14-20 February 1998, pp.30-32. 
'Investigate the Body: Get the Inside Story of the Human Body from Conception to Death -
And After', By Margo White, Listener, 26 September-2 October 1998, pp.68-70. 
'A Theory of Everything', By Ben Marshall, Listener, 19 December 1998, pp.30-31. 
'Oestrogen Rising', By Noel O'Hare, Listener, 16 January 1999, p.46. 
'Seed Money: Equal Reproductive Rights for Men, Say Some Groups', By Nick Smith, 
Listener, 10 April 1999, pp.34-35. 
'Shot in the Dark', By Marianne Betts, New Zealand Woman's Weekly, 12 July 1999, p.20-
21. 
'Natural Attractions', By Noel O'Hare, Listener, 24 July 1999, pp.17-21. 
'Big E', By Aimee Lee Ball, Harpers Bazaar, August 1999, pp.154,169-170. 
'The Creative Power of Thought', By John Campbell, The Press, 1 January 2000, p.58. 
'Bishop for Contraception', The Press (Auckland NZPA), 17 April 2000, p.9. 
'Men on the Pill', By Sheryl Blythen, She Magazine, May 2000, p.111. 
'Warning Attached to New Morning After Pill', The Press (Wellington NZPA), 2 June 2000, 
p.9. 
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'Pill For 24-Hour Sex', The Press (Reuters), 12 June 2000, p.12. 
'Blueprint to Improve Women's Lot', The Press (New York Reuters), 12 June 2000, p.11. 
'Abortion Pill Gains Support: Medics Want to Offer Choice', By Ruth Laugesen, Sunday Star 
Times, 25 June 2000, p. l. 
'Abortion Pill to be Tested', The Press (Wellington Reuters), 26 June 2000, p.5. 
'Fighting for a Woman's Right to Choose', by Lin Ferguson, Sunday Star Times, 2 July 2000, 
p.CS. 
'Abortion Research Criticised', By Kathryn McNeil, The Press, 20 August 2000, p.2. 
'Contraceptive Implant', The Press (Wellington NZPA), 17 November 1999, p.6. 
